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ABSTRACT
The concept of God as it is set forth in Charles
Hartshorne's panentheism is undoubtedly influenced by the
work of Alfred North Whitehead. This is generally acknow­
ledged. What is not fully appreciated, or at least has not
been systematized, is that Whitehead's philosophy was not
radically novel, but belonged to a particular philosophical
perspective, namely British neo-realism. Whitehead's roots
in British neo-realism can be demonstrated by a comparative
study which includes contemporaries of Whitehead who also
belonged to the neo-realistic school. Such a study demon­
strates that Samuel Alexander, C . Lloyd Morgan and Whitehead
all had similar viewpoints concerning such matters as ulti­
mate reality, a theory of emergence, the dipolarity of
nature, and God. Thus, an affinity of thought in these
philosophers can be clearly seen. It is therefore the case
that Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne was not merely the
influence of one man but was also the influence of the philo­
sophical perspective to which that one man belonged, namely
British neo-realism. Consequently, Whitehead's influence on
Hartshorne resulted in an affinity of thought not only in
two men, but also in two philosophies, British neo-realism
and American panentheism. This research systematically sets
forth this affinity in these two schools of thought.
Both British neo-realism and American panentheism
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belong to the wider context of Anglo-American process philo­
sophy. This philosophical perspective is found under exam-. 
ination to be a synthesis of realism and idealism. Thus the 
British neo-realists, Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead qualify 
their realism by retaining the concept of "mind" as central 
to their cosmology. All three philosophers expound a pan- 
psychistic view of the universe. In America, Hartshorne's 
panentheism is likewise panpsychistic in viewpoint, and is 
also a synthesis of realism and idealism. The major influ­
ences on Hartshorne were Whitehead and William Ernest Hocking, 
the American idealist. Hartshorne's panentheism may then 
best be understood as a synthesis of British neo-realism 
(from Whitehead) and American idealism (from Hocking).
On the basis of the metaphysical principles of process 
philosophy, we must conclude that the God who is presented 
is finite. In conjunction with this, while the process 
concept of God allows explanation for the temporal process, 
it allows no explanation for temporal or contingent exist­
ence . While such must be regarded as a deficiency, none­
theless the process philosophers rightly remind us of the 
importance of the topic concerning the nature of God.
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To describe the twentieth century as an age in 
search of God would, no doubt, be inai^ur^ate and some­
what optimistic. Nonetheless, the current century could 
perhaps be described as an age in search of the meaning 
of "God". This quest has been and is being conducted 
not only by linguistic analysts but also by philosophers 
and philosophical theologians who are willing to concede 
not only the possibility, but also the necessity, of 
metaphysical studies. Such metaphysicians hold that 
questions concerning the existence and nature of God and 
his relationship to the world remain vital, and that to 
these questions some answer should at least be attempted.
Among those philosophers who do accept the existence 
of God, the answers concerning his nature and relation­
ship to the world vary according to the metaphysical model 
chosen as the foundation or framework upon which the con­
cept of God can be erected. In the twentieth century a 
prevailing metaphysical model has been that of evolution, 
and within this evolutionary perspective the process
philosophers and theologians have played, and continue 
to play a major role in the great debate concerning the 
nature of God, Such is particularly the case in the 
United States of America where the work of Whitehead and 
Hartshorne has attracted much attention. In Great Britain 
the process viewpoint has thus far gained relatively few 
adherents, this in spite of the fact that much of the 
background to the current discussion in process circles 
lies in early twentieth century British philosophy, speci­
fically that perspective known as neo-realism.^ Among 
these realists was Alfred North Whitehead who produced 
his major metaphysical works after taking up residency 
in the United States.
Significance and Purpose of the Study 
As a study in the history of ideas, this research 
will demonstrate the affinity of thought in American 
panentheism and the earlier British neo-realism. That 
Hartshorne, a panentheist, is indebted to Whitehead is 
admitted by all, including Hartshorne himself. What is 
generally overlooked is that Whitehead's influence on
-1 The term "neo-realism" or "new realism" is used to distinguish the realism of the early twentieth century from earlier types of realistic philosophies. See William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1 9 6 8), pp . 2 9 2-2 9 8; Dagobart D. Runes, ed., Diction­ary of Philosophy (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1 9 7 9), p. 2 0 9.
American philosophy is not just the influence of one man, 
hut rather the influence of the philosophical milieu in 
which that one man's philosophy had its roots and from 
which it developed. Whitehead himself recognized the 
similarity of his thought to that of the other British 
realists, hut the consequent affinities in American pan­
entheism and British neo-realism have not been appreciably 
recognized or at least never systematized. That the 
"ancestry" of American process thought lies in the work 
of such British neo-realists as Samuel Alexander and 
C. Lloyd Morgan is recognized by Norman Pittenger. How­
ever, Pittenger confines his very brief remarks on the 
topic to an appendix--previously in lecture form— in one 
of his books. It will be the purpose of this research 
to systematize this relationship of thought in these two 
philosophical perspectives. The methodology will be as 
follows: since Hartshorne's indebtedness to-Whitehead is 
already accepted, this study will expound Whitehead's 
thought in the particular environment of British neo­
realism. This will be accomplished by examining the meta­
physics of two other British realists, Samuel Alexander 
and C. Lloyd Morgan, and comparing their work to that of 
Whitehead. These two are chosen specifically for several
4Norman Pittenger, God in Process (London: SCM PressLtd., 1 9 6 7), p. 9 7 .
reasons. First of all, they are selected because, like 
Whitehead, they expounded a realist metaphysics, with the 
emphasis here on the word "metaphysics". Such is not the 
case with all of the British neo-realists. Some, in re­
jecting the idealist metaphysics which dominated the 
philosophical scene in Britain at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, rejected also any metaphysics and 
turned their attention to the pursuit of other matters, 
including linguistic analysis. Others, including Alex­
ander and Morgan, sought to replace the idealist meta­
physics with a realist metaphysics, still believing that 
philosophy had a significant part to play in hopefully 
supplying answers to important questions.
Secondly, Alexander and Morgan are selected for this 
study because not only did they share an interest with 
Whitehead in metaphysics, but they also had in common 
with him an interest in setting forth a concept of God 
within the context of their metaphysical realism. Thus, 
as we examine the concept of God in the writings of Alex­
ander and Morgan, we will see that Whitehead's work was 
not totally novel, representing a radical departure from 
the philosophy of his day, but was rather the outgrowth 
of a particular philosophical perspective, namely British 
neo-realism.
Thirdly, Alexander and Morgan are also chosen for
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this research because they were contemporaries of White­
head. As such, the views of all three men appearing in 
close proximity to one another demonstrate a dominant 
theme, or at least a very active one, on the British 
philosophical scene. It is not, therefore, being claimed 
that Whitehead was influenced directly or solely by Alex­
ander and Morgan; what will be shown is that all three 
men shared a common perspective, each no doubt influencing 
the other. Whitehead's direct references in his writings 
to Alexander undoubtedly show some influence which the 
latter had on Whitehead's thinking. Indeed, Alexander 
reportedly said that he felt he had "rung the bell" for 
Whitehead and conceded that Whitehead had gone beyond his 
own formulations. To Whitehead was granted the great 
privilege of becoming the "bridge" that crossed the Atlan­
tic, where his British realism took root in the American 
soil and produced philosophical fruit which greatly in­
fluenced those who followed. This influence was and is 
most clearly seen in the work of Charles Hartshorne and 
his concept of God. Thus, while Hartshorne speaks of 
others who have inspired his work, and justly so, this 
research will trace a continuity of thought from the 
British neo-realism of the nineteen twenties to the 
American panentheism of the present day.
1However, the philosophy of the American idealist, William Ernest Hocking, will be reviewed in light of his influence on Hartshorne.
Hartshorne, possibly more so than any other single 
individual, has attempted to consistently use the tenets 
of process philosophy in his concept of dipolar theism 
and the implications of that concept for God's relation­
ship to the world, such relationship being panentheistic. 
Whether consistency has been truly achieved by Hartshorne 
is a matter which requires further study and discussion.
Resume of Related Literature 
As intimated above, this research will be concerned 
primarily with the affinity of thought in British neo­
realism and Hartshorne's panentheism, particularly as he 
sets it forth in his three books entitled Reality as 
Social Process, Man's Vision of God, and The Divine 
Relativity. The background material to Hartshorne's 
thought will be taken from the following works; Space, 
Time and Deity by Samuel Alexander; Emergent Evolution 
by C. Lloyd Morgan; and Process and Reality by Alfred 
North Whitehead. The research will thus concentrate on 
an exposition of primary sources.
Definitions, Assumptions and Limitations 
Although detailed definitions will be given in the 
body of the text where necessary, it is perhaps appro­
priate at this point to comment on some of the terms 
which will be used very frequently in this thesis.
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The term "process philosophy" will be used to refer 
to that metaphysical viewpoint which, as opposed to a 
philosophy of substance, emphasises "becoming" rather 
than "being" and stresses that ultimate reality, rather 
than being static is in a state of flux or dynamic pro­
cess. This process is "social" in the sense that it is 
brought about by inter-relationships among actual entities, 
or occasions. Such inter-relationship among actual enti­
ties is termed an "event". The term "actual entities" 
refers to the "final real things of which the world is 
made up." One is tempted to regard them as the basic 
building blocks from which the universe is constructed, 
but this can leave the impression that the actual entities 
are substances. They are basic, there being nothing more 
real behind them, but an actual entity is not a substance; 
it is a process, specifically a process of feelings, an 
individual unit of becoming. Each actual entity or occasion 
is "dipolar" indicating two aspects, the physical pole and 
the mental pole. In other words, from the viewpoint of 
process philosophy the universe is panpsychistic. This 
dipolarity applies to all actual entities without exception, 
from the least to the greatest, that is God. The expression 
"dipolar theism" will therefore refer to the point of view 
that God has two "poles", one primordial and the other 
consequent. As primordial, God is regarded as being
8infinite, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious.
As consequent, God is held to be finite, temporal, fully
actual and conscious. This consequent nature of God is
derived from his relationship to the world.
To some, dipolar theism finds its natural conclusion
in the doctrine of panentheism. The term "panentheism"
1was first used by Krause and in recent years has been 
revived by Hartshorne and others. "Panentheism" is the 
transliteration of the Greek words pan (all or everything), 
en (in) and theos (God), and thus refers to the theological 
formulation that all things, that is, all finite existants, 
are literally included in the being of God. However, 
although God is said to contain the world, he is also said 
to transcend it in some respect. The distinction between 
God and the world is that of whole and part. Although the 
world is jji God, God is more than the world. The world 
represents only one aspect of God; there is another aspect 
of God which is not the world, but which transcends it. 
Thus, panentheism is a specific type of dipolar theism.
As stated above, dipolar theism refers to the theory that 
God has two "poles", his consequent nature being derived 
from his relationship to the world. In dipolar theism 
this relationship need not mean that God includes the world
Arnulf Zweig, "Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich."The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 19§7)» IV, 363-365•
as part of himself. In panentheism, however, the aspect 
of God which is related to the world is related to it by 
means of literally including it in the being of God. In 
panentheism, God is all-inclusive, but is more than the 
universe he includes; that universe is only one aspect of 
God and in another aspect he transcends it. Thus panen­
theism is to be clearly distinguished from pantheism in 
which the world and God are identical, and also from 
theism in which the world is not included in God, Through­
out this work, the words "panentheism", "pantheism" and 
"theism" will be used as here defined.
This writer assumes the validity of metaphysics.
This assumption, of course, would hardly go unchallenged 
in the present philosophical climate. Especially is this 
true in Britain with its background of logical positivism 
and its emphasis upon linguistic analysis. Further, 
since this particular study has to do with the concept 
of God-~a meaningless concept according to many--perhaps 
a few additional words are necessary in justification of 
the approach adopted here. First of all, the criteria 
devised by the positivists (or logical empiricists as 
they are sometimes called) by which all metaphysics and 
theology are regarded as meaningless have had to undergo 
several changes since their inception. Such changes 
have been necessary but embarrassing to the positivists
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because the criteria chosen not only "eliminated" meta­
physics in general and God in particular but also several 
other matters dear to the hearts of the empiricists. Fur­
ther embarrassment resulted when it was pointed out that 
the verification principle of the positivists was, by its 
own definition, meaningless. Thus, in recent years the 
logical empiricists have now opted for a "falsifiability 
principle". The necessary limits of this writing will 
not allow for discussion of the continuing debate con­
cerning the falsifiability principle. However, suffice 
it to say that the empiricists have been unable to demon­
strate conclusively that metaphysics and theology cannot 
be viable pursuits. Of course, the empiricists may choose 
not to "indulge" in metaphysics, but it seems a little 
presumptuous to attempt to bind such on others who do not 
find the ever-changing criteria of the empiricists con­
vincing.
Of course, logical positivism is no longer the threat 
that it used to be. However, the general view of empiri­
cism still persists. Even here, however, it is recognized 
that a single methodology does not suffice for all disci­
plines. For example, empiricists allow methodological 
distinction in the realm of mathematics, where their em­
pirical criteria simply do not apply. Now, if the area 
of study determines method, why is this not true in the
11
theological disciplines? If mathematics cannot be limited 
to the empirical method, why should the study of the nature 
of God be so limited? Particularly is this true if God in 
any sense transcends the empirical realm. To insist that 
statements about God are meaningless, or ought to be made 
only within the confines of empirical observation, is simply 
to beg the question.
Another problem with the rejection of metaphysics, 
whatever the source, is the accompanying rejection of 
important questions. For example, there are still many 
who believe that the questions, "Is there a God?", "Why 
is there something rather than nothing?" and "What is 
ultimately real?" are significant and demand attention.
Of course, no claim is made that any one metaphysical 
system supplies undisputed answers. The point being made 
is that the questions are important, one might say funda­
mental to human consciousness. These questions, like the 
proverbial cat, keep coming back and it is the realm of 
metaphysics, including philosophical theology, which deals 
with such ever-recurring issues. Within the context of 
this metaphysical and cosmological approach, process 
philosophy and theology— still minority viewpoints-- 
seek to be heard.
This work is not a thesis on the theory of reality 
(either in terms of ontology or cosmology) but will deal
12
with such where necessary to supply clarification for 
discussion with reference to the meaning of "God". The 
research will not be concerned with reasons for belief 
in the existence of God, but will deal with recent dis­
cussion concerning the nature or attributes of God.
Plan of the Thesis 
This research will consist of six chapters, the first 
three of which will deal with those aspects of the re­
spective philosophies of Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead 
which were seemingly influential in laying the foundation 
of a later panentheism, and chapter four will present 
Hartshorne's panentheistic view.
Chapter I will set forth the views of Alexander 
which pertain to this study. These will include (l) his 
concept of Space-Time; (2) his theory of emergence; (3) 
his emphasis on correspondence, that is that something 
corresponding to mind exists at every level of being; and 
(4) his view of God and Deity and the distinction he 
draws between them.
Chapter II will emphasise the pertinent points in 
the philosophy of Morgan. These will comprise (l) his 
view of reality; (2) his emphasis on emergence; (3) his 
theories of involution, dependence and correlation; and 
(^) his concept of God.
Chapter III will stress the features of Whitehead's
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metaphysics which proved to be so influential in Hart­
shorne ’s thinking. After brief consideration of develop­
ments in Whitehead's thought, attention will be directed 
towards (1) his view of reality as constituted by actual 
entities ; (2) the dipolar nature of these actual entities; 
(3) the consequent view of the universe as panpsychistic; 
and (4) his concept of God as dipolar. Questions will be 
raised concerning the nature of Whitehead's God and his 
relationship to the world, and specifically two matters 
will be discussed: (i) Is God an actual entity or a
series of actual entities? And (ii) is the world in­
cluded in God, that is, does Whitehead's view qualify as 
panentheism?
While it is not the purpose of this research to 
offer a major critique of process thought, these first 
three chapters will be concluded with a brief examination 
of the philosophy presented, and chapter III will, in 
addition, compare the respective viewpoints of Alexander, 
Morgan and Whitehead, drawing particular attention to 
similarities rooted in their common perspective of British 
neo-realism. Within the framework of our study in the 
history of ideas, these brief critiques are significant 
insofar as they add to our understanding of process con­
cepts .
Chapter IV will present Hartshorne's dipolar theism
l4
and will emphasise similarities to, and differences from 
Whitehead. Attention will he directed towards Hartshorne's 
view of (l) God as dipolar; (2) God as a temporal series of 
actual entities; and (3) God as including the world, that 
is the doctrine of panentheism. Again, a brief critique 
will be offered.
The research will thus have traced some continuity 
of thought from the concept of Alexander's correspondence 
to Morgan’s correlation, Whitehead’s dipolar theism and 
Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism.
However, although the research will thus have accom­
plished its goal of demonstrating and systematizing the 
affinity of thought in British neo-realism and Hartshorne's 
panentheism, any serious study of Hartshorne would benefit 
by taking into consideration the influence of the American 
idealist, William Ernest Hocking. Chapter V of the thesis 
will therefore be given over to a brief statement of Hock­
ing' s thought, particularly with reference to his concept 
of God, a concept to which Hartshorne expresses some 
indebtedness.
Chapter VI will summarise the major points in the 
research and will give the conclusions of the author of 
this study.
CHAPTER ONE
SAMUEL ALEXANDER: GOD IN PROCESS TOWARDS DEITY
As stated in the introduction, it will be necessary 
to give some attention to the respective theories of real­
ity of these philosophers in order to appreciate more 
fully the concepts of God which they advocate. Such is 
certainly the case with Samuel Alexander and his theory 
of Space-Time as ultimate reality. Indeed Alexander 
himself emphasises that, in his view, all the vital prob­
lems of philosophy can be understood and solved only when 
a proper concept of Space and Time and their relationship
fto each other is comprehended. Therefore to Alexander's 
theory of Space-Time we now direct our attention.
For Alexander, Space and Time are not separate facts 
to be considered as isolated from each other but can only 
be understood within the context of their interdependence 
That is, "there neither is Space without Time, nor Time 
without Space. . , , Space is in its very nature temporal
pand Time spatial." It is therefore more accurate to
Samuel Alexander, Space, Time and Deity (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920; , Vol. I, p”. 35"!
2Ibid., p . 44.
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think of a single entity, Space-Time, although we shall 
notice later that each aspect of this dual entity has a 
significant and somewhat divergent part to play in the 
concept of emergence and the doctrine of God.
However, can one really describe Space-Time as an 
"entity"? It is a fundamental tenet of Alexander's meta­
physics that Space-Time is an entity and cannot be re­
garded as merely relational. By the "relational" view of 
Space-Time Alexander refers to the doctrine which declares 
"Space and Time to consist of relations between things or 
entities, these entities with their qualities coming first,
and Space and Time are then respectively the order of co-
1existence and succession of entities." This view is em­
phatically rejected by Alexander and, as the basis of his 
metaphysics, he offers an alternative theory as follows:
Another hypothesis as to the connection between things or events and the Space and Time they occupy places in is that Space and Time are not merely the order of their coexistence or succession, but are, as it were, the stuff or Matrix (or matrices) out of which things or events are made, the medium in which they are precipitated and crystallised; that the finites are in some sense complexes of space and time.2
For Alexander, then, Space-Time is the "nurse of 
becoming" . In other words, whereas in the relational 
view entities with their qualities appear first and only
^Ibid.. p. 37. 
^Ibid., p. 38. 
^Ibld., p. 331.
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then do Space and Time have any significance as the frame­
work in which the events occur, in Alexander's metaphysics
Space-Time "logically, and in fact, precedes finite things
1which are differentiations of that stuff." But Space- 
Time itself is not material, that is does not possess 
materiality; it is anterior to matter.
Of what, then, does Space-Time consist? Alexander’s 
reply is that Space-Time is composed of metaphysical 
elements which he terms point-instants or pure events.
These point-instants are distinguished within the matrix 
of Space-Time by the employment of "intellectual construc­
tion" which goes beyond what can be learned through sense.^ 
By the introduction of these intellectual constructions 
"we may distinguish points within Space which again are not 
independent but continuous. In a similar manner, within 
Time which is experienced as continuous, being a duration 
of the successive, it is possible to distinguish connected 
parts which are termed moments or instants Alexander 
emphasises the matter thus:
Space and Time then are presented to us as in­finite and continuous wholes of parts. I shall call these parts points and instants, availing myself of the conceptual description of them, and meaning by their connectedness or continuity at any rate that between any two points or instants another can be found. . . . This is a way of saying that the points and instants are not i s o l a t e d . 6
^Ibld.. Vol. II, pp. 48, 49. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p . 49. ^Ibid., p . 4o.
^Ibid., Vol. I, p. 39- °Ibid.. pp. 43, 44.
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Indeed the nature of these elements is such that 
points cannot he isolated from instants nor vice-versa;
"There are no such things as points or instants by them­
selves. There are only point-instants or pure events. . . . 
The real existence is Space-Time, the continuum of point- 
instants or pure events." The relation of these point- 
instants or pure events to one another is described by 
Alexander as "social". "There is a society of instants
which are minds established through their connections in 
„2space.
It is important to recognize that just as Space- 
Time itself is not material, neither are the point-instants. 
However, although they lack materiality they are nonethe­
less real and are to be regarded "not as physical elements 
like the electrons, but as metaphysical elements, as being 
the elementary constituents of Space-Time or Motion.
The above quotation equates Space-Time with Motion 
and Alexander indeed stresses this equivalence. We have 
already seen at least the suggestion of such a doctrine 
in Alexander's emphasis upon the connectedness or continuity 
of Space-Time constituted by point-instants which are also 
termed the "elements of motion. Space-Time is therefore 
a system of motions and to speak of a "vast entity Motion 
. . . is to do the same thing as to speak of Space-Time."^
In other words, ultimate reality is dynamic or in process.
h b i d .. p. 48. bbid.
2Ibid., Vol II, p. hi. ^Ibid., p. 62.
^Ibid., Vol. I, p. 325-
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From this ultimate reality of Space-Time constituted
by point-instants spring forth the empirical existents.
These existents are groupings of point-instants, "crystals
in that matrix. Only whereas a crystal may be separated
from its matrix, existents never can; they remain swimming
-1in the medium of Space-Time." This conception of exist­
ents emerging from and in Space-Time is basic to Alexander's 
metaphysics and we shall return to it shortly. Before do­
ing so, however, it is necessary at this time to comment 
on the categories as set forth in Alexander's system and 
how they relate to Space-Time itself and to the empirical 
existents,
For Alexander, the categories are the a priori or 
non-empirical characters which pervade all empirical exist­
ents without exception. These categorial features such as 
identity, existence, substance, relation and causality are 
not contributed by the mind as per Kant, but are the "fun­
damental properties or determinations of Space-Time itself,
pnot taken as a whole, but in every portion of it." The 
categories, then, are the simplest characters of Space- 
Time and no empirical existent is exempt from them; they 
apply to "everything empirical, everything which is not 
the whole of Space-Time but a part of it.
From the preceding quotations it is obvious that, in 
Alexander's view, Space-Time as a whole is not subject to
^Ibld.. p. 1 8 3 . ^Ibid., p. 3 2 4 .
^Ibid.. p. 1 8 9 .
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the categories. Such is the case because Space-Time
itself, although the source of the categories is not, in
actual fact, an existent. In the words of Alexander,
the source of the categories is not itself subject to the categories. . . . They apply in our conceptionof the matter to the empirical things which are special configurations in Space-Time and because they are such, but they do not apply to Space-Time itself. Space- Time does not exist but is itself the totality of all that exists. Existence belongs to that which occupies a space-time. . , . Space-Time therefore does not .exist but it is existence itself, taken in the whole. '
This particular concept of applying the categories to all 
empirical existents but not to Space-Time itself has sig­
nificant implications for Alexander’s doctrine of God.
We must now return to a matter which was referred to 
only in passing earlier, namely the emergence of empirical 
existents from the matrix of Space-Time. By referring to 
qualities and qualitied existents as "emergents" Alexander 
emphasised the novelty which each new quality possessed, 
as opposed to mere "resultants" which are wholly explicable
3in terms of their antecedents. The simplest statement
^Ibid., pp. 337, 338.
2There is a strange similarity between Alexander's concept of Space-Time, and Tillich's concept of God. For Tillich, God is not "a being" but "being-itself" and thus cannot be subject to the categories which can be applied only to finite beings. It is not so much that God exists; He existence itself. See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)V pp. 235 ff.
^Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Vol II, p. l4.
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of Alexander’s concept of emergence is that from Space- 
Time itself there emerged, by the complex groupings of 
point-instants, first of all matter with its qualities, 
then life in its multiple forms, and eventually mind.
Each of these empirical qualities is built upon the basis 
of the preceding quality but possesses some new attributes 
not explicable on the basis of the nature of the preceding 
quality alone. In other words life is also material but 
not merely material, and mind although also vital is not 
merely vital. Each new and more advanced quality appears 
as the consequence of more and more complex groupings of 
pure events or point-instants, the elements of motion, 
the dynamic factors constitutive of ultimate reality. 
Needless to say, since in this view the nature of reality 
is dynamic, the process of bringing forth new empirical, 
qualities continues. "There is a nisus in Space-Time 
which, as it has borne its creatures forward through matter 
and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher 
level of existence." In Alexander’s metaphysics the 
next level to appear beyond the empirical quality of mind
3is deity, also an empirical quality. We shall examine 
this quality of deity shortly when we analyze Alexander's 
concepts of God, deity and the distinction he draws between
^Ibid., pp. 43, 46.
^Ibid., p . 346.
^Ibid.. pp. 345, 347.
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them.
Before turning to that, however, the question must 
he raised as to the cause of the generation of these em­
pirical qualities. As has already been made clear, the 
complex grouping of point-instants supplies at least a 
partial answer, but it is only partial. Such complex 
collocation of pure events is only possible because of 
the nature of Time which is the productive or creative 
aspect of the dual entity Space-Time.
Empirical things come into existence, because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites,. . . But in a special sense Time is the author of finitude, for it is the transition intrinsic to Time which in the first place makes motion possible, and secondly provides for the ceaseless rearrangements in Space through which groupings of motions are possible. Time could not do its work without Space; but, this being presumed, Time is the principle of motion and change. . . . Time is in truth the abiding principle of impermanence which is the real creator.J
In Alexander's system it is evident that Time is the gen­
erator of qualities. Time is therefore productive or 
creative and, indeed, Alexander refers to Time as the 
"mind" of Space and Space the "body" of Time, once again 
emphasising the dual nature of Space-Time Indeed this 
duality expressed analogously in terms of the mind-body 
relationship is universal in Alexander's metaphysics, 
applying not only to Space-Time as a whole, but also to 
every part of it, that is to every empirical existent.
^Ibld., pp. 47, 48. 
^Ibld., p. 38.
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stating that there is nothing really unusual in this
hypothesis since the conception of a world-soul is an old
and familiar one, Alexander nonetheless seeks to assure
us that he does not mean that Time is mind "or any lowest
degree of mind." He is speaking only of that which
corresponds to mind at lower levels of existence and
stresses this correspondence as follows;
I mean that in the matrix of all existence, Space- Time, there is an element Time which performs the same function in respect of the other element Space as mind performs in respect of its bodily equivalent. The points of Space have no consciousness in any shape or form, but their instants perform to them the office of consciousness to our brains. . , .Our hypothesis is merely that alike in the matrix of finite things and in all finite things there is something of which, on the highest level we know of finite existents, mind is the counterpart or corres­pondent , 2
While stressing that this is a theory of correspondence 
and his use of language is metaphorical, Alexander yet 
insists that all finite existence is in a certain sense 
animated^ and that "in every finite there is one element 
corresponding to body in ourselves and another corres­
ponding to mind.
In brief summary, thus far we have seen that from 
the base of this "animated" Space-Time, with Time as the 
creative aspect, there springs forth as a result of complex 
"social" groupings of point-instants or pure events a
^Ibid., p . 43. ^Ibid., p . 69.
%bid. ^Ibid., p. 3 3 4 .
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series of empirical existents which are "emergent" in 
that, at each new level there is true novelty of character, 
that is, empirical qualities which could not have been 
predicted on the basis of the nature of the lower or pre­
ceding qualities alone. The highest empirical quality 
which has thus far emerged is that quality which we know 
as mind, but reality is dynamic and the process of emer­
gence continues. The next higher empirical quality to 
emerge will be, in Alexander's language, "deity" and to his 
concepts of God and deity we now direct our attention.
In Alexander's metaphysical approach, God is defined
as "the being, if any, which possesses deity or the divine 
1quality." Given this definition, Alexander's methodology 
is to ask first of all whether there is a place in the 
world for the empirical quality of deity, and if so, it 
would then be possible to verify the reality of the being 
which possesses that quality, that is God. As has al­
ready been noted, in Alexander's philosophy deity is the 
next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe 
is in the process of bringing forth.^ Two facts need to 
be emphasised at this point. First, "deity" is a general 
description of what is actually a variable quality, "and 
as the world grows in time, deity changes with it.
Alexander stresses that for any level of existence, deity
^Ibld., p. 342. ^Ibid., p. 34?.
^Ibid.. p. 345. ^Ibid., p. 348.
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is the next higher empirical quality. For example, "to
creatures upon the level of life, deity is still the
quality in front, but to us who come later this quality•1has been revealed as mind." Thus, "deity" refers to that
empirical quality, whatever it may be, which is the next
to be revealed. Secondly, for those of us who live upon
the level of mind "deity" can have no specific description.
We must remain agnostic concerning the nature of deity,
2that is the next empirical quality to be revealed. When 
that empirical quality of deity will be revealed it will 
be an emergent (as opposed to a resultant) and by defini­
tion could not possibly be predicted. For Alexander deity 
is the novel quality of the future and is thereby unknown 
and unknowable.
Having thus found a place for the quality of deity 
in his metaphysics, Alexander then turns to the question 
of God, the being, if any, which possesses deity. Is 
there such a being? Alexander’s reply is that "God is 
the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. Of 
such a being the whole world is the 'body' and deity is 
the 'mind.' Elsewhere Alexander confirms that the 
whole of Space-Time is God's body and states explicitly 
that "God in respect of his body is all-inclusive, and all
^IMd. p. 353-
^Ibid., pp. 347, 3 4 9 .
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finites are included in him." This all-inclusiveness of 
God is once again emphasised by Alexander when he says 
that "our minds, therefore, and everything else in the 
world are 'organic sensa' of God. All we are the hunger 
and thirst, the heart-beats and sweat of God." Because 
God's body is the whole of Space-Time it is therefore in­
finite in extent and duration, that is omnipresent and 
eternal.^ But is infinitude applicable to God's deity? 
Alexander replies in the affirmative, stressing that this 
is the case because God's deity "represents" his body 
and must therefore also be infinite, this representation 
being physiological "like the representation on the brain 
of the different portions of the body which send nervous 
messages to the b r a i n . T h u s  in Alexander's view, God 
is infinite in both his body and his deity.
Having thus argued for the infinitude of God, Alex­
ander then proceeds to emphasise that the infinite God 
so described is non-existentÎ This point is so signifi­
cant that we shall quote Alexander at length as follows;
We are now led to a qualification of the greatest importance. . . . The infinite God is purely ideal or conceptual. The individual so sketched is not asserted to exist. . . .  As actual, God does not possess the quality of deity but is the universe as tending to that quality.This nisus in the universe, though not present to sense, is yet present to reflection upon experi­ence. Only in this sense of straining towards deity can there be an infinite actual God. . . .
^Ibld., p. 394. ^Ibld., p. 358.
^Ibid., p. 357. ^Ibid., p. 357.
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Thus there is no actual infinite being with the quality of deity; but there is an actual infinite, the whole universe, with a nisus to deity.1
But infinite deity is never attained and does not and can
never exist. This is the case because the attainment of
deity would make deity finite. Alexander explains,
Deity is an empirical quality like mind or life. Before there was mind the universe was straining towards infinite mind. But there is no existent infinite mind, but only many finite minds. Deity is subject to the same law as other empirical qualities and is but the next member of the series.. . . God as an actual existent is always becoming deity but never attains it. He is the ideal God in embryo.2
Another way of expressing the same thought is to say that 
God as the possessor of deity would be a qualitied in­
finite. But in Alexander's metaphysical system quality 
belongs only to finite complexes of space-time. There­
fore God as possessor of infinite deity would be a mean­
ingless concept and Alexander draws attention to this 
point when he states that "God is never thus realised in 
the contradictory form of an infinite qualitied indivi­
dual, but he is in process towards this quality of deity. 
Thus, deity is never a present quality of God; deity al­
ways lies in the future and God is always in process to­
wards deity.
The tenet of God's being in process is, of course,
^Ibid., pp. 3 6 1, 3 6 2 . 
^Ibid., p. 3 6 5.
^Ibld.. p. 3 9 4 .
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fundamental to Alexander's philosophy. Because of the
nature of Space-Time itself, God’s body, being the whole
of Space-Time, is neither spaceless nor timeless and his
deity also is "essentially in process and caught in the
general movement of Time." God is therefore the whole
universe engaged in process towards the emergence of the
2new quality of deity.
Since the empirical quality of deity emerges from 
the lower finites or preceding qualitied existents, deity 
is thereby dependent upon such existents and, in Alex- 
ander's language, is "sustained"^ and indeed "created".
If deity is thus created, then by what or whom is it 
created? Is God the creator and, if so, how is he related 
to deity? Alexander's response is to state that God, 
taken as the whole universe in process is creative but 
that his distinctive character of deity is not creative 
but created.^ However, Alexander qualifies this immedi­
ately and significantly by stressing that "it is, properly 
speaking, Space-Time itself which is the creator and not 
God. He continues,
God, then, like all things in the universe— for Space-time itself is not in the universe, whereas God, since his deity is part of the universe, is in it--is in the strictest sense not a creator
^Ibid., p. 399- ^Ibld., p. 399
^Ibid., p. 429. ^Ibld.. p. 397
^Ibid., p. 395. Ibid.
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but a creature. . . . He Is an.infinité creatureof the universe of Space-Time.
It is clear, then, that for Alexander Space-Time is the
creative factor— we have already seen his emphasis upon
Time as the generative aspect of this dual entity--
whereas God, in terms of both his body and deity, is in
actual fact created. However, although God is created,
Alexander insists that there is nonetheless a sense in
which he is transcendent, namely by virtue of his deity
pwhich radically transcends all other qualitied existents, 
"God is thus immanent in a different respect from that in 
which he is transcendent. . . . God is immanent in respect 
of his body, but transcendent in respect of his deity."
In further clarifying this transcendence, Alexander states 
that deity is that which is distinctive of God.^
In spite of holding to the doctrine that God has a 
transcendent aspect, Alexander nonetheless has committed 
himself to the view that God is a creature rather than 
creator and is dependent upon finite existents. Is God 
then dependent upon man in any sense? Alexander replies 
in the affirmative. "There is always the double relation­
ship of need. If man wants God and depends upon him,
God wants man, and is so far dependent."^ This depend-
^Ibid.. p. 398. ^Ibid.. p. 394.
^Ibid.. p. 395. ^Ibid., p. 386.
^Ibid., p. 3 9 6 .
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ency of God is further stressed when Alexander states that
•1by our action we may affect God, and that we help to main-
ptain and sustain his nature. The implication for religion
and ethics is clear.
Accordingly in relation to conduct, religion does not so much command us to perform our duties with the consciousness that they are the commands of God, as rather it is religion to do our duty with- the consciousness of helping to create his deity.^
The emphasis is clear. If man is dependent upon God, God
is also dependent upon man.
This interdependence is a consequence of God's all-
inclusive nature. Given this all-inclusiveness, another
result is that unvalues also exist in God. For example,
with reference to evil, Alexander states that since the
world is the body of God, evil cannot be dismissed from 
4his nature. Similarly, pain is also experienced by God 
"in so far as God includes within his body the creatures 
which suffer pain."^ However, Alexander emphasises that 
moral evil, pain and all unvalues belong to the body of 
God but not to his deity; they exist in the immanent 
aspect of God but not in the transcendent aspect in which 
all values are conserved.^ Yet, neither in respect of 
his immanence nor his transcendence can God be described
^Ibld.. p. 387. ^Ibid.. p. 4l4.
^Ibld.. p. 388. ^Ibid., p. 425.
^Ibid., p. 399. ^Ibid., p. 419.
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as good or evil, since terms of value apply only to 
finites.^
If terms of value do not apply to God, neither do 
the categories apply. It is true that Alexander comments 
that the categories do apply to what he termed empirical 
infinites including the infinite deity. However, as we 
have already seen, infinite deity does not exist and in­
deed cannot exist since deity is an empirical quality and 
quality belongs only to finite existents. Therefore in 
neither his immanent nor transcendent aspect is God sub­
ject to the categories. His body, being the whole universe 
of Space-Time, is not subject to them--we have already 
noted that only finite portions of space-time are subject 
to the categories— and his deity, always a nisus but never 
an accomplishment, cannot be subject to them.^
It is this admission that deity is never realised or
accomplished which, in Alexander's own words "prevents4the conception from being wholly theistical," In spite 
of this concession Alexander elsewhere insists that it is 
in respect of his deity that this conception of God 
theistic.-^ What is to be made of this apparent contra­
diction? The solution lies in recognizing that, for 
Alexander, deity represents God's transcendence and it
^Ibid., p. 420. Ibid.
^Ibid.■ Vol. I, p. 324. ^Ibid., p. 394. 
^Ibid., Vol. II, p. 364.
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is this transcendent aspect of God which coincides with 
traditional theistic belief. However, this deity is 
never actualized in Alexander's metaphysics, and it is 
this lack of realization of deity which prevents the con­
cept from being wholly theistic.
Alexander himself believed that his conception of God
was in strict terms neither theistic nor pantheistic, but
that in different respects it could be described as both.
In respect of God's body which is all-inclusive, all finites
being included in him, he possesses "the totality which
2pantheism assigns to God." But, as has already been 
noted, Alexander believed that within his speculative 
system deity gave to God the necessary transcendence to 
allow this conception of God to remain predominantly 
theistic. If Alexander is correct in his estimation that 
his concept of God belongs neither to theism nor pantheism-- 
and we shall be obliged to return to this shortly— does it 
belong instead to panentheism? To this question we must 
now direct our attention.
It is undoubtedly the case that there are some pro­
cess and panentheistic concepts contained within the 
speculative conception of God advanced by Alexander. For 
example, that ultimate reality is dynamic or in process 
and is constituted by pure events whose relationship with
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one another may be described as "social" has obvious 
affinity with the views of Whitehead and Hartshorne in 
their discussion of actual entities. Also, Alexander's 
emphasis upon emergence is certainly closely allied to the 
importance which Whitehead attaches to novelty. In addi­
tion Alexander's basic tenet that Space-Time as a whole 
and every part of it, that is every finite existent, 
has a dual nature expressed analogously in terms of the 
body-mind relationship clearly resembles Whitehead's 
and Hartshorne's concept of nature as dipolar. More 
specifically, Alexander's doctrine of God's having two 
aspects, one being his all-inclusive and therefore 
immanent body and the other his transcendent deity 
certainly bears a strong relationship to later panen­
theism. Again, Alexander's emphasis upon God's being 
created and his dependence upon man is language dupli­
cated in later writers who were and are undoubtedly pan- 
entheists. Finally, Alexander's concession that unvalues 
exist in God's immanent aspect but not his transcendent 
aspect brings to mind the admissions of present day pan- 
entheists.
Does Alexander's concept of God then qualify as pan­
entheism? In spite of the above similarities the answer 
must be in the negative. In panentheistic views, there is 
an eternal transcendent aspect of God which exists beyond
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his all-inclusive immanent aspect, this transcendent aspect 
being what distinguishes panentheism from pantheism. It is 
true that Alexander argues at great length that God's deity 
is what is distinctive of him and is his transcendent as­
pect. But in reality this deity, as Alexander himself in­
sists, is never attained and never can be attained. In 
Alexander's concept of God deity, that is God's transcend­
ent aspect, is ideal but never actual; it is non-existent. 
We are compelled to draw the only logical conclusion; if 
God has no actual transcendence, then he must be wholly 
immanent. Alexander's concept of God must be regarded as 
pantheistic; it is a process view in which the logical 
conclusion is a God who is both temporal and sheerly im­
manent . It is this same lack of genuine transcendence 
which disqualifies Alexander's view not only from being 
panentheistic but also, as he himself admits, from being 
truly theistic. Of course, Alexander argues that his 
theological system cannot be equated with pantheism since 
God's deity makes him in some sense transcendent. It may 
also be argued that since deity is a variable quality, it 
is actualized with each new emergent quality which appears. 
However, each new quality is realised only in finite form, 
Alexander emphasising that there can be no qualitied in­
finite. It is precisely this point which makes Alexander's 
God, as possessor of infinite deity, only an ideal but
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never an actual reality. God, as actual is always finite. 
Infinite deity, that is God's transcendent aspect, is 
never attained and where there is no actual transcendence 
there is no ontological distinction between God and the 
world. Such is the case in the Space-Time universe of 
Samuel Alexander.
As noted in the introduction, it will be appropriate 
to conclude this chapter with some additional brief criti­
cisms of Alexander's particular view of God.
First of all, it is clear that Space-Time is more 
ultimate than God himself. On the one hand Alexander 
states that all of Space-Time is the body of God; on the 
other hand it is conceded that God is an infinite creature 
of Space-Time. But if God is a creature he must be con­
tingent, accidental rather than essential. God is not 
in control, but under control of factors other than 
himself.
Secondly, we have seen Alexander's insistence upon 
the mutual dependence of God and man. If we need God, 
he also needs us; we affect him and help create his deity. 
But all of these factors, dependence, need, being affected, 
are aspects of relatedness. However, we have noted that 
neither God's deity--which is never a present reality-- 
nor his body--which is the universe ^  a whole--can be 
subject to the categories among which are the categories 
of relation and reciprocity. How can God be dependent
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if the categories do not apply to him? This is a funda­
mental contradiction in Alexander's concept of God.
Thirdly, Alexander's rejection of God as creator 
leaves nothing in this metaphysical system which ful­
fills the requirement of the principle of sufficient 
reason. The question as to why anything should exist 
at all--even a quality-less Space-Time--remains unanswer­
ed; it admits no explanation. It is not surprising that 
later process writers would at least attempt to retain 
God as creative agent within their philosophical frame­
works .
In conclusion, Alexander's conception of God con­
tains certain problems which will be repeated in later 
writers to be discussed. We have concluded that in its 
logical outcome Alexander's doctrine is actually pan­
theistic rather than panentheistic. Nonetheless, some 
of his basic tenets and much of his language undoubtedly 
laid the groundwork for a later panentheism.
CHAPTER TWO
C. LLOYD MORGAN:
GOD AS EXISTENT IDEAL INVOLVING THE WORLD PROCESS
The evolutionary philosophy of Samuel Alexander, 
with its emphasis on emergence, has a strong affinity to 
the philosophical position of C. Lloyd Morgan. Morgan 
however was not uncritical of Alexander and it is there­
fore the case that there are some major differences in 
their respective speculative systems. In this chapter 
the philosophy of Morgan, as set forth in his work en­
titled Emergent Evolution, will he examined and his 
criticisms of Alexander and differences from him noted.
As will he recalled from chapter one, the base of 
Alexander's metaphysical system is a quality-less Space- 
Time which is anterior to matter and which is constituted 
by immaterial pure events or point-instants which are re­
lated to one another in a manner which in some sense can 
be termed social. Eventually qualities emerge because of 
the grouping and rearrangements of point-instants within 
the context of Time which, as the principle of impermanence, 
is productive or creative and is the generator of qualities.
This concept of Space-Time is rejected by Morgan on 
two counts. First of all he insists that primordial events
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cannot be immaterial. He states, "I seek in vain for 
evidence that spatio-temporal relatedness does exist apart 
from physical events. I can pierce no deeper than events 
which, in their primordial form are not only spatio- 
temporal, but physical also." Secondly, Morgan denies 
the creativity of Time. "I doubt" he writes, "whether 
the concept of the fluency of time, on which so much turns,
pwill stand the test of philosophical criticism," In other 
words, time is by its very nature successive, but this 
temporal succession neither necessitates nor implies 
creativity. In the language of Morgan, time is not "effect­
ive", that is, it does not supply sufficient reason for 
the emergence of qualities which make such a radical dif­
ference to the world in which they appear. This ineffect­
iveness of time will, as we shall see later, cause Morgan 
to look elsewhere for his explanation of emergence.
Having rejected Alexander's concept of an incorporeal 
Space-Time, Morgan sets forth his own view of emergent 
levels with matter as the lowest level or base. For Morgan, 
this matter is the physical world and from this basal level 
emerge in ascending order life, mind and reflective 
thought Including the basal material level the natural 
systems described by Morgan are matter systems, life-
1C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (London*. Williams and Norgate Ltd.1 1927), p . 23l
^Ibid., p . 24.
^Ibid., p . 1 .
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1matter systems and mind-life-matter systems. As in other
theories of emergence, including that of Alexander, natural
events at the level of mind are "higher than those at the
level of life, and these higher than the events at the
2level of matter." In dealing with some events being 
"higher" than others, Morgan introduces his notion of in­
volution and dependence. In explaining his concept of
involution he writes.
When two or more kinds of events . . , as A,B and C, co-exist on one complex system in such wisethat the C kind involves the co-existence of B, andB in like manner involves A, whereas the A-kind does not involve the co-existence of B, nor B that of C, we may speak of C, as, in this sense, higher than B, and B than A. Thus, for emergent evolution, con­scious events at level G (mind) involve specific physiological events at level B (life), and these involve specific physico-chemical events at level A (matter). No C without B, and no B without A.No mind without life ; and no life without "a physi­cal basis."3
Morgan specifically emphasises his use of the word "in­
volve" in the above passage. He continues, "I speak of
events at any given level in the pyramid of emergent evo­
lution as 'involving' concurrent events at lower levels.
By "involution" it is clear that Morgan is referring to 
a given event (such as mind) involving the necessary co­
existence of another event at a lower level (such as life).
In Morgan's philosophy, emphasis on "dependence" is 
no less essential than that on "involution".
^Ibld.. p. 22. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 15- Ibid.
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In a physical system wherein life has emerged, the way things happen is raised to a higher plane. In an organism within which consciousness is emergent a new course of events depends on its presence. In a person in whom reflective thought is emergent be­haviour is sustained at a higher level . . . .Strike out reflective consciousness and action is of a lower impulsive order. Strike out all guiding consciousness and behaviour is that appropriate to the level of life. Strike out life and the course of events drops down to the physical level. The new relations emergent at each higher level guide and sustain the course of events distinctive of that level, which in the phraseology I suggest de­pends on its continued presence.i
Thus in Morgan's view, the concepts of involution and de­
pendence are inextricably bound up with his theory of emer­
gent levels. At any given level, higher events involve 
the necessary co-existence of lower events, while the low­
er events are guided and sustained by, and are dependent 
upon the higher events. This one-way direction of depend­
ence in which the lower is always dependent upon the high­
er, but never the higher upon the lower, has significance 
for Morgan’s concept of God which shall be discussed 
later.
Having glanced briefly at Morgan's theory of emergent 
levels— and we shall shortly examine this more closely—  
we now return to his view of the physical world as the 
base or lowest level in the scheme of things. Such a
2physical world Morgan accepts under "acknowledgment".
The notion of acknowledgment is vital to his philosophy
^Ibid.. p. 1 7 . 
^Ibld.. pp. 24, 3 3 .
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and. is defined by Morgan as "acceptance of that which is
. , . not susceptible of logical proof or disproof, on the
grounds that such acceptance gives consistency to a scheme
1otherwise incomplete." With reference to the physical 
world, Morgan holds that its independent existence is not 
susceptible of proof under rigid philosophical criticism 
and that he therefore accepts such a world under acknow­
ledgment "as part of a constructive scheme of emergent 
2evolution." Elsewhere he concedes that acceptance under 
acknowledgment goes beyond the positive evidence and this, 
also, will prove significant with reference to his state­
ments concerning the existence of God.
If such acceptance of anything under acknowledgment 
goes beyond the positive evidence, how does Morgan reach 
this acknowledged physical world? He does so by following 
downwards the line of involution till he reaches what is, 
for his constructive philosophy, the "limiting concept", 
that is matter or the physical w o r l d . A s  we noticed 
earlier, the concept of involution refers to that which 
is involved as a necessary co-existent. Thus for Morgan, 
matter or the physical world is the lowest level of neces­
sary co-existence with which and upon which higher events 
occur. It is important to recognize that the notion of
^Ibid., p. Il6 . 
^Ibid., p . 24. 
^Ibld., p. 3 3 -
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involution does not represent an argument for the indepen­
dent existence of the world; such a world, recognized as 
the basal limiting concept via involution is still only 
accepted under acknowledgment. Morgan emphasises that 
this acknowledgment of the world as an independent exist­
ent presents, for his philosophy, an escape from solipsism.
The world thus acknowledged by Morgan is physical but 
not merely physical; it is also psychical. While he seems 
to follow Alexander fairly closely at this point in the 
latter's emphasis upon "correspondence", that is something 
corresponding to "mind" applying throughout nature, Morgan 
objects to Alexander’s use of the word "mind" in this con­
text. Morgan prefers to accept the psycho-physical nature 
of the universe under his acknowledgment of "correlation". 
He writes,
Without subscribing to Mr. Alexander’s doc­trine of time as, in any sense, the mind of space—  this my attitude towards spatio-temporal related­ness precludes--! fully accept unrestricted and universal correlation as an acknowledgment--avowedly speculative, and admittedly beyond positive proof (or disproof), but essential to my constructive philosophy of evolution. This means, for me, that there are no physical systems, of integral status, that are not also psychical systems; and no psy­chical systems that are not also physical systems.All systems of events are in their degree psycho­physical. Both attributes, inseparable in essence, are pervasive throughout the universe of natural entities.2
The above quotation makes clear that Morgan's view
^Ibid., pp. 1 9 5, 1 9 6 . 
^Ibid., p . 2 6 .
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that all physical events have psychical or mental cor­
relates, and that all mental events have physical cor­
relates, is accepted hy him under acknowledgment. Since 
such correlation goes beyond any positive evidence for 
it, why should such be postulated at all? Morgan re­
sponds, ’’Universal correlation is also part of my creed—  
assuredly beyond proof. . . . Should this also be accept­
ed it annuls the 'fatal gulf' between the material and the
'Iimmaterial aspects of the world." In other words, the
acceptance of correlation under acknowledgment provides an
answer to the problem of psycho-physical dualism. It
should, however, be emphasised that there is no causal
relation between the physical and psychical attributes;
2it is strictly a matter of correlation. Thus, in Morgan's 
view, the psychical attribute is not an explanation for, 
that is, is not the cause of new emergents.
The psycho-physical world accepted under acknowledg­
ment is a world in constant process of change.
Events are always involved; and events imply change in the relation of terms. Even an electron . . . is an event; and an atom, for all its seeming sta­bility, is a rhythmic whirl of events . . . .  We must bear in mind, then, that relatedness, in the world at large and in everything therein, is au fond fluent and ever changing.3
Morgan, then, views reality as being in process of develop­
ment,^ with relatedness as an essential feature of that
^Ibid., p. 62. ^Ibid., pp. 66, 6?.
^Ibid. . p. 28. h b i d . . p. 203.
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reality. Relatedness is that which "obtains throughout
1. . . the pyramid of emergent evolution."
Within this ever-changing reality, as stated earlier, 
emergence occurs. Morgan draws the same distinction as 
Alexander with reference to emergents and resultants.
Both men emphasise, under the concept of emergence, the 
incoming of the new. Under Morgan's scheme, examples are
2found in the advent of life, mind and reflective thought. 
As noted earlier, Morgan does not include matter as an 
emergent; the physical world is not an emergent but is 
instead the necessary base or foundation upon which emer­
gence takes place. In recognizing this philosophical 
position, one is almost compelled to raise the question 
of the origin of matter itself. For Alexander, it will 
be recalled that matter is itself an emergent which arises 
from a quality-less and non-material Space-Time. Morgan, 
as noted, rejects such a view and instead regards matter 
as the base for his theory of emergent evolution. Whence 
then matter? Is it eternal? As interesting as this ques­
tion undoubtedly is, we shall delay dealing with it Until 
later discussion concerning Morgan's concept of God,
Morgan’s theory is a theory of levels and his world 
is a world of emergence, that is, with the emergence occur- 
ing upon the limiting concept of matter. In any theory of 
emergence, the question of "cause" must be raised, that
^Ibld., p. 1 7 8. ^Ibid., p. 1.
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is, what makes emergents emerge? As has been previously
indicated, Morgan rejected Alexander's view of time as
the effective generator of emergent qualities; temporal
succession is not sufficient explanation of emergence.
Further, since in Morgan’s theory of levels the psychical
and physical are only correlates and there is no causal
2relation between them, it is clear that in his specula­
tive system the psychical attribute cannot be the cause 
of emergence in or from the physical or vice versa, nor 
can the higher events explain the existence or emergence 
of lower events. It is, of course, true that the lower 
events are dependent upon the higher but this dependence, 
as made clear by Morgan, refers to the higher events 
(such as mind) "guiding" or "sustaining" the lower events 
(such as matter or "body"), that is, the higher may in-, 
fluence the behaviour of the lower which co-exists with 
it under the concept of involution.But this dependence 
of the lower upon the higher does not refer to dependence 
for existence or emergence. Nor can the lower events 
explain the emergence of the higher events. If such were 
the case, the new qualities and relations would not be 
emergent at all, but would be merely resultant.
Since Morgan has eliminated time, psychical attri-
^Ibid., p . 24. 
^Ibid.. p. 2 8 . 
^Ibid.. p. 1 7 .
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butes, higher and lower events as causes of emergence, one 
may be tempted to question whether there is anything with­
in his scheme of emergent evolution which could possibly 
be an explanation of emergence. In the absence of a 
specific cause of emergence within the system, one may 
have expected Morgan to do as many before and after him 
have done, namely appeal to the general theory of evolu­
tion as the explanation. However, this he refused to do. 
Morgan recognized that evolution is not an explanation
1of emergence but merely a "descriptive interpretation".
Is there anything, then, which will not merely inter­
pret but will also explain the process of emergent evolu­
tion? Morgan answers in the affirmative by introducing 
his concept of Activity. Morgan himself raises the ques­
tion, "What makes emergents emerge?" and answers it by 
stating that there is "some Mind through whose Activity 
. . . the course of events is directed."^ For Morgan, 
this Mind or Spirit— he uses the words synonymously— is 
God "through whose Activity emergents emerge, and the 
whole course of emergent evolution is directed."^ Morgan 
chooses to emphasise the contrast between the explanations 
of emergence given in his own system and that of Alexander 
as follows:
^Ibid.. pp. 2 0 6, 2 0 7. h b l d . . p. 3 6 .
^Ibid., p . 3 2 .
^Ibid.
4?
For hlm ^lexande:^ , as I understand, it is the inherent go of time that pushes events onwards.A doctrine that acknowledges a directive Activity in evolution explains also from above, accepting with its fitting form of piety, God who draws all things and all men upwards. 1
In Morgan's view, therefore, the world is in constant 
process of change and "ultimately all observable change 
is due to some form of Spiritual Activity," God is the 
ultimate philosophical explanation.^
At this critical point in his metaphysical system, 
in the acceptance of the existence of God as an ultimate 
philosophical explanation, Morgan emphasises that this 
too is accepted under acknowledgment.^  This acknowledg­
ment of God, for which there can be no positive proof, 
nor against which no disproof can be levelled, is founded 
upon philosophic considerations only, without scientific 
evidence or support, the proper attitude of science being 
that of agnosticism.^^
Since by Morgan’s own definition and concession, 
nothing accepted under the concept of acknowledgment can 
be proven true, why should God be acknowledged at all? 
Morgan gives four reasons for so doing. First of all, 
such an acknowledgment functions in his metaphysical sys­
tem as the ultimate philosophical explanation as has al-
^Ibid., p. 6 2 . ^^ Ibid., pp. 6l~2 , ll6 .
^Ibid., p. 2 7 6. -^ Ibid., pp. 2 , 9 .
^Ibid., p . 9 ■
48
ready been discussed. In other words, God supplies the 
explanation for process and emergence. Secondly, the 
acceptance of God under acknowledgment is supported by, 
although of course not proved by, the concept of depend­
ence. In accordance with this concept, which theorizes 
that lower events are guided and sustained by, and are 
dependent upon higher events co-existing at the same 
level, Morgan speculates,
if . . . 1  follow upv/ards the line of "dependence"I again reach (for my constructive philosophy) a limiting concept— that of ultimate dependence in terms of which the whole course of emergent evo­lution is explained (not merely interpreted) within one consistent and balanced scheme. This, too, I accept under acknowledgment.^
Thus for Morgan, just as the physical world is the limit­
ing concept under "involution", so God is the limiting 
concept under "dependence".
Thirdly, Morgan accepts the existence of God under 
acknowledgment by introducing a pragmatic element into 
his philosophy which otherwise emphasises the importance 
of coherence. He states that belief in God has pragmatic 
endorsement in that it has profound influence in the prac- 
tical guidance of human conduct. Elsewhere, emphasising 
the same point, Morgan states that the acknowledgment of 
God is a "postulate" which is accepted on the ground that 
it "works".^  .
Fourthly, there is also an intuitive and subjective
^Ibid.. p. 3 3 . ^Ibid.. p. 2 9 9-
^Ibld. , pp. 6l, 6 2 .
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element involved in the recognition of the Activity of
God under acknowledgment.
Within us, if anywhere, we must feel the urge, or however it be named, which shall afford the basis upon which acknowledgment of Activity is founded. What then does it feel like? Each must answer for himself, fully realising that he may misinterpret the evidence. . . .  To me it feels like a drawing upwards through Activity existent at a higher level than that to which I have attained. Of course, I am quite ready to admit that those who do have this feeling of be­ing attracted by the Ideal and who build an ex­planation thereon may be mistaken. Hence my reiterated speaking of acknowledgment
Again, Morgan stresses that unless we "intuitively" enjoy 
God's Activity within us, we can have no immediate know­
ledge of Him as the source of our own existence and of
2emergent evolution.
It is evident that, although Morgan concedes that 
belief in the existence and Activity of God can never be 
proved since it is accepted under acknowledgment, he 
nonetheless offers rational (with emphasis on coherence), 
pragmatic and intuitive elements in defence of such 
acknowledgment.
Morgan specifically justifies his acknowledgment of 
God on the basis that this acknowledgment lends coherence 
to his scheme which aims at constructive consistency.-^ 
Allowing Morgan this acknowledgment, let us examine his




concept of God a little more closely.
First of all, it must be pointed out that what Morgan 
here acknowledges is, in his estimation, "a really exist­
ent Ideal" just as the physical world which he also accepts 
under acknowledgment is regarded as existing independently 
of its being perceived. Morgan contrasts his own position
with that of Alexander whose concept of God is such that
2God, as actually possessing deity, does not exist. As 
emphasised in the previous chapter, Alexander viewed God 
as an ideal in the process of becoming, that is in process 
towards, but never attaining infinite deity. Morgan, on 
the other hand, stresses that what he acknowledges is an 
Ideal which actually exists.
Further, in Morgan's scheme of things God, as cause 
of and explanation for emergence does not himself emerge. 
Morgan states explicitly that Mind--his synonym for Spirit
3or God— "as directive of emergent evolution does not emerge." 
In this instance also, Morgan adopts a position at variance 
with Alexander, as the latter viewed God himself as emerg­
ing from, and being an infinite creature of, Space-Time. 
However, although in Morgan's view God does not emerge, 
he is progressively unfolded and this "progressive unfold­
ing is a process 'in time. ' Thus God is manifested in 
natural events and in a temporal process. Morgan himself
^Ibid., pp. 208, 209. ^Ibid., p. 37.
^Ibid., p. 3^. Ibid., p. 112.
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immediately raises the question, "Does the Activity which 
is thus manifested subsist sub specie temporis or sub 
specie aeternitatis?" His response is an emphatic vote 
for the latter alternative. After conceding that his 
belief in the existence of the physical world, of God, and 
of unrestricted correlation is accepted under acknowledg­
ment, he states,
It is within such an acknowledged frame of reference, with its three-fold relatedness of in­volution, dependence, and correlation, that world- events take their course "in space and time."p But dependence on God is sub specie aeternitatis.
Thus in Morgan's view God possesses both temporal and non­
temporal features. The temporal is the manifestation of 
his Activity, the progressive unfolding of himself in the 
world process; the non-temporal is that aspect upon which 
everything else, including the world process, depends.
The former represents God's immanence ; the latter represents 
his transcendence.^
Morgan therefore leaves the impression that God, in 
some sense, does transcend the world. However, with refer­
ence to this matter there may be some ambiguity. In one 
brief comment emphasising God's relationship to the world 
Morgan states, "Emphasis on relatedness still seems to be 
essential; and this is implied in both involution and de~
^Ibid. ^Ibid., pp. 208, 209.
^Ibid., p . Il6.
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pendence. Of God in isolation from the world . . .  I can 
form no adequate conception." Morgan had, as we have 
already seen, stressed the essential relatedness of natural 
events within the world process of space and time; in this 
brief statement there is at least the apparent suggestion 
that essential relatedness may also exist between God and 
the world. Since Morgan stresses that essential related­
ness is implied in his doctrines of involution and de­
pendence, we must pursue this matter a little further to 
determine in which ways, if any, either involution or 
dependence can be applied to God, or rather if God him­
self is subject to either involution or dependence.
It must be clear already that in Morgan’s view God 
is not and cannot be dependent upon anything else. This 
is the case because in Morgan’s theory of dependence, 
dependence is always upon the "higher", the "higher" not 
depending upon the "lower" but involving it. This again 
differentiates Morgan’s view from that of Alexander who 
held that dependence was mutual, God depending on the 
world (and man in particular), and the world (and man in 
particular) depending upon God as in panentheism. How­
ever, as previously stated, such is not the case in 
Morgan's scheme. In his estimation dependence is a "one­
way street" as it were, the lower events depending upon 
the higher, but never the higher upon the lower; the high­
^Ibid., p . 299.
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er events, however, do involve the lower events as nec­
essary co-existents.
If God, then, is not subject to dependence, is he 
subject to involution, that is, does God involve the world
as a necessary co-existent? In actual fact, this is another
-1formulation of the question already raised earlier, namely 
is matter just as eternal as God himself? It would seem 
that in answer to this question, three alternatives are 
possible : (l) that matter itself is not eternal but is an 
emergent from something else; (2) that matter is not eter- . 
nal but was brought into existence, that is created, by 
God; and (3) that matter is eternal. With reference to
(1) we have already seen that Morgan denied that matter 
is emergent. In his view, although life, mind and re­
flective thought are emergents, this emergence takes place 
from matter which, for Morgan, is the basal level, the
limiting concept under involution. For Morgan, primordial
2events are material. Matter is not an emergent. Con­
cerning (2) Morgan makes no specific reference whatsoever. 
However, in light of his view that primordial events are 
physical and his concession that he can form no concept 
of God in isolation from the world, it would appear that 
he would also reject this second alternative. What then 
of option (3)? Regarding this possibility of the eternity 
of matter Morgan again makes no specific comment. How-
^Supra, p. 37. Morgan, Ibid., p. 23.
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ever, that this is at least the implication of his philo­
sophical position is indicated by the following consider­
ations. First of all, the eternity of matter seems to be 
implied in the theory of involution. It will be recalled 
that this concept refers to higher events involving lower 
events as necessary co-existents. Morgan, however, in­
sists that under the theory of involution the physical 
world, that is matter, is the limiting concept . What, 
then, does matter "involve"? Nothing; it is the base.
But if matter involves nothing else, then it requires 
nothing else as a necessary co-existent, and if nothing 
else is necessary to the existence of matter, then matter 
is self-existent or eternal. Secondly, if the first point 
is inconclusive on its own, it must be considered in the 
context of Morgan’s view that primordial events are phy­
sical. Taken together, these two points state, in sum­
mary, that the primordial events were constituted by, or 
composed of matter and that matter itself required nothing 
else for its own existence. Self-existent matter, without 
beginning, seems to be the picture portrayed, that is, 
eternal matter. If the picture seemingly portrayed is 
accurate, then what is the relationship existing between 
this eternal matter and God? Does God involve the physical 
w^orld? This possibility may be attacked on the basis that 
involution applies only to natural events occurring in
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space and time. However, such limitation of the concept 
of involution to the world process may not be justified.
It will be recalled that Morgan viewed the entire process 
of emergence as being dependent upon God. Therefore the 
concept of dependence at least is significant in terms of 
God's relationship to the world; why not also the concept 
of involution? Indeed, this seems to be the thrust of 
the brief passage with which this discussion began, that 
both dependence and involution are embraced in the rela­
tionship existing between God and the world, that is, God 
involving the world, and the world depending upon God. In 
this view it would seem that God and the world require each 
other, God involving the world as a necessary co-existent 
and the world process, that is the temporal course of 
events, depending upon God, that is, in the language of , 
Morgan, being guided and sustained by him. This we regard 
as the meaning of Morgan’s statement, ’’Emphasis on related­
ness still seems to be essential; and this is implied in 
both involution and dependence. Of God in isolation from 
the world . . .  I can form no adequate conception."
In view of this relationship in which God and the 
world process apparently require each other, can Morgan’s 
view be described as a process philosophy and, more speci­
fically, can it be regarded as being panentheistic?
^Ibid.. p. 209.
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Certainly Morgan'S philosophic scheme contains elements 
which are found in, or bear some affinity to both process 
and panentheistic concepts. His repeated emphasis on the 
world being in constant process of change; his stress upon 
the essential relatedness of the "events" within the world 
process; his affirmation that even the seemingly stable, 
such as the atom, is in actual fact a rhythmic whirl of 
events; all of these are positions endorsed by process 
thinkers. Not only so, but his theory of correlation in 
which he asserts that all systems of events contain both 
psychical and physical aspects, that both attributes are 
pervasive throughout the universe of natural entities, is 
seemingly parallel, if not identical, to the process view­
point of nature itself as dipolar. In both Morgan's posi­
tion and that of process philosophy the universe is pan-, 
psychistic. In addition, Morgan's use of the concept of 
God as an explanation for the world process was duplicated 
by process writers. For example Morgan, it will be recall­
ed, stated that God draws all things and all men upwards; 
Whitehead affirms that actual entities go through a pro­
cess of completion motivated by consequent, conceptual 
experience initially derived from God, a position to be 
discussed in the next chapter. Further, Morgan’s state­
ments which refer to God's being progressively unfolded 
in the temporal world process, but that this process it­
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self is dependent upon God sub specie aeternitatis, are 
certainly extremely similar to the theories advanced by 
process and panentheistic philosophers. Also if, as seems 
to be the case, in Morgan's view God and the world pro­
cess are essentially related, requiring each other— this 
being implied in the theories of involution and dependence-- 
then this, too, is a fundamental tenet of the process and 
panentheistic positions. Therefore on the basis of these 
facts, together with the explication of them in this 
chapter, we must conclude that Morgan's metaphysical 
position truly belongs to the process perspective.
The question yet remains: Is Morgan's view of the
relation between God and the world a panentheistic one?
In this instance we believe that the answer must be in 
the negative. The basic tenet of panentheism, by defi­
nition, is that everything is in God; God is all-inclusive. 
Such cannot be conclusively demonstrated to be the case in 
Morgan's philosophy and, indeed, there are strong indi­
cations to the contrary. First of all, there is no 
explicit statement with reference to God's being all- 
inclusive. There is no language in Morgan indicating that 
the world process is literally a contingent aspect of God 
himself. But, it may be argued, is it not Morgan’s view 
that God is "unfolded" in the temporal process? Yes, but 
this unfolding of God in the world is not, in Morgan's
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metaphysics, a process whereby God grows or develops as in 
panentheism; instead it is "the unfolding of that which is 
enfolded; the rendering explicit of that which is hitherto 
implicit." With additional reference to the world pro­
cess, Morgan writes, "In the beginning the end was enfold­
ed; but only through unfolding do we learn what was, from
2first to last, the nature of this enfolded end." We wish 
to draw attention particularly to the expression "from 
first to last" in the above quotation. The conclusion, we 
believe, is clear: God is progressively manifested in the 
temporal process, but this unfolding is of that which is 
constant, which does not itself grow or develop. This 
conclusion finds confirmation in Morgan's explicit state­
ment that "Mind"-~his synonym for God--"as directive of 
emergent evolution does not emerge. In addition, Mor­
gan's rejection of Alexander’s view that God, as possessor 
of deity does not exist but is always "becoming", coupled 
with his own belief that God is a really existing Ideal, 
once again indicates that in Morgan's view God is not 
"caught up" in the temporal process. Therefore, if the 
temporal world process which, by definition, is growing 
and developing does not cause God to do the same, then 
the world process cannot be contained within God; and if
^Ibid., pp. Ill, 112.
^Ibid., p. 111.
^Ibid., p . 37•
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the world is not contained within God, then Morgan's view 
cannot be considered as panentheistic. If it be argued 
that we have not considered the possibility that it is 
God's essence which does not change and that this may be 
the already existent Ideal of which Morgan speaks, we 
reply that Morgan himself makes no distinction between 
the essence and accidents of God, and that to read such 
panentheistic concepts into his writing is unwarranted.
If Morgan, then, is not a panentheist, what is his 
position? Morgan's view seems to result in a metaphysical 
dualism in which the psycho-physical universe is co-existent 
with God but not a part of him. This disqualifies Morgan's 
theory of reality not only from being panentheism but also 
from being pantheism inasmuch as God and the world are not 
identical. Is Morgan, then, a traditional theist? Some 
have held that this is the case, but to this conclusion 
we must take exception. In Morgan’s theory of reality 
God and the world may be distinct, but there remains an 
ultimate metaphysical dualism. God may in Morgan's words 
be the "ultimate philosophical explanation" for the world 
process, but there still remains the "problem" of the 
world's very existence. God may cause emergence from 
the basal psycho-physical events, but as indicated in 
this chapter, the psycho-physical events themselves seem 
to be just as ultimate as God. This ultimate metaphysical 
dualism is contrary to the traditional concept in which 
God is responsible for the very existence of the world.
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We conclude, therefore, that if Morgan be considered as a 
theist because of the distinction he draws between God 
and the world process, his position should be recognized 
as a limited theism in which God is, and always has been, 
confronted with a spatio-temporal realm not of his making 
but over which he can exert his influence. Thus Morgan's 
description of God as the ultimate philosophical explana­
tion seems to be premature ; something else requires ex­
planation, the very existence of the finite entities in 
which process or change is taking place. As in Alexander, 
so in Morgan, there is no real sense of God as creator.
We repeat here a comment we made in concluding the pre­
vious chapter. "The question as to why anything should 
exist at all . , . remains unanswered; it admits no ex­
planation." This particular lacuna is not uncommon in 
process philosophy.
In conclusion, for Morgan belief in the existence 
of God is not a deduction from any closely reasoned argu­
ment ; the concept of God is a postulate which, even if 
erroneous, lends coherence to the system. There is, 
therefore a presumption in favour of theism— or at least, 
as we have seen, a limited theism— but one may well be 
justified in at least raising the question as to whether 
such a limited theism is truly explanatory of the uni­
verse in which we live.
In terms of explaining the process pervading reality, 
Alexander assumed Time as the creative element, subordinat­
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ing God to the position of being a creature of Space-Time, 
Morgan, recognizing this weakness, postulated God himself 
as the explanation of the world process. In the next 
chapter a similar but far from identical view will be 
examined as we review the metaphysical position of 
Alfred North Whitehead.
CHAPTER THREE 
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD: DIPOLAR THEISM
As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, 
the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, specifically 
as it is set forth in his work Process and Reality, will 
be briefly examined in this chapter. Obviously, no one 
chapter can do. justice to the genius of Whitehead, nor 
can his metaphysics be critically examined within such 
limits as are necessary in this writing. All that will 
be attempted will be a brief review of his philosophy as 
it pertains to his doctrine of God. An effort will be 
made to emphasise the similarities to, and differences 
from, the viewpoints of Alexander and Morgan, and hopefully 
a groundwork will be laid for the next chapter in which 
Hartshorne’s indebtedness to Whitehead will be demonstrated. 
Before turning to an examination of Process and Reality, 
which can surely be regarded as the culmination of White­
head's philosophy, it will be advantageous to trace the 
development of his thought prior to the publication of 
that work. Such a development can be seen from his earlier 
writings, particularly Science and the Modern World and
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Religion in the Making.^
In Process and Reality Whitehead concedes that his
philosophical perspective is closely allied to that of
Spinoza, but distinguishes between them in that his own
view emphasises dynamic process as opposed to the one sub-
2stance of Spinoza. Much of the similarity to Spinoza
which has been lost in Process and Reality is more clearly 
recognized in Science and the Modern World to which we now 
direct our attention. In that work, Whitehead had regarded 
the ultimate metaphysical reality as a substantial or 
eternal activity,and had compared this underlying activity 
to the one infinite substance of Spinoza.^ However, al­
though the two views can be compared, they cannot be equated. 
Whitehead again stresses that the eternal activity which 
he regards as the ultimate reality is not a static sub­
stance but rather an underlying process."^ Despite this 
basic distinction, the affinity existing between the views 
of Spinoza and Whitehead remains obvious. Just as the one 
infinite substance of Spinoza is characterized by its two
'tJohn B. Cobb, Jr. has noted this progression in excellent fashion in his work, A Christian Natural Theology (Philadelphia; The Westminster Press, 1965), p p. 135-175•
^Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1929)» P* 10.
^Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925) » PP~* 15^» 155 •
^Ibid., p. I8l. -^Ibid.
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known attributes and its various modes, so also in the 
philosophy of Whitehead the ultimate reality which is 
eternal activity is characterized by its attributes and 
modes. Indeed, in Whitehead's metaphysics this character­
ization is essential; the eternal activity, apart from its 
attributes and modes, is abstract and non-actual. As Cobb
states the matter, "Substantial activity . . . cannot occur
1except in some definite way," that is, through its attri­
butes and modes. The question which arises at this point 
has to do with the identification and nature of the attri­
butes and modes; what are they? Cobb summarises the matter 
as follows:
. . . all definite entities can be analyzed into actual entities and eternal objects. This means that substantial activity necessarily adopts these forms which are then declared, in accordance with Spinozistic terminology, to be its attributes. In concrete, substantial activity is given only in actual entities which are called its modes.^
Thus at this stage, eternal activity can be seen to possess
two attributes, namely eternal objects and actual entities.
An extremely important distinction which must be noted is
that although eternal objects and actual entities are both
attributes of substantial activity, only the actual entities
are truly actual. That is, they are concrete matters of
^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 139* 
h b i d . , pp. 139-140.
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fact, actual existents. Eternal objects, on the other 
hand, are not actual; they compose the realm of possibili­
ties for actualization and can be classified as pure poten­
tials for the constitution of concrete things, that is, actual 
entities. These actual entities, as Cobb notes, are the 
modes of eternal activity. Whitehead also theorizes that 
the eternal activity envisages both eternal objects and 
actual entities. He states,
The underlying activity, as conceived apart from the fact of realisation, has three types of en- visagement. These are: first, the envisagementof eternal objects; secondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future
Thus far, we have seen that Whitehead viewed ultimate 
reality as an eternal activity which envisaged two of its 
own attributes, namely the realm of possibilities or poten­
tials, and the realm of concrete fact. However, at this 
point there seems to be no relationship between the two 
different realms, or at least no explanation as to how 
the potentials become actualized in the world of concrete 
things. Whitehead meets this apparent deficiency by intro­
ducing a third attribute of the eternal activity, namely
the principle of concretion or limitation, which Whitehead
2also refers to as God. Three matters of consequence should
^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, pp, 154, 155. 
h b i d ., pp. 250, 2 5 6.
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be observed at this time with reference to the doctrine 
of God as it appears in Science and the Modern World; (1)
God is not the ultimate reality; he is merely one of three 
attributes of the ultimate reality which is eternal activity;
(2) God is not concrete, that is, not a c t u a l H e  is a meta­
physical principle; (3) How God functions as the principle 
of concretion, mediating between the eternal objects and 
the actual entities, is at this point in Whitehead's philo­
sophy simply not explained. For a partial explanation of 
how God functions as the principle of concretion, and for 
further development in Whitehead's philosophy and his 
doctrine of God, we turn to Religion in the Making.
In Religion in the Making Whitehead continues to theorize 
that God is the principle of concretion, but expands and al­
ters the theory in various significant ways. Two major 
changes are made which at least partially explain how God 
functions as the principle of concretion. First of all, 
Whitehead states that God grasps the realm of eternal objects 
in the synthesis of omniscience and that he embraces "the
concept of all such possibilities graded in harmonious,
2relative subordination." It is clear then that the actual 
world takes the definite form it does because of God’s 
envisagement and ordering of the eternal objects. Through
^Ibid., p. 257.
^Alfred N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York; The Macmillan Company, 1926) , p. 157*
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this envisagement of the eternal objects and his ordering I
of them whereby some potentials become definite and actual,
God functions as the principle of concretion. Obviously,
a major modification has occurred in Whitehead’s view since t
his publication of Science and the Modern World. In that 1
work, it will be recalled, the eternal activity envisaged
two of its ovvTL attributes, namely the eternal objects and
the actual entities. The third attribute of the ultimate
metaphysical reality was God, the principle of concretion.
In Religion in the Making, on the other hand, God— still as
the principle of c one re t i on--envi sage s the eternal objects,
and this envisagement is no longer attributed to the under-
lying activity, which in Religion in the Making is now■1termed "creativity".
The second major change in Whitehead’s doctrine of 
God could well have been brought about in response to an 
obvious question; how can a non-actual metaphysical principle 
possess the capacity of envisaging the eternal objects and 
of ordering them in such a fashion that some potentialities
are actualized? Whitehead's response is to desert the pre- Î
■|
viously held position that God is not concrete, and to adopt |
instead the view that God is an actual entity. ^  As Cobb 
relates, "This is not a rejection of the view that he 
is the principle of concretion (or limitation) but the
Î
^Ibid., p . 90.
^Ibid., pp. 90-99 .
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affirmation that it is an actual entity that performs the
function of providing the limitations that make concretion 
1possible." This new emphasis upon God as an actual entity 
seems to be an early application of the ontological princi­
ple which plays such an important part in Whitehead's think­
ing in Process and Reality, a matter to which we shall 
return later.
Although God is now classified as an actual entity,
Whitehead draws a distinction between God and all other
actual entities; whereas they are temporal, he is non- 
2temporal. This non-temporal character of God is necessary 
for the "definite determination which imposes ordered 
balance on the world . . . . However, although God is 
described as non-temporal, he is nonetheless related to the 
temporal actual entities composing the world of concrete 
fact. "There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of 
the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect 
of the world as qualified by the f o r m s . T h u s  as the non­
temporal actual entity, God envisages not only the eternal 
objects, but also the temporal actual entities and is there­
by related to them, the non-temporal interacting with the
^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. l46. 
^Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 90. 
^Ibid.. p. 94.
^Ibid., p. 9 8 .
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temporal. An excellent summary of the development of 
Whitehead’s thought as seen in Science and the Modern World 
and Religion in the Making is given by Cobb as follows:
In Science and the Modern World, we encountered four metaphysical principles: the underlying sub­stantial activity and its three attributes— eternal objects, actual entities, and the principle of limi­tation. In Religion in the Making, subtle but im­portant changes have occurred in the understanding of these four elements in the philosophic system.First, the underlying substantial activity is novf called creativity. . . .  We are no longer invited to compare Whitehead’s thought with that of Spinoza.We read no more of attributes and modes, and the tendency toward monism of the earlier book gives way to an emphatic pluralism of actual entities.Whereas substantial activity was that of which all the other three were attributes, creativity is accorded no such favored place. Complete inter­dependence of the four principles is stressed rather than the primacy of any one. Second, since God is now conceived as an actual entity, we might consider the four metaphysical principles as re­duced to three: creativity, eternal objects, andactual entities including God as a special case.If we do so, however, we have to remember that there is a major philosophical difference between God and the temporal actual entities.1, 2
As stated earlier, in Religion in the Making we find 
partial answers to questions raised concerning how God 
functions as the principle of concretion. He does so as 
an actual entity who envisages and orders the eternal ob­
jects. The question, however, remains as to how God's 
envisagement and ordering of the realm of possibilities 
actually results in certain determinate, concrete existants.
^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 1^8, 149.
2For the preceding section of this chapter, I have been heavily indebted to Cobb's work. For the remaining portion of the chapter, we now turn to an examination of the primary source, Process and Reality.
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To seek the answer to this and other questions we now come 
to what can surely he regarded as Whitehead’s greatest and 
most influential work, Process and Reality.
Whitehead insists that the importance of philosophy 
lies in its fusion of religion and science into one rational 
scheme of thought. Obviously, such a fusion is more com­
patible with some scientific theories than with others.
pWhitehead opts for a realistic philosophy which is not
allied to a rigid empiricism. As he says,
In natural science this rigid method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently pursued, would have left science where it found it.What Bacon omitted was the play of a free imagination, controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. The true method of discovery is like the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational inter­pretation.3
It is evident from the above quotation that Whitehead's 
philosophy is speculative and, indeed, he himself gladly 
concedes the point, stating that the lectures are designed 
as "an essay in Speculative Philosophy.However, in his 
speculative philosophy Whitehead insists upon two conditions 
for the success of the "imaginative experiment". The "first 
requisite is to proceed by the method of generalization so
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 23* 
^Ibid., pp. vii, viii.
^Ibid., p . 7• 
^Ibid., p , 4.
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that certainly there is some application. . . . The second
condition for the success of imaginative construction is 
unflinching pursuit of the two rationalistic ideals, coher­
ence and logical perfection."^ Earlier, Whitehead had add­
ed the criterion of adequacy to those mentioned above.
. . , the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and, in respect to its interpretation, ap­plicable and adequate. Here 'applicable’ means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and 'adequate' means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation. . , . 'Coherence,' as here employed, means that the fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in isolation they are meaningless. . . , The term 'logical' has its ordinary meaning, in­cluding 'logical' consistency, or lack of contra­diction . . .  .2
Thus in his speculation, Whitehead seeks to achieve a
philosophical perspective which meets the test of both
empirical and rational criteria, and at the same time
brings about a fusion of science and religion. In his
view, the "philosophy of organism"^ or "organic realism"
meets the challenge.
In his philosophy of organism, Whitehead rejects not 
only a rigid empiricism but also a strict materialism.^ As 
stated earlier, some scientific theories are more compatible 
than others with a fusion of science and religion, and a 
strict materialism would not easily lend itself to such a
^Ibid., p. 8. ^Ibid., p. 471.
^Ibid., pp. 4, 5• ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p . V .
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synthesis as Whitehead no doubt recognized. The rejection of 
materialism in favour of organic realism is no doubt signi­
ficant in this context. However, it is not being suggested 
that this was Whitehead's primary motive for the substitu­
tion of one perspective by the other. Undoubtedly he re­
garded the organic philosophy as more readily fulfilling the
“Iempirical and rational criteria already cited. Further,
the rejection of materialism in favour of organic realism
"is the displacement of the notion of static stuff by the
2notion of fluent energy,"' a viewpoint supportive of White­
'shead's emphasis upon dynamic process.
The notion of 'organism' is combined with that of 'process' in a twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism; but it is not a static organism. It is an incompletion in process of pro­duction. Thus the expansion of the universe in re­spect to actual things is the first meaning of 'pro­cess'; and the universe in any stage of its expan­sion is the first meaning of ' o r g a n i s m . '4
The second manner in which the notions of organism and pro­
cess are combined reintroduces us to the actual entity, 
already briefly discussed in the material on Science and 
the Modern World and Religion in the Making.
. , . each actual entity is itself only describable as an organic process. It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a process pro­ceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question.5
1Supra, p . 71.
2 IIProcess and Reality, p. 471. Ibid., p. 327.
^Ibid., pp. 10, 327. ^Ibid.
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Thus, for Whitehead, the universe is a dynamic organism
composed of dynamic organisms, the latter being actual
entitles, "the final real things of which the world is 
1made up ."
The theory of actual entities is central to the philo­
sophy of Whitehead. Not only is there "no going behind 
actual entities to find anything more real" but there 
is no going behind them to find any reasons. This is the 
famous ontological principle, also called the principle of 
efficient and final causation, which states that "the 
reasons for things are always to be found in the composite 
nature of definite actual entities . . . .  The ontological
principle can be summarized as: no actual entity, then no 
4reason." On the surface it may appear since actual entities 
are the only reasons and one cannot go behind them to find 
anything more real, that one could conclude that these 
entities are now the ultimate in Whitehead’s metaphysics.
Such a conclusion, however, would be unjustified. In White­
head's philosophy of organism, the ultimate metaphysical 
principle continues to be creativity,^ earlier termed 
eternal activity. In what sense, then, can creativity be 
regarded as ultimate when Whitehead insists that there is
Ibid., p. 27. 
^Ibid.
^Ibid., pp. 33, 37.
4
5
Ibid., p. 2 8. See also pp. 46, 65, 373.
Ibid., p . 11.
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no going behind actual entities to find anything more real?
The key to this question is found in the word "real".
Actual entities are "real", that is concrete; creativity
as the ultimate metaphysical principle is not concrete,
not actual. It is "the ultimate notion of the highest
1generality at the base of actuality." Whitehead describes 
the relationship existing between this highest generality 
and the concrete actualities on the basis of a philo­
sophical assumption which he states as follows; "In all 
philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in 
virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of 
characterization through its accidental embodiments, and 
apart from these accidents is devoid of actuality." In 
the philosophy of organism, the ultimate is creativity 
and the actual entities are its accidental embodiments or 
accidents. There is some ambiguity in the language of 
Whitehead as to whether he wishes to describe the actual 
entities as really characterizing creativity. In the 
above quotation the word "characterization" is used to 
describe this relationship and the same idea is again 
employed when Whitehead writes that "it is the function 
of actuality to characterize the creativity. . . . How­
ever, he also writes that creativity "is that ultimate
^Ibid., p. 47.
^Ibid., pp. 10, 11.
^Ibid., p. 344 (emphasis added).
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notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality.
It cannot be characterized, because all characters are 
more special than itself. But creativity is always found
-Iunder conditions, and described as conditioned." That
there is a seeming contradiction here cannot be denied, but
the apparent contradiction seems to be merely verbal and
of no real consequence. However, because of Whitehead"s
ambiguity in this matter, in this writing the actual
entities will not be referred to as characterizations of
creativity but rather as accidents of creativity. They
will also be referred to as "creatures" of creativity, in
compliance with Whitehead’s own vocabulary. He states that
"the actual world is a process, and that the process is
the becoming of actual entities. Thus actual entities
2are creatures." Again he writes, "But of course, there 
is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures'
. . . and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 
'creativity . . . ."^ It is evident that Whitehead has
moved a long way from his earlier position set forth in 
Science and the Modern World. In that work eternal activity 
as the ultimate was indeed characterized by its own attri­
butes, including the actual entities, also called "modes" 
of eternal activity. Now in Process and Reality, the
^Ibid., p. 47 (emphasis added).
^Ibid., p. 3 3 .
^Ibid., p. 3 4 4 .
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actual entities are neither attributes nor modes of the 
ultimate reality, creativity, but rather its creatures.
While the emphasis of this discussion has been placed 
upon Whitehead's view that the actual entities are creatures 
of creativity, he also stresses— as noted above--that 
creativity itself is always found under conditions, and 
described as conditioned. In this respect, actual entities 
have a vital part to play; they are said to condition creati­
vity, and such is possible by virtue of a decision on the 
part of the actual entities. In a significant passage, 
Whitehead writes as follows:
. . . 'decision' cannot be construed as a casual adjunct of an actual entity. It constitutes the very meaning of actuality. An actual entity arises from decisions for it, and by its very existence provides decisions for other actual entities which supersede it. . . . Just as 'potentiality for pro­cess' is the meaning of the more general term 'entity,' or 'thing'; so 'decision' is the additional meaning imported by the word 'actual' into the phrase 'actual entity.' 'Actuality' is the decision amid 'potential­ity. ' . . . . The real internal constitution of anactual entity progressively constitutes a decision conditioning the creativity which transcends that actuality.!
In summary, to be actual means to be involved in decision, 
and the decision which is made conditions creativity within 
the limits or confines of that decision. Thus an actual en­
tity may be described as a decision-making, dynamic organism 
in the process of becoming.
It must be understood in this context that "in our
^Ibid., pp. 68, 69.
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reference to the actual world, we rarely consider an in­
dividual actual entity. The objects of our thoughts are 
almost always societies, or looser groups of actual enti- 
ties," and it is these societies— also called a "nexus"
oof actual occasions or "event" --which "enjoy adventures 
of change throughout time and s p a c e . O n  the other 
hand, actual entities do not change; they exist for only 
an instant and then perish, and in perishing compel their 
successors to take account of them.^  Thus what we may 
consider to be an object will actually be composed of 
any number of actual entities. Whitehead illustrates 
this in two significant examples. He states that man is 
a society of actual entities with personal order, "an 
historic route of actual occasions"--another terra for the 
temporal actual entities--"which in a marked degree . . . 
inherit from each other. In this first example, al­
though the description of a person as a society of 
entities may appear unusual, it is not difficult to 
attribute decision making to a person. However, in his 
second example, and this with specific reference to 
decision making in actual entities or occasions, White­
head reaches into what is generally considered to be the
^Ibid., p. 301. Ibid., pp. 52, 92, 222, 223
^Ibid., pp. 113, 124. ^Ibid., p. 137.
^Ibid., p . 52.
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inorganic realm. He writes, "The Castle Rock at Edin­
burgh exists from moment to moment, and from century to 
century, by reason of the decisions effected by its own 
historic route of antecedent occasions." The question 
must be asked: In what sense can decision making be
attributed to the actual occasions constituting the Castle 
Rock at Edinburgh, or any other object which is generally 
held to be inorganic? Whitehead's answer is that mental 
activity belongs to all actual entities in some degree. 
However, such mental activity or experience does not 
necessarily involve consciousness, which arises only in 
the higher phases of concrescence.^ Nonetheless, mental 
activity can be attributed to all actual entities, and 
all actual entities can therefore be described as dipolar, 
possessing both physical and mental poles or aspects.^
In this theory Whitehead, like Alexander and Morgan, 
presents a basic panpsychism as fundamental to his 
philosophy. Through this panpsychistic theory, White­
head is able to account for decision-making in all levels 
of concrete reality.
Thus, all actual entities are dipolar, and since 
each entity is dynamic, or in process of becoming, the 
process of becoming is dipolar. In this process each pole 
or aspect of the actual entity performs a different function.
^Ibid., p. 69. ^Ibid., pp. 5^i 386.
^Ibid., pp. 88, 386.
^Ibid., pp. 54, 130, 246, 379, 423.
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With the physical pole, the actual entity takes account
of the actual world, composed of other actual entities in
its past, since according to Whitehead contemporary entities
1are causally independent of one another. With the mental 
pole the actual entity takes account of the eternal oh- 
jects which are pure potentials for the specific deter-
3mination of fact. This "taking account of" other actual 
entities or eternal objects, Whitehead calls a "prehension"^ 
which he equates with rudimentary feeling. Such prehen­
sions include emotion, purpose, valuation and causation,^ 
but as noted earlier, consciousness is not necessarily 
included. Thus the actual entity is dipolar by reason of 
its physical prehensions of the actual world and its con­
ceptual prehensions of eternal objects.^ As a result of
its physical prehensions, an actual entity is interdepen- 
7dent and social, the latter being the case because "the
outlines of its own character are determined by the data 
which its environment provides for its process of feeling. 
As a result of its conceptual prehensions, each actual 
entity takes account of possibilities for future realisa­
tion into concrete fact. Whitehead further explains con-
,,8
^Ibid., pp. 95» 102. ^Ibid., p. 28.
^Ibid., p. 7 2 . °Ibld., pp. 7 2 , 3 6 6, 3 6 7.
^Ibid.. pp. 3 2 , 3 4 , 44. ^Ibid.. p. 2 8 .
Ibid., p. 3 3 5 . ^Ibid., p. 309: see alsoP , 168 .
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ceptual prehension by the use of an equivalent term, 
"appetition". He states,
Appetition is immediate matter of fact in­cluding in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be. The im­mediate occasion thereby conditions creativity so as to procure, in the future, physical realization of its mental pole, according to the various valu­ations inherent in its various conceptual pre­hensions . 2
With reference to the above quotations, two matters 
must be emphasised: (1) In its appetition for the concrete 
realisation of certain potentials, the actual entity aims 
at a specific ideal for itself;^ and (2) in conditioning 
creativity in accordance with that aim, the actual entity 
can be described as self-creative or self-caused.^ Of 
course, as noted earlier, actual entities are creatures 
of creativity, but in their decision making role with refer­
ence to the ideal to be achieved, that is, in their process 
of concrescence, they are self-creative. In the language 
of the ontological principle, they are their own reasons 
for what they are becoming and become. As the self-creative 
process of becoming is completed, the actual entity is said 
to perish, having reached its satisfaction and, in this 
satisfaction loses its self-creative subjectivity but con­
tinues to exist as a superject or object to be prehended 
by succeeding occasions. In the latter state, the entity 
is said to be "objectively immortal" or to possess "object-
^Ibld., p. 4 9 . ^Ibid., p. 1 3 0 .
^Ibid.. pp. 47, 48. Ibid., pp. 38, 130, 339-340, 374.
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1ive immortality." The emphasis here should be placed 
upon the word "objective"; immortality does not belong 
to the experiencing subject in the process of becoming, 
but only to the entity as superject or object for the be­
coming of others. Whitehead makes the point as follows:
. . . actual entities ’perpetually perish' sub­jectively, but are immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy. It loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation whereby it is a ground of obligation characterizing the creativity.^
In the preceding quotation, Whitehead mentions two 
different types of causation with reference to the actual 
entities, "final" and "efficient". The distinction be­
tween these is extremely important, Whitehead stressing 
that "one task of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final 
and efficient causes in their proper relation to each
3other." First of all, with reference to efficient causa­
tion, this must always be understood in the context of 
the entity having already reached its satisfaction, and 
always has reference to its effect upon other entities. 
Whitehead states that the effects of the actual entity
. . , are all to be described in terms of its 'satisfaction.’ The 'effects' of an actual entity are its interventions in concrescent processes other than its own. Any entity, thus intervening in processes transcending^^itself, is said to be functioning as an object.
^Ibid., pp. 44, 71, 89. ^Ibid., p. 1 2 9 .
^Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 336 (emphasisadded).
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Of course, as noted earlier, contemporary entities are
causally independent of one another and, consequently,
efficient causation always has reference to the past.
That is, the entity which intervenes in the concrescent
process of another through being prehended by the latter,
is always in the past. Indeed, Whitehead speaks of the
-1efficient cause as being "the immortal past".
The final cause, on the other hand, has reference 
to the future, to the ideal or potential yet to be real­
ised by the entity concerned. Further, this final cause 
is not inherited from the past but is "the internal prin- 
ciple of unrest" within the present actual entity. This 
internal principle of unrest or final causation is termed, 
by Whitehead, the "subjective aim" of the actual entity.^ 
It is the ideal for itself which guides the actual entity 
in its self-creative process.^ This ideal is recognized 
by the occasion via its mental pole or aspect. Here 
again the element of decision is involved. As Whitehead 
states, "the decision derived from the actual world, which 
is the efficient cause, is completed by the decision em­
bodied in the subjective aim which is the final cause. 
However, the decision embodied in the subjective aim does 
not necessarily include consciousness. Whitehead writes.
1 /xIbid., p. 320. Ibid.. pp. 130, 134.
^Ibid., p. 44. ^Ibid., p. 423.
^Ibid., pp. 130, 320. °Ibid.
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This subjective aim is not primarily intellectual; it is the lure for feeling. This lure for feeling is the germ of mind. Here I am using the term 'mind' to mean the complex of mental operations involved in the constitution of an actual entity,Mental operations do not necessarily involve con­sciousness .!
Thus the final cause is the lure for feeling, the germ 
of mind, the internal subjective aim of the actual entity 
as a subject seeking to realise in actuality what it re­
cognizes as an ideal for itself, seeking what is not, 
and yet may come to be.
With the foregoing brief discussion of causation in 
mind, it is possible to draw a simple but significant 
conclusion; efficient causation has to do strictly with 
inheritance from the past; final causation--the subjective 
aim of the actual entity--has to do with future possibilities 
yet unrealised, that is, with the emergence of novelty.
This subjective aim which allows for novel concrescences 
is supplied to each actual entity by God. Through supply­
ing the subjective aim, God is thereby the principle of 
concretion. "In this sense God is the principle of con­
cretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each 
temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which 
its self-causation starts.*
Whitehead has now explained in what sense God is the
^Ibid., p , 130 .
^Ibid., pp. io4, 164, 343, 373, 522.
^Ibid., p. 374.
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principle of concretion. This is a further development 
of his previous thought. It will he recalled that in 
Science and the Modern World God was regarded as only a 
metaphysical principle; in Religion in the Making God was 
described as an actual entity, still functioning as the 
principle of concretion, but with no indication given as 
to how that function was performed; now in Process and 
Reality, we are informed that God functions as the prin­
ciple of concretion by supplying the initial subjective 
aim to the temporal actual entities. In Process and 
Reality Whitehead confirms the position adopted in Religion 
in the Making, namely, that God performs this function as 
an actual entity since, in accordance with the ontological 
principle, only actual entities are effective. As the 
principle of concretion God can also be described as the 
organ of novelty. He is "the ground of all order and
pof all originality." As the ground of all originality,
God can be described as a "mediator" in two different 
respects. First, God "mediates" between creativity and 
the actual occasions. Creativity is the principle of 
novelty,^ the actual occasions are the real concrete 
novelties, and God is the organ of novelty making it
^Ibid., p . 104.
. p. 164.
^Ibid., p . 31 ■
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possible for the metaphysical principle to be actualized, 
in its temporal creatures. Secondly, God "mediates" be­
tween the eternal objects and the temporal actual entities.
. . . the actualities constituting the process ofthe world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or ’participation’) of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal.The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timeless­ness of what is potential. This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization. This ideal realization of poten­tialities in a primordial actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable.1
God, therefore, as an actual entity, envisages all the 
eternal objects, that is the entire realm of possibili­
ties and, prehending also the actual world, presents to 
each occasion the ideal for itself within the context of
pits actual world.~ The "actual world" is peculiar to 
each actual entity, and always includes the primordial 
actual entity, God. Because God is an actual entity,
^Ibid., pp. 63» 64.
. p. 248.
^Ibld., pp. 42, 102
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he too is both subject and superject; God, too, is pre­
hended by the temporal occasions, and it is through pre­
hending God that the temporal occasions become aware of 
"the ideal" for themselves. In this respect, the pre­
hension through which God is objectifled--that is, through 
which he is an object for the temporal actual occasions-- 
is termed by Whitehead a "hybrid" feeling, that is a 
feeling whose data are the conceptual feelings of God.
To summarise— and certainly to oversimplify--through 
God’s envi sagement of all eternal objects he is aware 
of the ideal for each actual entity; through the actual 
entity's prehension of God, it too becomes aware of the 
ideal for itself, thereby obtaining its subjective aim 
for its process of becoming. "The novel hybrid feelings
2derived from God . . . are the foundations of progress."
Through supplying the subjective aim to the occa­
sions, God can be termed the creator of each temporal 
actual entity,-^ However, this would be, in Whitehead's 
own admission, "misleading". There are several reasons 
why this is the case. First of all, as noted earlier, 
each actual entity is self-created. Although it receives 
the general outline of its character from the past, it 
still has a significant part to play in its own becoming.




this through the decision involved in its subjective aim.
In this respect, the actual entity is conditioned but not 
determined by its subjective aim; it remains free and in 
its freedom creates itself. Secondly, to describe God 
as creator would be inappropriate because it suggests 
"that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be 
ascribed to God's volition" whereas the "true metaphys­
ical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of 
this creativity. . . That is, God too, as an actual 
entity, is a creature of creativity.Thirdly, God can­
not be termed the creator of the temporal actual entities
because there is no meaning to "God" apart from the tempo- 
4ral creatures. This last point has reference to White­
head's rejection of the traditional Christian view which 
regards God as "the transcendent creator, at whose fiat 
the world came into being . . . .
It is clear, then, that in Whitehead's speculative 
system God cannot be justly called creator. Nevertheless, 
in the philosophy of organism God plays a major and sig­
nificant part as the actual entity which makes the emergence 
of novelty possible . We will now turn to a more detailed 
study of the concept of God in Whitehead's philosophy.
With reference to his doctrine of God, Whitehead
^Ibid.. pp. 135, 373. h b i d .. p. 344.
^Ibid.. p. 344. ^Ibld.. p. 519-
^Ibid., pp. 33, 46.
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frankly states some matters of great importance. He con­
cedes that his theory of God is an interpretative element
1 2 in his cosmology, and that no "proof" is offered. What
he does undertake is a dispassionate investigation as to 
what his metaphysical principles require concerning the 
nature of God. That is, "God is not to he treated as an 
exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save 
their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."-^
In compliance with the metaphysical principles of 
Whitehead's system, and specifically with reference to 
the ontological principle, God is regarded as an actual 
entity. As stressed above, only by being an actual entity 
could God function as the principle of concretion, the 
organ of novelty since, according to the ontological prin­
ciple, only actual entities are agents, that is, are 
effective. Much discussion has centred around whether 
Whitehead intended God to be viewed as an actual entity 
or a series of actual entities. The controversy is not 
sheerly academic but has to do with further implications 
concerning the nature of God and his relationship to the 
world. Three such important matters--only mentioned here 
but discussed later--are (l) Can God be described as per­





entities, that is, is it a doctrine of panentheism, and 
(3) is God able to preserve value in the universe? To 
these matters we shall return later and we shall deal at 
the moment only with the question as to whether God is an 
actual entity or a series of entities.
Much of what has been written in this chapter already 
has made reference to God as "an actual entity". This 
has not been an effort to prejudge the issue but is rather 
an attempt in this research to reflect Whitehead's own 
usage. While insisting that actual entities differ among 
themselves, he states that "God is an actual entity, and 
so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty 
space." In dealing with the ontological principle in 
the context of the potentiality of the universe he writes, 
"the general potentiality of the universe must be some­
where . . . .  This 'somewhere’ is the non-temporal actual 
2entity." As noted earlier in direct quotations from 
Whitehead, God is described as "that actual entity" which 
supplies the initial subjective aim of each occasion^ and 
as "the final entity" which makes novelty possible
In view of the explicit statements by Whitehead that 
God is ap actual entity, it may seem unusual that any dis­
cussion should arise concerning the possibility that he 
intended to describe God not as a single entity but rather
^Ibld.. p. 28. , p. 374.
^Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 64.
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as a series of entities. Among those who hold that White­
head may really have regarded God as a series of actual 
entities are Robert Whittemore and Charles Hartshorne. 
Hartshorne's position will be the object of our attention 
in the following chapter. Whittemore believes that Hart­
shorne's assessment that Whitehead may have viewed God 
as a series of actual entities is correct. Whittemore 
reaches this conclusion on the basis that Whitehead him­
self draws attention to the fact that God does differ from 
other actual entities. That Whitehead does indeed dis­
tinguish between God and other actual entities is certainly 
true, but such qualifying statements do not have any refer­
ence to the question concerning whether God an actual 
entity; they have reference to distinctions between God 
as the primordial actual entity and the temporal occasions. 
Cobb, who adopts the view that God should be regarded as 
a series of actual entities, rightly concedes that such a
conclusion differs from Whitehead and that Whitehead him-
2self undoubtedly thought of God as ap actual entity.
There is nothing in the text of Process and Reality which 
in any respect detracts from the clear and explicit state­
ments by Whitehead that God is a single actual entity.
Because God is an actual entity, certain other con-
Robert C . Whittemore, "The Americanization of Panentheism," Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Spring,
1 9 6 9), 29-35.
^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, p. 188.
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elusions can be reached about God within the framework of 
Whitehead’s metaphysical principles. For example, if God 
is an actual entity, he must, as noted earlier, also be a 
creature. Such, indeed, is confirmed by Whitehead in very 
clear language.
In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. It is only then capable of characterization through its accidental embodiments, and apart from these acci­dents, is devoid of actuality. In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed 'creativity^ and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident.
Again,
This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity.. . . And also it is to be noted that every actualentity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies.3
As stated earlier, and here confirmed, in the philo­
sophy of organism the ultimate is creativity and God is 
its creature. However, it must be remembered that creativity 
is devoid of actuality separate and apart from its creatures, 
including God.
. . . there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the temporal creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'4
Here Whitehead is laying strong emphasis upon his concept
of coherence which stresses that the basic elements in his
metaphysics "presuppose each other so that in isolation
^Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 33» 46.
^Ibid.. pp. 10, 11. ^Ibld., p. 135. Ibid.. p. 344.
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fthey are meaningless." Thus, although God is a creature 
of creativity, as are the temporal actual entities, all 
three--creativity, God and the temporal occasions--require 
each other in Whitehead's speculative system.
It is clear from the above quotations that God is a 
creature. It is equally clear that he is not a creature 
in the same sense as the other actual entities. He is the 
"primordial, non-temporal" creature; they are "temporal 
creatures". This distinction is vital but must be under­
stood within the context that God as primordial has refer­
ence to only one aspect of his nature. In other words, 
like all actual entities, God too is dipolar, this theory 
once again being in compliance with the general meta­
physical principles of Whitehead's system.
Thus, analogously to all actual entities, the nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. . . .[The primordial nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actu­ality which it presupposes. It is therefore in­finite . . . .  This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious. The other side jGod's consequent nature^ originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world. . . .  It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual,and conscious.2
Elsewhere Whitehead states.




God, . , . God is the primordial creature; butthe description of his nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His 'consequent na­ture' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities.^
With further reference to the consequent nature of God,
Whitehead writes that as a creature, God is "always in
concrescence and never in the past," and so receives a
reaction from the world; this reaction, says Whitehead,
2is God's consequent nature.
In summary, God like all other actual entities is 
dipolar. Unlike the temporal occasions, one pole or 
aspect of God is primordial, eternal, underived; this 
aspect is constituted by God's conceptual prehensions of 
all eternal objects. The other pole or aspect of God is 
consequent, derived from and dependent upon his physical 
prehensions of the temporal occasions. As noted earlier, 
it is precisely because God envisages all potentials that 
he is able to present the "ideal" as a subjective aim to 
each temporal occasion. As Whitehead says, "The primary 
element in the 'lure for feeling’ is the subject's pre-
3hension of the primordial nature of God." Thus, it is 
God in his primordial nature who is the source of the 
possibilities for the realisation of value in the actual 
world.
For Whitehead, however, the realisation of value is
^Ibid. , p. '^6 , ^Ibid., p. 287. See also
2Ibid., p. 47. p. 104.
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not the only goal he seeks in his metaphysics; the con­
servation of value is of equal importance. What is 
gained must not be lost. In Whitehead's system, the values 
realised as a result of God's primordial nature are con­
served in his consequent nature. Whitehead makes clear 
that objective immortality within the temporal world 
does not solve the problem of loss. This problem can 
only be solved by the world becoming "everlasting" by its 
objective immortality in God. In God's consequent na­
ture there is no loss. This is what Whitehead means when
2he calls the consequent nature of God "everlasting."
"The consequent nature of God is his judgement on the 
world. He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy 
of his own life. It is the judgement of a tenderness 
which loses nothing that can be saved,
Thus, God in his primordial nature is the source of 
the subjective aim of each temporal actual entity. In 
his consequent nature he prehends the concrete realisation 
into fact of the value achieved. In this respect, God can 
be conceived as not only the organ of novelty, but as the 
conserver of value. To this matter of God's conserving 
value we shall return in the next chapter when it will be 
necessary to compare Whitehead's position to that of 
Hartshorne.
^Ibld.. p. 527. ^Ibid., p. 525.
, pp. 524, 525.
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As God in his consequent nature conserves the value 
realised in the temporal occasions, he too is the recipient 
of benefits from the world. First, and most fundamental, 
it is only in his consequent nature that God is truly act­
ual, As primordial he is deficient in actuality or "defi­
ciently actual". Such is the case because his feelings
1are only conceptual, having reference to nothing con­
crete. Thus the consequent nature of God is required as 
"the fulfillment of his experience by his reception of 
the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of his
own actualization. It is God as really actual, completing
2the deficiency of his mere conceptual actuality."
Secondly, since conceptual feelings, separate and 
apart from integration with physical feelings, are devoid 
of consciousness, God in his primordial nature is not con- 
scious. Therefore the physical feelings of God, supplied 
by his relationship to and prehension of the temporal en­
tities, are necessary to God if he is to be regarded as 
conscious. These physical feelings or prehensions, of 
course, constitute the consequent nature of God, and it 
is this consequent nature of God which is conscious.^
Thirdly, as God reaps the benefit of concrete actual­
ity and consciousness in his relationship with the world, 
he also profits by the addition of novelty to his own being.
^Ibid.. pp. 50, 521. ^Ibid., pp. 521, 522.
^Ibid.. p. 530. ^Ibid■, p. 524.
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As God in his consequent nature conserves all values 
achieved, he himself is the recipient of the novel addi­
tions. Thus as God is the organ of novelty for the world, 
so the world is the organ of novelty for God. "Neither 
God, nor the world, reaches static completion. Both are 
in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the 
creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and
-1the world, is the instrument of novelty for the other."
2In this sense, God and the world require each other.
Thus God, in his consequent nature, that is, through 
his relationship to the world, reaps the benefits of con­
crete actuality, consciousness and the advance into novelty. 
Conversely, God benefits the world. By supplying the sub­
jective aim to each temporal occasion, he is the prin­
ciple of concretion and the organ of novelty. In his 
consequent nature, he conserves without loss all of the 
values realised in the world. This mutual benefit is 
shared by God and the world, each requiring the other.
In Whitehead's metaphysics, God and the world are inter­
dependent. This interdependence is expressed most clearly 
in Whitehead's now famous antitheses, some of which are 
as follows:




It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many. It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.l
We now return to two questions raised earlier, namely, 
is God personal and is he all-inclusive, that is, can 
Whitehead’s doctrine of God be described as panentheistic?
With reference to the first question, it is undoubt­
edly the case that Whitehead uses language which attri­
butes personal characteristics to God. For example, God 
is conceived as being conscious in his consequent nature. 
He is described as having a tenderness for the temporal 
actual entities, and, in a well-known passage, Whitehead 
speaks of God as "the great companion--the fellow-sufferer 
who understands." If Whitehead's language could be taken 
literally, then God must surely be regarded as truly per­
sonal. However, Whitehead himself warns us that when he 
speaks of God as possessing a "tender care" that he is 
using an "image", that is, the language is not to be 
understood literally. Further, Whitehead's language could 
only be regarded as literal if it were isolated from the 
rest of his metaphysics, specifically his explicit state­
ments to the effect that personality belongs to societies
^Ibld.. p, 528. ^Ibid., p. 532.
^Ibid., pp. l6l, 525.
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of entities and not to single entities. Man, for example, 
is a society with personal order, an historic route of 
actual occasions. But God is not a society of actual 
entities as we noted earlier. Consequently we must con­
clude on the basis of Whitehead's metaphysical principles, 
that God— as ^  actual entity— is not a divine person, or 
personal.
And now we turn to the second question as to whether
Whitehead's doctrine of God could justly be described as
panentheistic, a position attributed to Whitehead by
Hartshorne. William Christian has dealt with this matter
in excellent fashion and we will simply summarise his 
2argument.
In panentheism, as it is set forth by Hartshorne— a 
perspective to be examined in the next chapter— God liter­
ally contains the universe, and thereby also literally has 
all of the experiences that the temporal actual entities 
have. In Hartshorne's language, God is the "subject of 
all change" who includes all the experiences of finite 
subjects and in this sense includes the world. On this 
basis, then, can Whitehead be regarded as a panentheist?
Christian points out that while it is true that God 
does prehend actual occasions, he does not share their
^Ibid.. pp. 137. 138, 244, 3 0 1 .
2William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, IncT, Ï977TT PP . 4o4-409.
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immediacy. "Actual occasions enter into God’s experience, 
but they do so as objects of his physical prehensions. . . . 
And an objectified entity has perished and lost its sub­
jective immediacy. It is functioning as an object and
1not as a subject." He continues, "Between God and an 
actual occasion there is no sharing of immediacy. In this 
respect God does not include the world but excludes it.
God is not the subject of all change. There are real
pprocesses of change of which God is not the subject."
In conjunction with the above, Christian reminds us 
that, according to Whitehead’s metaphysical principles, 
contemporary actual entities are causally independent, 
that is, cannot prehend one another, or be objects for 
one another. Thus for any given "now" God cannot even 
prehend the temporal occasions a[t all. Thus, Christian 
argues effectively that, for Whitehead, God does not 
literally include the actual world because (l) he does not 
include their experiences as subjects; he prehends them 
only as objects which have lost their subjective immediacy 
and (2) God cannot include, even as objects, the contempo­
rary occasions.
An additional, but simple, argument which Christian 
does not mention is the difficulty of viewing God as all- 
inclusive when he is a single actual entity. In other
^Ibid.. p. 405.
^Ibid., p . 4o6.
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words, could God be truly described as ^  actual entity 
if he literally included as part of himself all of the 
temporal occasions and societies of occasions which make 
up the finite world? It seems evident that Whitehead’s 
description of God as an actual entity eliminates his 
theory of God from being panentheistic,
Since, on the basis of the above arguments, it seems 
that in Whitehead's view God transcends the world not only 
in his primordial nature but also in his consequent na­
ture, can this perspective be regarded as more nearly a 
traditional theism than panentheism, as Christian believes?^ 
If such is the case, it is certainly true that Whitehead's 
"theism" is not to be equated with traditional theism. As 
Thomas says, "Whitehead’s view of God is so different in 
several respects from the traditional Theism . . . that
it would probably be wise not to speak of him without
2qualification as a "theist." This word of caution is 
surely justified. As we have already seen, Whitehead’s 
God is neither truly personal nor truly creator. Nor is 
he transcendent in any unique sense. As noted above, there 
is indeed a sense in which Whitehead’s God transcends the 
world in both his primordial and consequent natures, but 
this transcendence "is not peculiar to him. Every actual
^Ibid., p . 4o6.
2George P. Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 6 5)7 P • 373•
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entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, 
1God included." Again, Whitehead writes that "every
actual entity also shares with God the characteristic of
2transcending all other actual entities, including God," 
Thus if it can he argued that God transcends the world, it 
can also be argued that every actual entity in the world 
transcends God. Whitehead's concept of the transcendence 
of God seemingly allows no ontological distinction be­
tween God and the temporal entities. While it is true 
that Whitehead emphasises that God is a unique actual 
entity, being non-temporal in his primordial nature, it 
is equally true that Whitehead also stresses that there 
is only one genus of actual entity, including God.^ Al­
though actual entities differ among themselves, some 
being more important than others, "yet in the principles 
which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. 
Elsewhere Whitehead explicitly states that no "eminent 
reality" is to be attributed to God. The conclusion 
is inevitable; in Whitehead's view there is no onto­
logical transcendence of God,
This lack of true transcendence on the part of God 
has to do not only with his relationship to the temporal 
occasions, but also with his relationship to creativity.
-1Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. l43.
, p. 339. t b l d ., p. 2 8.
^Ibid., p. l68. ^Ibld.. p. 521
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Creativity, of course, is the ultimate metaphysical
principle and God is its primordial creature. Thus God,
along with all of the temporal creatures, is "in the
grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative
1advance into novelty." It is evident therefore, that
in the context of his relationship to both creativity
and the other actual entities, God is not uniquely
transcendent,
Further, it can be argued that Whitehead's God is
finite. Such an argument must be made in the face of
Whitehead's own explicit statement that God in his
2primordial nature, is infinite. However, as Whitehead 
himself insists, God is deficient in actuality in his 
primordial nature and requires his consequent nature 
for his own completion. That is, as an actual entity,
God cannot be abstracted from his consequent nature, 
and it is this consequent nature which makes him finite, 
that is dependent. As Whitehead says, "Conceptual ex­
perience can be infinite, but it belongs to the nature 
of physical experience that it is finite. Not only can 
God not be abstracted from his consequent nature, that is, 
his prehension of the temporal actual entities, he cannot 
be abstracted from the temporal entities themselves. In 
other words, in Whitehead's concept of coherence, God
^Ibld., p. 529. ^Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 524.
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and the temporal occasions presuppose each other; they 
need each other in Whitehead’s system. Such "need" on 
the part of God excludes any possible claim that God is 
infinite. Whitehead has been justly criticized for 
sometimes writing as though God's primordial and con­
sequent natures were two different "beings". Such, of 
course, is not the case. God is an actual entity and 
is therefore, by definition, dipolar. As argued above, 
his consequent pole makes him finite. This would not 
necessarily be true of a God who was the free creator 
of all temporal creatures. He could have knowledge of 
them without jeopardising his infinity. But in White­
head’s system, God and the occasions require each other.
God needs them as much as they need him. God is dependent.
In light of the fact that Whitehead's God is not 
personal, not creator, not uniquely transcendent and not 
infinite, it would indeed be unwise to call Whitehead a 
traditional theist. What then is he?
Certainly Whitehead cannot be regarded as a pan­
theist. His emphasis upon the primordial nature of God 
makes this clear. Further, since in pantheism God and 
the world are equated one with the other, then God--as 
the world— would experience all of the subjective immedi­
acy of the elements in the world. Such is not the case 
in Whitehead's view as we have seen. Thus, Whitehead 
is neither traditional theist, pantheist, nor panentheist.
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The elimination of these alternatives leaves little room 
for further choice. However, Whitehead himself identifies 
his position clearly in the following passage;
There is another point in which the organic philosophy only repeats Plato. In the Timaeus the origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic accord­ing to our ideals. This is the evolutionary doctrine of the philosophy of organism.!
With reference to his doctrine of God, Whitehead is a
metaphysical dualist. His God is a finite God who has
always been confronted with a reality other than himself.
In this respect Whitehead's dualism is similar to that
of Morgan described in the last chapter.
We now turn to a brief discussion of the internal 
integrity of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. In 
this short critique, the criteria applied will be those 
suggested by Whitehead himself, namely applicability, 
adequacy, coherence and logical consistency. With 
reference to applicability, Whitehead means that some 
items of experience can be interpreted within the 
context of his philosophy. This will be conceded. In 
light of the great variety of "things" of which this world 
is composed, it would seem unwise to conclude that none 
could be interpreted according to the metaphysical prin­
ciples of organic realism.
However, as we move to the consideration of
^Ibid., p . 146
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adequacy, by which Whitehead means that no items of 
experience are incapable of being interpreted by his 
philosophy, the conclusion may not be quite as evident 
as Whitehead himself would believe. Can the philo­
sophy of organism really explain all items of experience 
from the greatest to the least? For example, can the 
actual entities composing the Castle Rock at Edinburgh 
really be "of one genus" with the actual entities which 
constitute a human being and his qualities, say, the 
genius of Whitehead himself? Of course, Whitehead makes 
clear that actual entities differ among themselves in 
terms of their degrees of importance and function, but 
the question still remains: is the intellect of White­
head really only different in degree from the non- 
conscious "decisions" of the occasions making up the 
Castle Rock? Surely some case may be made for a more 
radical distinction than this. At least, it would seem 
that reasonable doubt can be offered concerning the ade­
quacy of the philosophy of organism in this respects
We now turn to Whitehead's concept of coherence, by 
which he means "that the fundamental ideas, in terms of 
which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so
'Ithat in isolation they are meaningless." An excellent 
illustration of the application of this concept is found 
in a previously quoted passage:
^Ibid., p . 5•
lo6
. . . there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the creativity and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the temporal . creatures apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'
Whitehead does seem to have developed a metaphysics in 
which every element presupposes every other. Ironically, 
it is this "success" in stressing this particular con­
cept of coherence that brings about one of the most 
damaging attacks against Whitehead's philosophy, and 
particularly against its logical consistency or lack of 
it in one crucial matter. Whitehead has developed a 
philosophy in which--in accordance with his concept of 
coherence--everything presupposes, requires or explains
everything else, but nothing explains the whole. This
2basic ontological problem has been noted by others but 
has been stated in a precise manner by Robert Neville.
He argues that there is nothing in Whitehead's system 
to account for the existence of the actual entities. 
Creativity does not suffice since it "is indeterminate 
in abstraction from concrete events that exhibit it" 
and it therefore cannot be regarded as a normative prin­
ciple that necessitates that there are actual entities.^
^Ibid., p. 3 4 4 .
2For example, E. L. Mascall, He Who Is (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1970), pp. 158, 159; WilliamTemple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan and CompanyLtd., 1 9 3 4), p. 2 6 3.
^Robert C. Neville, "Whitehead on the One and the Many," Southern Journal of Philosophy, VII (Winter, 1 9 6 9),
3 9 0.
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Whitehead, we imagine, would agree since only actual 
entities are effective according to his ontological 
principle.
However, as Neville points out, neither does the
ontological principle account for the existence of
actual entities; it has to do with the decision of
entities in their process of becoming and "does not
answer the question why there is any decision at all 
1♦ . . ." The ontological principle does not solve the
ontological problem and it is therefore "misleadingly
named. It should be called the cosmological principle,
since it deals with the constitution of the particu-
2larities of this cosmos." Neville thus rightly insists 
upon the distinction between such a cosmological prin­
ciple and a truly ontological principle which would really 
explain the existence of entities and not merely the 
stages of their process. In this respect, Whitehead's 
ontological principle is deficient and, since this prin­
ciple is central to the whole philosophy of organism, it 
would seem that some radical revision is required, a 
revision which would not only explain temporal process, 
but would also help us understand the existence of actual 
finîtes.




integrity of Whitehead's philosophy, we wish to direct 
our attention to one other question, namely, does 
Whitehead succeed in his effort to apply his meta­
physical principles to God in such a way that God does 
not represent an exception to those principles? In 
one major respect it seems that Whitehead may have 
failed, and this with reference to God, as a single 
actual entity, possessing objective immortality. It 
will be recalled that Whitehead stresses that objective 
immortality is obtained at the cost of the subjective 
immediacy of the actual entity involved; it is no 
longer a prehending subject still in the process of 
concrescence, but is now an object to be prehended by 
succeeding actual entities. In other words, the subject 
perishes, having reached its satisfaction, and is then 
an object for others. Whitehead emphasises it thus:
All relatedness has its foundation in the relatedness of actualities; and such related­ness is wholly concerned with the appropriation of the dead by the living— that is to say, with 'objective immortality' whereby what is divested of its own living immediacy becomes a real component in other living immediacies of becoming.i
In what sense, then, does God have objective immortality? 
Can God lose his subjective living immediacy in order 
that he might become an object for others? That God is 
indeed prehended by the temporal creatures we have al­
ready seen; God belongs to the actual world of all occa-
Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. ix.
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sions; through a hybrid prehension of God’s conceptual 
feelings they derive their subjective aims. Further, 
Whitehead explicitly states that God has objective im­
mortality in respect to both his primordial and conse-
1quent natures. That God is an object for others is 
clear. The problem is, Whitehead uses language which 
seems to contradict such a possibility. He states 
that God, as a creature, is "always in concrescence 
and never in the past" and thereby is able to receive 
a constant reaction from the world. But if God, as an 
actual entity, is "always in concrescence and never in 
the past", how can he ever attain his "satisfaction"?
And if his satisfaction is not attained, how can he be 
an object for others; how can he possess objective im­
mortality? Whitehead's God is an actual entity always 
in concrescence, that is, always retaining his subject­
ive immediacy, while at the same time he is always an 
object for others. Such a conclusion seems to be in­
evitable. Christian agrees. "Unlike other actual 
entities God does not perish. He is everlasting. No­
thing could happen that would entail the final comple­
tion and perishing of God. God is always in concrescence
pand always satisfied." In this conclusion Christian 
apparently sees nothing problematic for Whitehead's sys­
tem. We beg to differ in this matter. There is a funda-
^Ibid., p. 4 7 .
Christian, Interpretation of Whitehead's Meta- physics, p. 397 (emphasis added).
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mental contradiction at this point. How can God be always 
"satisfied" but never completed? If we transfer White­
head' s terminology to this question, the contradiction 
becomes evident: How can God be always objectively im­
mortal but never objectively immortal? Or, Christian's 
statement that "God is always in concrescence and always 
satisfied" may be "translated" as "God always possesses 
subjective immediacy and always possesses objective im­
mortality." We agree that Christian's interpretation of 
Whitehead at this point is correct ; the point being made 
is that God, as an actual entity who is objectively im­
mortal while retaining his subjective immediacy, is an 
exception to the metaphysical principles of Whitehead's 
own system.
Before concluding this chapter on Whitehead's view 
of reality and his dipolar theism, we will take this oppor­
tunity to compare the respective viewpoints of Alexander, 
Morgan and Whitehead, drawing particular attention to 
similarities rooted in their common perspective of 
British neo-realism.
We turn first of all to what is ultimate in each man's 
philosophy. For Alexander this ultimate is Space-Time 
with a "nisus", that is a straining or striving towards 
realisation of ever higher levels of finite existence, 
with these emergent finite existents referred to as the 
"creatures" of Space-Time. The similarity to Whitehead 
is obvious. Whitehead's ultimate, creativity, bears a
Ill
strong affinity to Alexander's Space-Time with its nisus; 
creativity also has its finite "creatures", the actual 
occasions. A further parallel can be drawn in that, for 
Alexander, Space-Time--with particular reference to the 
Time aspect of this dual entity— is the "principle of 
change"; for Whitehead, creativity is the "principle of 
novelty." There are, of course differences. For example, 
Alexander views Space-Time as a non-material entity, 
anterior to matter. Whitehead, on the other hand, does 
not regard creativity as an entity in itself; it cannot 
be abstracted from its creatures. Apart from the crea­
tures there is no meaning to creativity. In this respect, 
Morgan sides with Whitehead against Alexander, For Mor­
gan there is a basal physical or material level which 
cannot be regarded as an emergent; events even in their 
primordial form are not only spatio-temporal, but also 
physical. Thus, Alexander and Whitehead concur in their 
respective emphases upon "nisus" and "creativity"; Mor­
gan and Whitehead concur that ultimately even the physi­
cal events are required. All three men agree that ulti­
mate reality is dynamic. This "process" concept is a 
fundamental tenet of British neo-realist metaphysics.
Another fundamental aspect of British neo-realism is 
its emphasis upon emergence. Again, all three philosophers 
under discussion share this basic concept. Alexander and 
Morgan place their emphasis upon a theory of emergence as
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opposed to the production of mere resultants. In other 
words, they stressed the emergence of novelty. Whitehead 
shared this emphasis with them, drawing the distinction 
between efficient causation which accounted for what was 
merely inherited from the past, and final causation which 
accounted for the production of novelty. Again, close 
kinship can be seen in the views of all three men in their 
views as to how such emergence of novelty occurs. Alex­
ander speaks of emergence arising from groupings of point- 
instant s or pure events whose relationship can be described 
as "social". Whitehead describes novelty as being produced 
by the decision of actual entities which are interdependent 
and "social" in their relationship. Morgan stresses that 
what emerges is a new form of relatedness. Although the 
views are far from identical, the affinity is evident.
With reference to what each man regarded as the agent 
or cause of emergence, Morgan and Whitehead are more close­
ly related in their views, whereas Alexander differs sub­
stantially. It will be recalled that Alexander viewed 
Time— one aspect of the dual entity, Space-Time— as the 
generator of qualities. By its very nature. Time is the 
principle of impermanence and the real creator of emergents. 
To this view Morgan took exception, claiming that although 
time is by nature succesive, this does not imply creativity 
on its part. He therefore introduced his concept of God 
through whose "Activity" emergents arise. Morgan speaks
1 1 3
of emergence occuring in response to "God who draws all 
things and all men upwards", and that men can feel within 
the "urge" upon which this theory can be and is founded. 
Morgan’s view is certainly similar to that of Whitehead 
for whom God, as an actual entity, presents the "lure" by 
which each temporal occasion moves on to its satisfaction. 
As we noted, God is therefore the agent of novelty. Thus 
for Alexander, Time is effective; for Morgan, Time is not 
effective and he therefore postulates God; for Whitehead, 
only actual entities are effective (on the basis of the 
ontological principle) and so God, as an actual entity, 
is required as explanation for progress and novelty.
Moving on now to Whitehead’s view of the dipolarity 
of nature, here again we find that he draws on a per­
spective not uncommon to British neo-realism. Although 
it was left to Whitehead to speak specifically of "dipolar­
ity", the same concept is clearly seen in both Alexander 
and Morgan. Alexander sets it forth in a theory of 
correspondence, namely that something corresponding to 
"mind" exists at every level of being. Morgan expounds 
the same basic theory, calling it correlation. In this 
view, all physical events have psychical or mental cor­
relates and all mental events have physical correlates; 
there are no physical systems which are not also psychi­
cal systems. The parallel to Whitehead's view of di­
polarity, in which all actual entities have both physical 
and mental poles, is obvious. All three views fall under
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the category of panpsychism. This is one of the ironies 
of British neo-realist metaphysics. While it arose in 
opposition to the absolute idealism of the very early 
twentieth century which attributed everything to mind, 
it never fully escaped it; British neo-realism, in turn, 
attributed "mind" to everything.
Finally, we come to the concept of God. Again, al­
though not identical, the views of these three men are, 
in some instances, strikingly similar. For example, 
Alexander describes God as an infinite creature of Space- 
Time; Whitehead speaks of God as the primordial creature 
of creativity. For Alexander God has two aspects to his 
nature, his all-inclusive body (in process towards deity) 
and his transcendence, that is his "deity", always future 
but never realised. For Whitehead, God has two "poles", 
one primordial and the other consequent, although we have 
argued that for Whitehead, God is not all-inclusive. Just 
as Alexander's God is in process towards deity (new empiri­
cal qualities yet future) so Whitehead's God reaps the 
benefit of the novel additions to his own consequent nature 
Morgan, while agreeing that God has both temporal and non­
temporal features, disagrees with the concept of God him­
self being caught up in the process of emergence or novelty 
Therefore in this case, Alexander and Whitehead bear more 
similarity to each other than they do to Morgan. Another 
respect in which Morgan disagrees with Alexander and White­
head has reference to whether God is dependent upon the
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finite existents. It will be recalled that for Morgan, 
dependence is always a "one way street", the lower events 
depending upon the higher, but never the higher upon the 
lower. Consequently, God cannot depend upon anyone or 
any thing. Against this, Alexander and Whitehead both 
agree that God is dependent upon the finite existents, 
just as they are dependent upon God.
However, if Morgan does not like to speak of God as 
depending upon the world, he does concede that God neces­
sarily "involves" the world, that is, Morgan states that 
he could form no adequate conception of God in isolation 
from the v/orld. This language parallels closely that of 
Whitehead when he states that there is no meaning to God 
apart from the temporal creatures.
A matter in which Morgan and Whitehead agree against 
Alexander has to do with the actuality of God. Alexander, 
of course, states that God as actually possessing deity 
does not exist. Morgan, on the contrary, stresses that 
what he acknowledges is an Ideal which actually exists. 
Whitehead, as we have seen, states that God is fully 
actual, this because of his consequent nature which com­
pletes the deficient actuality of his primordial nature.
It is interesting to note that the contrast between the 
views of Alexander and Morgan is reminiscent of the con­
trast between the earlier and later views of Whitehead 
which Cobb draws attention to and which are discussed at
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the beginning of this chapter.
One final word, should be said concerning the re­
spective concepts of God set forth by Morgan and White­
head. Both writers seek a systematic philosophy which 
is coherent and logically consistent. Morgan postulates 
God under his concept of acknowledgment, by which he means 
that the theory is subject to neither proof nor disproof 
but lends coherence to his scheme. Thus, for Morgan, God 
is postulated as an explanation for the process of emer­
gence, and this postulation is intended to lend consistency 
to Morgan's philosophy. In one respect, Whitehead also 
sets forth a postulational theism. This is the case be­
cause, as noted earlier, Whitehead himself admits that 
with reference to his concept of God nothing in the na­
ture of proof is offered. Yet, as we also noted, White­
head's system "requires" God as the actual entity who is 
the agent of novelty. However, one must make a dis­
tinction between the postulational theism of Morgan and 
that of Whitehead. In the former, God is postulated 
by Morgan without any effort being made to subject that 
concept to the same principles which apply to the rest 
of Morgan's philosophy. Such, of course, may not be a 
weakness; the assumption that the same metaphysical 
principles which apply to finite creatures must also 
apply to God perhaps cannot be maintained. In any case, 
this assumption, apparently rejected by Morgan, is accepted
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by Whitehead. Thus in postulating God, Whitehead at least 
attempted to construct a concept of God which was not an 
exception to the metaphysical principles of his scheme.
As argued earlier, this attempt failed.
One other matter of importance is shared by these 
three men. All of them devised theories of reality which 
share a common weakness; the ontological problem. None 
of them really deals with the basic question as to why 
anything exists at all. They are all concerned, and 
justly so, with an explanation for the temporal process; 
the question of finite existence is, in the final analysis, 
unanswered.
We have seen, then, that Alexander, Morgan and White­
head have very much in common with reference to their 
theories of ultimate reality, emergence, the dipolarity 
of nature, and God. We believe that the foregoing compara­
tive study, based upon the works of Alexander, Morgan and 
Whitehead as explicated in these three chapters, surely 
demonstrates the common viewpoint shared by all three 
philosophers. That common viewpoint was British neo­
realism. Consequently, we believe that the purpose of 
this research is well on its way to being accomplished; 
the influence of Whitehead on American dipolar theism, 
and more specifically on Hartshorne, resulted in an 
affinity of thought between British neo-realism as a 
whole and American panentheism. It was our purpose to
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set forth this relationship of ideas between these two 
philosophical perspectives in a more systematic fashion 
than previously shown. Thus to complete our objective, 
it remains to be shown within the framework of this re­
search a point generally acknowledged, namely the influ­
ence of Whitehead on Hartshorne.
Therefore, as we continue our study in the next 
chapter dealing with Hartshorne's panentheism, although 
the major point will be to show the influence of White­
head on Hartshorne, the conclusion of our study thus far 
will not be forgotten; Whitehead's influence on Hart­
shorne resulted in an affinity of thought not only in 
these two philosophers, but also in two great philoso­
phies. We turn now to a study of Hartshorne's panen- 
theism.
CHAPTER FOUR 
CHARLES HARTSHORNE: SURRELATIVE PANENTHEISM
In America, the influence of Whitehead is perhaps best 
seen in the work of Charles Hartshorne. One is tempted 
to consider Hartshorne as the best known "disciple" of 
Whitehead but, although Hartshorne is undoubtedly indebted 
to Whitehead for much of his thought, he is justly recog­
nized as an independent thinker in his own right who did 
not merely follow Whitehead, but rather adapted and 
expanded his work. Those who participate in the dis­
cipline of philosophical theology should recognize their 
debt to Hartshorne in at least two respects. First of all,
as Hartshorne himself states, Whitehead’s work is for many
-1readers "inaccessibly intricate". Hartshorne therefore 
has attempted, with much success, to make Whitehead’s 
work more available to more people through expounding 
Whitehead’s writings in less technical terms where such 
has been possible. Secondly, whereas Whitehead through 
choice or limited time confined most of his exposition to 
the .philosophical realm, Hartshorne has applied White­
head's philosophical principles primarily to the theo­
logical realm and, more specifically, has applied them
-1Charles Hartshorne, Man’s Vision of God (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964), p . x.
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to the concept of the being of God.
As will be seen in this chapter, the similarity of 
Hartshorne's view to that of Whitehead will be evident.
This will particularly be the case with reference to the 
theories of a "social" cosmology and a God who is also 
truly social. However, as we shall see later, it may well 
be the case that Hartshorne's view of God is not quite as 
similar to that of Whitehead as Hartshorne himself thinks, 
this with particular reference to Hartshorne*s view of God 
as a temporal succession of actual entities and as all- 
inclusive, that is, the doctrine of panentheism. As 
will be recalled, we argued in the last chapter that in 
Whitehead’s view God is a single actual entity and not a 
society, and that Whitehead’s concept of God was not pan- 
entheistic in its formulation. Thus, we will contend that 
while Hartshorne's view bears extremely close affinity to 
that of Whitehead, Hartshorne’s conclusions are more of an 
adaptation of Whitehead than even Hartshorne himself real­
ised .
The influence of Whitehead on Hartshorne is varied.
In some cases it is perhaps not quite as immediate as had 
been considered. For example, Hartshorne relates that his 
view concerning God as temporal as well as eternal and his 
concept of reality as panpsychistic did not derive directly 
from Whitehead. The former he attributes primarily to
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Hocking, and the latter he regards as an idea he held 
prior to any acquaintance with academic philosophy. How­
ever, this is not to deny Whitehead’s influence on Hart­
shorne in these crucial matters. On the contrary, Hart­
shorne concedes his great indebtedness to Whitehead as 
the one who had given these matters their classic and 
therefore most influential expression.^ In addition, 
Hartshorne constantly refers to the similarity existing 
between his own views and those of Whitehead.^ Thus it 
would be fair to say that although other philosophers 
(for example Hocking) had a chronologically prior influ­
ence on Hartshorne, no single philosopher had the impact 
of Whitehead on Hartshorne's thinking. Indeed, Hart­
shorne states that in some respects Whitehead's influence 
may well be even greater than perhaps many have realised. 
For example, while some may see in Hartshorne’s writings 
the influence of the American pragmatists, especially 
Peirce, James and Dewey, Hartshorne insists that their 
contribution was not great, because he is inclined to
We shall briefly review Hocking’s influence on Hartshorne in the next chapter.
^Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971)» P- .
^Ibid.. p. 20.
Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Pres^ 19&4), p p . ix, xiii, 28, 29.
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think "that what is valid in pragmatism is largely con-
1tained in Whitehead." Thus Whitehead's influence on 
Hartshorne is indeed extensive.
Hartshorne seeks to take the Whiteheadian principles 
set forth in the previous chapter and apply them primarily 
to the concept of God. In this effort he is concerned 
with setting forth his view of God within the context of 
two general standards. First of all, the concept of God 
must he free from logical contradiction or absurdity. 
Secondly, the idea of God must be so formulated as to 
preserve and perhaps even increase its religious value.^ 
With reference to both criteria Hartshorne believes he 
has been successful. As to the first standard, Hartshorne 
--as one would expect from any metaphysician--obviously 
believes his scheme to be internally coherent. As to the 
second, he concludes that his doctrine of God is in line 
with the spirit of the Gospels^ and is not hopelessly in 
disagreement with the views of Jesus and the prophets.-^
Before turning specifically to Hartshorne's doctrine 
of God, we must first direct our attention to his cosmo­
logy since such will give added insight into the sub­
sequent concept of God. In common with the philosophers
1Reality as Social Process, pp. 20, 21,
^The Divine Relativity, pp. ix, 1, 2.
Ibid., p . 1.
^Reality as Social Process, p. 23- ^Ibid., p. I96
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discussed in the previous three chapters, Hartshorne
regards all reality as being social; reality social
process. For this theory that reality is essentially
2social, Hartshorne introduces the term "societism". In 
this societism there is no individual unit of reality 
which is not social. God is social (a matter to which
we shall return shortly), human nature is social,^
4 <animals are social, plants are social,^ and seemingly
inorganic parts of nature are in some sense social.^
But what does it mean to be social? Hartshorne defines
the social as,
. . . the appeal of life for life, of experience for experience. It is "shared experience," the echo of one experience in another. Hence nothing can be social that is without experience. The minimum of experience, let us further agree, is feeling. Creatures are social if they feel, and feel in relation to each others' feelings.?
Again he states, "The social theory of existence denies
that any individual unit of reality . . .  is absolutely
without feeling or free creative action."^ Thus, when
Hartshorne contends that all reality is social, he is
^Ibid., p. 17. ?Ibld., p. Jk.
^Ibid., p. 24. Ibid.. p. 134.
-"^Divine Relativity, p . 2? .
^Reality as Social Process, p . 34.
^Ibid., p. 33.'
^Ibid., pp. 35, 36.
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arguing that reality is composed of individual units of 
feeling. The language could easily be that of Whitehead. 
The influence is obvious, the views extremely similar.
For Hartshorne, as for Whitehead, reality is panpsychistic 
Hartshorne argues for panpsychism on the basis of 
aesthetics, that is, the world is more aesthetically 
pleasing or beautiful if the panpsychistic conclusion is 
true. He asks.
Is the universe as a whole beautiful? Cer­tainly it contains more contrasts than anything else, for all contrasts fall within it. And it does have unity . . . .But there is one contrast in the world which seems unbalanced by any sufficient unity. This is the contrast between living mind and mere dead matter, between that which has feeling and emotion and memory and desire, and that which totally lacks these traits. Now such a contrast as this between the living and the dead, that which has feeling and that which has none, is not beautiful . . . .The way to bring the most beauty into our pic­ture of the world is to regard atoms and the other inferior individuals as very simple, low-grade types of minds, or sub-minds, with their own to us more or less unimaginable feelings. Then we have immense . , . contrasts between the various levels and kinds of mind and feeling. Mind in general becomes the theme of which the entire universe is a system of variations.1
Hartshorne therefore argues for a panpsychistic view of 
the universe on the aesthetic basis that there is a need 
for the greatest possible contrasts, and that such con­
trasts would be absent if panpsychism were not true. 
Hartshorne's emphasis upon aesthetics will be just as 
significant in his doctrine of God, as we shall see later.
^Man's Vision of God, pp. 213, 2l4.
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For Hartshorne, not only are there different levels
or complexities of mind, there are different types of
societies, two to he precise, namely democratic and
monarchical. A democratic society is one in which all
the members are of similar grade with no single dominant 
1member. An example of a democratic society--which
Hartshorne borrows from Whitehead— is a tree in which
each of the cells has more functional unity than the 
2whole tree. A monarchical society, on the other hand, 
has a dominant ruling member which is radically superior 
to the others,and because the other members are in 
subordination to a superior, "in a monarchical society 
the entire group acts with a functional unity comparable 
or superior to that of the various members. Probably 
the best example of a monarchical society is that of the 
human being. As Hartshorne says, "The living human body 
is a society of cells (relatively low-grade individuals) 
plus one high-grade individual, the human personality 
whose body it is."-^
On this distinction which Hartshorne makes between 
democratic and monarchical societies, he bases an argument






for the existence and nature of God. Using the human 
hody-personality relationship analogously, Hartshorne 
argues that
. . . a portion or sub-class of a monarchical society may in itself be a democracy. Thus, the cells of the heart, though they act together, do so only in crude fashion as compared to the unity of action found in the growth and self-maintenance of the single cells composing the heart. No ruling member of the heart society, it seems, imposes unity of action upon the society, though the ruler of the entire body, the human person­ality, does of course, influence the heart action. Now this suggests the idea that all societies, however democratic, may be portions of an all- inclusive monarchical society, the entire uni­verse, with order imposed throughout by a single dominant all-ruling member.!
Hartshorne continues the argument by contending that God
must be understood as the dominant ruling member of the
universal monarchical society if any sense is to be made
of the fact that the world continues to exist without
disintegration into chaos.
The members of a democracy which is merely that, in other words, which lacks an imposed ruler, would not be compelled to cooperate. Would they even be able to do so? Nothing would guarantee the continuance of the society from moment to moment save the infinite good luck that they all happened to use their freedom in ways servicable to the society . . . .  If there were in the universe no radically dominant member, able to set limits to the chaotic possibilities of individual freedom, it seems there would be no reason why the scheme of things should not dissolve in a choas of unmitigated conflict . . . .  Hence it seems clear that the universe as a going concern must be a monarchical
^Ibld., p. 38.
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society . . . .What we have arrived at is the question of the existence and nature of God, as it arises in any philosophy based on the social conception of reality,!
Thus, for Hartshorne, the social theory of reality becomes 
an argument not only for God’s existence, but also for 
attributing to God a specific nature; he is the radically 
dominant member in the monarchical society of the cosmos 
who imposes order on the society by setting limits upon 
the freedom of the included democratic societies, there­
by prohibiting sheer chaos and encouraging mutual co­
operation.
With reference to this description of the nature of 
God, the question arises as to the relationship existing 
between God, as the radically dominant member of the 
cosmic society, and the other members of the society. 
Hartshorne acknowledges that the relation of God to the 
world must be conceived by analogy with relations given 
in human experience. (We have already noted something 
of this view where Hartshorne states that the human 
personality as the dominant ruling member of the human 
body suggests that the cosmos as a whole requires a radi­
cally dominant member, that is, God). That such an 
analogy is justified Hartshorne argues on the basis that
3man is indeed the image of God. What then, does human
^Ibid., p. 39» See also p. 135' 
^ a n ’s Vision of God, p. 174.
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experience tell us concerning God's relation to the 
world?
The most obvious quality of human experience is that
it is social. Our experience is permeated by, indeed in
a real sense, constituted by our social relations with
others. Thus by analogy Hartshorne concludes that the
relationship between God and the world can be conceived 
1as social. The view that the relationship between God 
and the world is social has two strengths. First of all, 
it is religiously significant inasmuch as God has been 
viewed as a father caring for his children, an obviously 
social relationship. Secondly, social relationships are 
meaningful and understandable to us. We live by them, 
with them and in them every day of our lives; we know what 
it is for a relationship to be social.
However, although Hartshorne believes that the social 
analogy is to be preferred over any other because of its 
religious significance, he regards it as deficient in 
several respects; the social analogy "throws no light on 
the radical superiority of creator to creatures; and it 
throws no light on the immanence or omnipresence ascribed 
to God. In addition, the social analogy does not allow 
us to conceive of God's relationship to us as immediate 
since human intercourse "is apparently not direct contact
^Ibld., p. 175. ^Ibld., p. 175.
^Ibid.. pp. 175, 202.
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of mind with mind, hut requires intermediaries, such as 
vibrations of the air particles between their bodies."
Thus, in Hartshorne's assessment, the social analogy fails 
to do justice to God’s radical superiority as creator, 
his immanence or omnipresence, and the immediacy of his 
relations with the world.
Hartshorne therefore seeks another analogy drawn
from human experience which will do justice to the
elements mentioned above. He insists that such an
analogy must be based upon a relationship which will treat
the human personality as radically superior to sub-human
creatures. In Hartshorne's view, there is another analogy
drawn from human experience which will accomplish this
purpose and which is to be preferred philosophically to
the social analogy; it is the mind-body or organic analogy.
This analogy is not without its difficulties but these are
in Hartshorne's view not insurmountable. He writes,
Our relation to the sub-human, to bear much analogy to the relation of God to the world, must be a relation to a whole of things all of which are radically inferior to us, and in which whole we may be said to be something like omnipresent or immanent. There is one and only one such whole— the human b o d y . 2
Thus the mind-body analogy is strong where the social 
analogy is weak. The organic analogy allows for radical 




the human body, for the concept of immanence and also for 
immediacy in the relationship of mind to body.
The organic analogy, however, also has its weaknesses. 
For example, the "human body does not, for direct per­
ception, contain distinct individual things, as the world 
to which God is to be related certainly does." Hart­
shorne overcomes this particular problem by insisting, 
in keeping with his social theory of reality, that the 
human body is in actual fact a "world" of individuals, 
microscopic in scale— "and a mind . . . is to that body 
something like an indwelling God." There are, however, 
two other weaknesses in the organic analogy acknowledged 
by Hartshorne.
The organic relation is factually immediate but mysterious or unintelligible as it stands. (It is further insufficient in that the relation of God to man which we particularly wish to under­stand is that of mind to mind, whereas the rela­tion of a man’s mind to his cells appears to be the relation of "mind" to "matter.")5
Thus far Hartshorne has presented us with two analogies, 
each with strengths and weaknesses. The social analogy, 
which Hartshorne prefers for religious reasons, has the 
advantage of being intelligible to us and has to do with 
mind to mind relations, but lacks the immediacy of relation­
ship which is required of God’s relation to the world; the 
mind-body analogy, which Hartshorne prefers philosophically,
^Ibid. ^Ibld., p. 187.
^Ibid., p. 177.
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has the advantage of this immediacy of relationship, but 
the relationship itself is mysterious and unintelligible, 
and has to do with mind to matter rather than mind to 
mind.
Thus we have two analogies, each of which is strong where the other is weak, and neither of which alone can suffice . . . .  What is to be done? What could possibly be done except to combine the two analogies so as to produce a unitary variable without either the seeming unintelligibility and materialistic character of the one or the non-immediacy of the other?. . . . We have only to suppose the mind- body relationship is immediately social . . . .  the body is a society of living organic cells.We have only to suppose that these cells possess humble forms of feeling or desire to reach the position that the human mind influences and is influenced by them through immediate (there is nothing to mediate it) sharing of feeling, with much indistinctness on both sides . . .  .1
Thus Hartshorne concludes that the combined organic-
social analogy must be the best means of constructing apconception of God and his relations with the world.
Three consequences follow from the adoption of the 
organic-social analogy. One is thereby committed to (1) 
"a certain interpretation of the mind-body relation,
(2) the view that all of reality is social, that is,
"a relational form of panpsychism,and (3) the theory 
that the world is God's body. With reference to point





(1), Hartshorne has little to say except that it is his 
view that "there are no facts which disprove the social 
character of the surely immediate mind-body relations, 
and some which suggest it." It is not to be forgotten, 
of course, that Hartshorne has already conceded that the 
mind-body relationship is "mysterious or unintelligible"
— one of the weaknesses of the organic analogy taken on 
its own--but in his estimation this relationship must be 
regarded as social as described above. As to point 
number (2) Hartshorne, as we have seen, not only concedes 
the necessity of the panpsychistic conclusion on the basis 
of the organic-social analogy, but insists upon it. His 
insistence is founded upon two basic arguments which we 
have already noted, namely, the general metaphysical 
argument that all of reality is social and the more 
restricted aesthetic argument that the contrast between 
living and dead is not truly beautiful, and therefore 
life and feeling must be attributed to all units of 
reality. We now direct our attention to the third 
consequence of the organic-social analogy; the world is 
God's body.
To the concept of the universe as God’s body we have 
already been introduced in Hartshorne’s writings to the 
effect that God is the dominant all ruling member of the 
cosmic monarchical society. The organic-social analogy
^Ibid., p. 187.
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sets forth the relationship between God and the other 
members of the society as a social relationship, thereby 
implying their experience of and feelings for one another. 
Hartshorne asks us to "consider seriously the doctrine 
that the world is God's body, to whose members he has 
immediate social relations, and which are related to 
each other, directly or indirectly, exclusively by social 
relations."
Although Hartshorne is satisfied with the organic- 
social analogy, he recognizes that certain questions may 
be raised with reference to at least apparent weaknesses 
in the analogy, and he therefore attempts to answer some 
of these questions which can be anticipated. For example, 
if the world is God's body then how does one deal with 
the problem of evil? Hartshorne concedes that this is
2the most serious problem confronting the organic analogy. 
After all, if the world is God's body, must God not be 
held responsible for the acts of wickedness perpetrated 
by parts of himself, that is, the finite existents which 
constitute his body? Hartshorne responds in two ways: 
first, God is not qualified by moral evil, only by 
aesthetic evil; secondly, since the finite existents 
constituting God’s body possess not only feelings but 




actions. We now let Hartshorne speak for himself on these 
matters.
We must . , . admit that in some sense the worldbody is not an absolute, perfectly harmonized unity . . . .  For him fGodJ and in the world body no conflicts occur except such as are to him tolerable. But this does not mean that for God no conflict and nothing unpleasant occurs at all . . . .
It is to be noted that omniscience must in some fashion know evil. Now to know involves experience; hence God must experience the quality of evil. Could he experience the evil of conflict if there were nothing in his being but sheer harmony?
Does this imply that God must experience wick­edness through himself being wicked, as he must experience conflict by himself suffering from it? I reply that conflict is positive in a sense in which wickedness is not. God is himself qualified by what is positive in evil, namely discord, which is not mere absence of harmony, but positive clash. But he is not qualified by the privative element essential to moral evil, namely blindness to the interests of others . . . .
It may be said that there is an element of positive willfulness in wickedness, which we call perversity. But the answer is that it is not simply as deliberate volition that perversity is perverse, but as the deliberate choice of non­realization over realization . . . .  Only aesthe­tic evil which alone is not privative (it is not the absence of things which harmonize but the presence of things which conflict), can qualify God.
From another point of view this is clear enough, in that aesthetic evil is "suffered," while moral evil is enacted, chosen. God must suffer all things, for he must participate in all things to know them, but he cannot be said to choose all things, for he has granted choices also to the creatures.^
^Ibid., pp. 195-197•
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Thus Hartshorne contends--in terms rather reminiscent of 
Augustine--that God is not qualified hy moral evil since 
such is not positive but privative. He is, however, 
qualified by, or affected by the aesthetic evil in the 
universe, that is the contrasts and disharmony produced 
within the body. Hartshorne further maintains that 
although God is all inclusive, he is not involved in the 
evil choices of creatures because those creatures are 
free.
But are they truly free? Can the individual units 
of reality, each a part of God’s body, be genuinely free 
in terms of their own desires and actions? After all, 
does not the personality as the dominant member of the 
human body dictate the action of the body as a whole, 
the parts of the body simply complying with the desires 
and purposes of the dominant member? Hartshorne's 
response is to continue with the organic analogy, basing 
his argument at the cellular level. In the human body 
the cells cannot feel dominated by the personality 
whose body it is because the human being "must be in­
comprehensible to the cell to such an extent as to con­
stitute merely a sort of environment, not a definite 
term of a social relation." Hartshorne draws the 
parallel.
Again, consider the relations of a man to a
^Ibld.. p. 190.
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radically superior mind, such as God . . . .What vfould this imply? The man would not have the divine as a clear and distinct datum; for if he saw God distinctly he would W  God, himself omni­scient. Thus, as the man to the cell, the divine to the man would be a vague environment rather than a definite social other . . . .  And the vague­ness which inevitably limits the direct vision which we men could possibly have of God gives us plenty of freedom of interpretation of the divine datum, this freedom going all the way to denying that there is a God. An indistinct datura can always be explained away, if not completely, still sufficiently for a good many purposes,^
Thus Hartshorne seeks to preserve the freedom of the 
creatures by regarding God, the dominant ruling member of 
the world society, as an indistinct datum, a vague en­
vironment rather than a definite social other. Our know­
ledge of God, as he is related to the world, must be re-
2garded as infinitesimal.
There are two other questions to which Hartshorne 
responds concerning the organic-social analogy. First, is 
this analogy not inadequate inasmuch as bodies, being 
composite and mutable, are also destructible?*^ What then 
of God's body? Hartshorne's reply is that just as even 
the weakest minds have some preserving power over their 
bodies, so the "most eminent mind" may amount to "an 
unconditional power to preserve the body always . . . .
^Ibid., pp. 1 9 0, 1 9 1 .
^The Divine Relativity, pp. 4o, 4l, 92. 
^Man's Vision of God, p. 180.
^Ibid.
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In this sense, God's body is uniquely perfect. If it be
complained that at this point Hartshorne is inconsistent
in his presentation, he reminds us that the bodies with
which we are familiar eventually disintegrate because of
an external environment over which we have no immediate
control. The universe, on the other hand, has no external
environment, no external factors upon which it depends; it
immediately controls all its parts and so is self-maintain- 
1ing. In this respect— as well as others we shall note
later--the universe, being maintained by an "eminent mind",
2is an eminent effect.
The remaining question which is raised concerning the 
organic-social analogy may be phrased as follows: "Does
the analogy not break down inasmuch as the mind-body rela­
tion is dependent upon a nervous system and sense organs 
for the qualities of experience and feeling?" Hartshorne 
responds by turning this seeming deficiency to an advantage. 
He concedes that
God cannot . . . have a nervous system or sense organs, for these are bodily parts with a preferential relation to the mind. And if by "sensation" we mean experience mediated by sense organs, then God has no sense experiences, But if by sensation we mean that aspect of experience which is neither thought nor volition, neither meaning nor action, but qualitative feeling, then God can as little be free from sensation as man. . . . God will have not the least but the most of the richness supplied by such qualities;
^Ibid., p. 181.
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but he will derive them from all parts of the world body, not merely from focal points which would constitute sense organs.!» 2
In other words, it is precisely because God is not 
dependent upon a nervous system or sense organs that he 
is able to enjoy the fullest intimacy with all parts of 
his body. In this sense the divine organism is more 
organic than man himself, and God, having this immediate 
intimacy with all parts of the body is able "to partici­
pate without reserve in every last fragment of feeling 
and thought anywhere . . . . Thus God is "the subject
of all change, the one who is eminently related to all 
things
This theory that God is eminently or supremely 
related to all things, Hartshorne terms "surrelativism" 
and is eager to deny that it is a pantheistic doctrine. 
Pantheism rejects the personality of deity and makes 
God identical with the universe. According to Hart­
shorne, it is true that the
. . . total actual state of deity-now, as sur- relative to the present universe, has nothing outside itself, and in that sense is the All.But the individual essence of deity (what makes
^Ibid., p. 199.
2There is a striking similarity here to Alexander's view that "our minds . . , and everything else in the world are 'organic sensa' of God." (Supra, p . % ,  emphasis added).
^Man's Vision of God, p. 200.
^Ibid., p . 265.
-^Ibid. ^Divine Relativity, pp. ?6, 123.
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God God, or the divine divine) is utterly independent of this All, since any other poss­ible all (and there are infinite possibilities of different totalities) would have been com­patible with this essence.1
This essence of God, which Hartshorne equates with God’socharacter or personality, is absolutely independent of 
any particular universe and consequently "can be cor­
related with any possible character you please in its
3correlate, the world.' Thus for Hartshorne, whatever 
form the world may take, the essence of God--his character 
or personality— remains absolutely independent of those 
particular finite existents.
If Hartshorne's denial that his theory is not 
representative of pantheism is justified--and we believe 
that it is justified— what description would suffice? 
Hartshorne himself adopts the term "panentheism"^ for 
the view that "deity is in some real aspect distinguish­
able from and independent of any and all relative items, 
and yet, taken as an actual whole, includes all relative 
items.' In this concept, while God is "literally all 
inclusive" he is both the system of dependent things
^Ibid., pp. 88, 89.
^Ibid., pp. 80, 88, 89, 90; Man's Vision of God, p. 1103•'^Divine Relativity, p. 80; see also pp. 81, 89.
~^^ Ibid. , pp. ix, 89, 90.
^Ibld.. p. 89.
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1and something independent of it. We have now reached 
Hartshorne's view of God as dipolar; in one aspect God 
is relative, supremely related to every contingent exist­
ent; in another aspect--in his character or personality—  
he is absolute which by Hartshorne's own definition means 
"nonrelative.
Hartshorne regards absolute and relative as polar 
concepts which require each other^ and sets forth both 
philosophic and religious reasons for the necessity of 
both poles. For example, in terms of metaphysics it is 
not possible to think of everything as relative, because 
"if all things are relative . . . then at least rela­
tivity itself . . . must be something invariant, non-
relative, or 'absolute.*"^ Further, in terms of reli­
gion, God must be regarded as absolute since "absolute­
lyness is requisite for complete reliability."-"^ However, 
also within the context of religion, the complete or 
total absoluteness of God would not be admirable or 
appropriate since this w^ould mean that God would be in 
no way related to the world and would be totally neutral 
or insensitive to our needs.^ Some dependence on God's
^Ibid., p . 90.
^Ibid., pp. 1 9 , 8 3 .
^Man's Vision of God, p . 15. 
^Divine Relativity, p . 6 . 
^Ibid., p . 22.
^Ibid., pp. 42, 43.
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part, on the other hand, would be admirable since this
would mean that he would be related to the world and
could respond appropriately to each and every circum- 
1stance.
This dependent or relative aspect of God which is
constituted by the contingent existents— that is, God's
body-~is according to Hartshorne, in a very real sense
necessary as a correlate to the absolute or nonrelative
aspect of God. On this very important point we quote
at length from Hartshorne.
God's necessity of existing, while our existence is contingent, may simply mean that had we not existed, still some creatures or other would necessarily have existed, sufficient for God's needs. Any particular contingent thing might not have existed; but it does not follow that there might have been contingent things.It would be a contradiction to say that a certain accidental thing happens by necessity; but there is no contradiction in saying that it is necessary that some accidents or other should happen, that there should be accidents
Thus God may depend,.even for his essence, upon there being creatures, but he may have power to guarantee absolutely that there should be such; while beyond his essential characters he may necessarily have accidental ones . . . .^
On the same theme Hartshorne writes.
It may be necessary, not contingent, that there be some contingent things or other . . . .  There is no possibility of "nothing contingent," but only of this contingent thing or that contingent thing or some other contingent thing (other
^Ibid., p. 4 5 .
^an's Vision of God, p. 108.
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than sheer nothing) . . . .
The import of the foregoing is that the absoluteness of God need not imply his non­relationship to the creation such, but only to the contingent alternatives of creation.1
And again,
. . . the abstract is neutral with regard to alternatives of concrete embodiment but is not neutral to the alternative, some embodiment or none.2
In this important matter we select one final quotation.
Since absolute is defined in terms of relativity, as such, it cannot be independent of relativity in every sense, but it can be independent of which relative things there are
It is abundantly clear that in Hartshorne's view God's 
abstract, absolute aspect requires some accidental embodi­
ment or other. This accidental embodiment, whatever form
it takes, is God's concrete relative aspect constituted,
\as we noted earlier, by the physical universe, God's body. 
Having clarified that both aspects of God require each 
other, we nov7 turn to a further examination of the nature 
of each aspect, paying particular attention to the con­
trasts involved,
Hartshorne equates the abstract and concrete aspects 
of God with the primordial and consequent natures respect­
ively of Whitehead's God, the abstract or essential 
aspect being purely eternal and the concrete accidental




aspect being temporal. In his absolute character God 
is existence or "Being itself," that is pure being 
abstracted from any concrete accidental embodiments; 
he is, in this abstract essence, "no actual subject."^ 
However, in his concrete aspect God is not pure being, 
but is the total actual being of a given moment, "with 
all achieved determinations.The similarity to White­
head's view of God’s primordial nature being deficient 
in actuality, but this deficiency being countered by 
the fully actual consequent pole, is evident.
In his essence or absolute aspect God is necessary; 
in his concrete aspect he is contingent.^ That is to say, 
in his essence and for his existence God is absolutely 
independent of any particular finîtes, but he depends 
upon those finîtes for his concrete e x p e r i e n c e Thus, 
for Hartshorne there is an element of divine emergence, 
namely the achieved concrete experience. "All such 
achievement is an emergent, a creation, even if it be 
divine achievement.
^Man's Vision of God, p. 2^4.
^Ibid., pp. 93» 284; Divine Relativity, pp. 8 7 , 88. 
^Reality as Social Process, p. ?6.
^Divine Relativity, p. 88.
% a n 'B Vision of God, p. 29; Divine Relativity, p. 32
^Man’s Vision of God, pp. I0 7 , l64; Reality as Social Process, pp. 138, 139*
^Reality as Social Process, p. 203.
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Another contrast which can be drawn between the two
aspects of God is that in his absolute aspect God is
perfect whereas in his concrete aspect he is perfectible.
That is, as abstract he is ethically perfect; as concrete
1he is aesthetically perfectible without limit. Although 
God’s ethical perfection is absolute, that is independent 
of any finite existants, he "needs" the creatures for the 
intrinsic beauty of their lives, which beauty adds to the 
life of God. This aesthetic need of God exists because, 
in Hartshorne's view as we have already seen, the beautiful 
must contain contrast and "it is as necessary that there 
be variety, multiplicity, in God as that there be unity. 
Thus Hartshorne's "aesthetic" argument which we noted 
earlier has a two-fold thrust. First he argues that to be 
truly beautiful the universe must be constituted by in­
dividual units of reality each of which must possess feel­
ings; secondly, he contends that the universe thus consti­
tuted supplies God's aesthetic needs by its inclusion in 
his being.
Now, if it is the case that God is in his concrete 
aspect aesthetically perfectible without limit, always 
having new "enjoyments" added to his own life, can he then 
meaningfully be described as a truly perfect God? Hart-
^Man’s Vision of God, pp. 29» 50, 159»
^Ibid., p . 163•
^Ibid., p. 217.
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shorne answers in the affirmative but concedes the
need to redefine "perfection". He states,
. . . we define the perfect, or supremelyexcellent or good, as that individual being . . , than which no other individual being could conceivably be greater, but which itself, in another "state," could become greater (perhaps by the creation within itself of new constitu­ents) . . . .  Or again, let us say that the perfect is the "self-surpassing surpasser-of all." . . . .  The self-surpassing surpasser of all has the power of unfailingly enjoying as its own constituents whatever imperfect things come to exist. Then it will be bound to possess in its own unity all the values which the imperfect things severally and separately achieve, and therefore it is bound to surpass each and every one of them. Thus it is certain of superiority to any "other individual." It must, in any conceivable state of existence, be the "most excellent being."2
Thus Hartshorne redefines "perfection" in such a way that 
God, as the all-inclusive being (and therefore including 
the values of the individuals "contained" in him), is 
perfect in the sense that he cannot be equalled or ex­
ceeded in value by any other individual, but may exceed 
the total value himself as new experiences and enjoyments 
are added to his being. Hartshorne is eager to point out, 
however, that God's perfectibility in this respect does 
not detract from the absolute and therefore immutable 
perfection of his ethical character.^
A further distinction that can be drawn with
^Ibid., p. 6; Divine Relativity, p. 20. 
^Divine Relativity, p . 20.
^an's Vision of God, p. 21.
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reference to Hartshorne's dipolar concept of God is that 
between God as creator and God as created, or God as 
cause and God as effect.
That God is the cause, the "creator," of all things . . . does not imply that he is in no sensethe effect of anything. For his essence may bethe cause, the necessary condition, of all other essences, and the effect of none in particular nor of any totality of them; and yet his accidentsmay be both cause and effect in relation to otherthings. In terms of accidents man may be part- creator of God.l
Hartshorne emphasises the same point when he says that
"in a very real sense the First Cause is also effect
(not in his essence), the creator is also (in some
aspects) created, and the creatures are also creative."
In speaking of God as both creator (cause) and created
(effect) Hartshorne once again applies the principle
of eminence. We have already noted his application of
this principle to God's relativity, that is, God as
eminently or supremely related to every part of the world
Now Hartshorne applies it again stressing that God is
eminently or supremely creative and also (in another
aspect) eminent or supreme effect. With reference to
God as creator, Hartshorne writes that
God, if social, is eminently or supremely so . . . .  Man certainly is social. If then ordinary sociality is ordinarily creative, eminent sociality will be eminently creative, divinely creative. And ordinary sociality is, in a humble sense, creative. A man contributes
^Ibid., p. 109.
^Ibid., pp. 1231 124.
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creatively to the concrete actuality of his friends and enemies, and they to his . . . .The supreme member of a society would contribute most vitally and largely to the actuality of all.l
Hartshorne of course recognizes that some will object 
that this is not truly creation since it presupposes 
material with which to work. He responds by rejecting 
creation ^  nihilo, insisting that there was no first 
moment of creation and that God creates each stage of 
the world as successor to a preceding phase and so on
othrough an infinity of earlier universes. Further, 
Hartshorne argues that the only "making we ever encounter 
is transformation, enrichment of something already there. 
If it be objected that divine creation must be a unique 
case, Hartshorne argues that the uniqueness of God's 
creating lies in "maximality. He makes on a supreme, 
that is cosmic, scale; he makes the whole, not just 
certain parts, and he makes not for a limited time but 
during infinite time. In this respect, Hartshorne 
equates his own view with that of Whitehead who held 
that the world process had no beginning. Hartshorne's 
conclusion in this matter could have been anticipated; 
we have already noted that in his view both aspects of
^Divine Relativity, p. 29*
^Ibid. , p. 30', Man's Vision of God, p. 94. 
^Man's Vision of God, p. 231.
^Ibld.
Reality as Social Process, p. 203.
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God, the absolute and the concrete, require each other, 
in which case the contingent aspect, the universe, could 
have no beginning in time, Thus God is eminently creative 
through infinite time by continually transforming the 
contingent existants.
But how does God effect this transformation? He
does so by being the object of our awareness. Our being
is dependent upon God and specifically so in the sense
that our knowledge that God knows us is constitutive of
our being. In this sense God can be said to create us.
God and men are objects for each others* knowledge and so
can respond to each other. The divine response,
. . . becoming our object . . . influences us . . .  . The radical difference between God and us implies that our influence upon him is slight, while his influence upon us is predominant. We are an absolutely inessential (but not inconsequential) object for him; he is the essential object for us . . .  . Thus God can rule the world and order it, setting optimal limits for our free action, by presenting himself as essential object so characterized as to weight the possibilities of response in the desired respect. This divine method of world control is called "persuasion" by Whitehead . . . .He, perhaps the first ofall, came to the clear realization that it is by molding himself that God molds us, by presenting at each moment a partly new ideal or order of preference which our unself-conscious awareness takes as object, and thus renders influential upon our entire activity . . . .Only he who changes himself can control the changes in us by inspiring us with novel ideals for novel occasions. We take our cues for this moment by seeing, that is, feeling
^Divine Relativity, p. 123.
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what God as of this moment desiderates.^
For Hartshorne, as for Whitehead, God's creative or 
transforming power lies in "persuasion" as he presents 
himself to us as the object of our awareness.
To speak of God as the object of our awareness is to 
speak of him in his absolute aspect. We have already ob­
served that God in his concrete aspect is eminently related 
to the world, is indeed the subject of all change. Hart­
shorne stresses the same point when he describes God as 
the subject-for-all-objects. However, Hartshorne con­
tends that just as God is unique in this sense, so is he 
also unique in the sense that he is the object-for-all- 
subjects.
. . . to be known by all subjects is fully as distinctive a status as to know all objects . . . .Only God can be so universally important that no subject can ever wholly fail or ever have failed to be aware of him (in however dim or unreflective a fashion). Thus the unique status of object- for-all-subjects is to be correlated with .the.more : commonly recognized one of subject-for-all-objects.The difference between them is that the latter means, "having relations to all objects," and thus implies universal relativity; the former means that all subjects have relation to the one object, without the latter having relation . . .  to them.3
So we find another contrast in God's respective aspects:
as absolute he is the object of our awareness; as
relative he is the subject, aware of us. Again, we wish
^Itoid., pp. l4l, 142.
^Ibld., p. 70.
^Tbid., pp. 70, 71.
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to emphasise the importance of this matter with reference 
to God as creator. It is not only our awareness of God, 
but rather our awareness that he is aware of us that 
is constitutive of our being, and as we respond to this 
knowledge that God is aware of us, his creative or 
transforming power is realised. In this transformation 
of the finite existants God is eminently creative.
However, as noted earlier, God is not only creator
or cause, he is also created or effect, and to God as
effect Hartshorne also applies the principle of eminence.
It will be recalled that we drew attention earlier to
Hartshorne'8 view of the universe as an eminent effect,
a self-maintaining, uniquely perfect body. Hartshorne
further affirms this conclusion, once again basing his
argument upon his panpsychism, when he insists that the
universe must be regarded as both animate and rational.
Suppose then that the universe is, in eminent fashion, animate and rational. It will, accord­ingly, be supreme among effects. All other creatures will be its members, inferior as such . . . . Thus the universe, patterned after the ideal of rational animality, will be as distinc­tive among effects as the creator of the universe is distinctive among c a u s e s . 2
Hartshorne, having supposed that the universe is indeed
eminent in the manner described, then presents us with a
dilemma.
^Man's Vision of God, pp. 180, l8l, 
^Divine Relativity, p . 79•
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. , , if the universe is eminently animate and rational, then either it is God, or there are two eminent beings, God and Universe, and a third supereminent entity, which is the total reality of God-and-universe. The dilemma is satisfactorily dissolved only by the admission that the God who creates and the inclusive creation are one God. Then the two eminences under cause and effect are two aspects of God rather than two Gods, or than a God and an eminent being other than God.l
It is clear that Hartshorne's panpsychism results in a
concept of God in which God must be all-inclusive
(and therefore effect as well as cause), or else he is
confronted with an eminent being other than himself.
Thus in his absolute and abstract being, God is cause;
in his relative and concrete aspect he is effect.
Perhaps one of the clearer distinctions that 
Hartshorne draws between the two aspects of God is that 
of character and experience, the former being God's 
abstract aspect and the latter referring to his concrete 
aspect. In his character God is immutable;- in his 
concrete experience he is mutable, ever changing. We 
shall return shortly to the immutability of God's 
character and for the present look a little more closely 
at the mutability of God's concrete experience. We have 
already encountered this concept in Hartshorne's view 
that God is the subject of all change. Hartshorne con-
^Ibid.
^Wan's Vision of God, p. 110.
^Ibid., p . 112.
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tinues the same theme when he speaks of God as the "endurer
1of all change, the adventurer through all novelty." Hart­
shorne then contends that all changes, once they have 
occurred, are retained for ever more in the "expanse of
his 1^ 0d '^  memory, the treasure house of all fact and
2attained value," In God’s perfect memory all of the 
past is retained without any loss of detail or quality. 
"From this memory, no joy once attained anywhere in the 
world can ever be lost."^ Furthermore, in God's memory 
there will always be a net increment of value. This is 
the case because there is always--Hartshorne assumes but 
does not argue— more joy than sorrow in the world.^
This view of the retention of value in God’s con­
crete aspect is extremely similar to Whitehead’s concept 
of the preservation of value in God's consequent nature. 
Hartshorne continues this Whiteheadian theme when he 
correlates the perfect memory of God with the objective 
immortality of the finite existents. Our lives become 
meaningful now when we realise their significance in a 
two-fold sense. First, our lives contribute to the life 
of God. Secondly the lives which we have lived and thus 
have contributed to the life of God are never lost; they
^Ibid.. p. 298. 
^Ibid.
Reality as Social Process, p. l6l.
Divine Relativity, p. 46.
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are retained, in terms of the values achieved, in the
1perfect memory of God. In this sense, and only in this
sense, does Hartshorne believe in immortality. As in
Whitehead, this objective immortality is not to be
confused with personal immortality, that is, the
survival of the human soul or spirit as subject. For
Hartshorne, the real death is forgetting the past
2experiences of life. This "death" is overcome in the 
perfect memory of God. Again, what is preserved, what 
"survives" is not the subject, but the values the 
subject achieved.
Although the views of Hartshorne and Whitehead on 
God's memory constituting the objective immortality of 
finites seem to be identical, we contend that there is 
at least one significant difference in the views of the 
two men. In the previous chapter we argued that accord­
ing to Whitehead the values attained by the finite 
existents were added to the experience of one single 
actual entity who is God. In Hartshorne’s view, however, 
God as recipient of the values achieved by the finites 
is himself a temporal series of entities or beings.
There is a "temporal series of self-states in God. The 
divine personality is concretely and in part new each 
moment, and each new divine self sympathises with its
-1Reality as Social Process, pp. 4l, 42.
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•1predecessors and its (in outline) anticipated successors."
God, says Hartshorne, is in process and has "a distinct
2personality for each stage of his life."
In this connection it must be pointed out that
Hartshorne believes that even with respect to God as a
temporal series, his view coincides with that of White- 
3head. That Whitehead held such a view Hartshorne believes 
to be the case because Whitehead reportedly confirmed such 
in conversation with a third party.^ Hartshorne's view of 
Whitehead's position notwithstanding, we have argued in 
the previous chapter— based upon the writings of Whitehead-- 
that the British philosopher viewed God not as a society 
of actual entities but as a single actual entity. We 
maintain that in this respect these two great philosophers 
differ.
Hartshorne's concept of God as a temporal series or 
society makes it possible— within the context of process 
definitions— to regard God as a person. It was observed 
in our study of Whitehead that he regarded persons as 
societies of actual entities. With this position Hart­
shorne agrees,^ and since he insists that God himself is
^Man's Vision of God, p. 351■
2Reality as Social Process, p. 153.
%an's Vision of God, p. 51, Divine Relativity, p. 31.
^Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 274.
•^Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p. 209»
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also a temporal society, God too can be considered as a
person. Hartshorne refers to God as "the supreme case of
1 2 personality," and as "a supreme person." Furthermore,
Hartshorne stresses that to describe God as a "divine 
person" is not to speak metaphorically. "It is the 
human being that more or less exhibits personal continu­
ity and integrity, God that literally, is always the 
same personal 'I ' . This continuity and integrity of 
God, this absolute dependability has to do with God's 
immutable character (as opposed to his mutable accidents) 
and to this immutable character of God we now direct our 
attention.
In discussing the character of God— which Hartshorne 
equates with the abstract aspect of God— we are dealing 
with absolute, that is, nonrelative types of relations 
These abstract relational types are Gods immutable 
attributes and we shall deal in fhis.study with some 
attributes of particular religious significance, namely 
God's omnipotence, omniscience, holiness and love.
With reference to these attributes of God, Hartshorne's 
definitions are very important and must be taken into 
consideration. Hartshorne insists that there is a great
^Divine Relativity, p. 25. 
^Ibid.. p. l42.
^Ibid., p . 39■
Ibid.. pp. 121, 143, 156.
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need for clearer definitions and he attempts to supply 
them. God's omnipotence, for example, must be defined 
in such a way that this omnipotence is not limited by free 
human choice. That is, we must avoid the dilemma of 
having to choose either that God is omnipotent or that 
there are such things as free human choices. Omni­
potence must be defined so that free human choice is not
■1limitative of God's omnipotence but rather implied by it.
That God cannot make us do certain things "does not 'limit'
his power, for there is no such thing as power to make
2nonsense true . , . ." Hartshorne seems to be saying
that some things are not subject to power, not even in­
finite pov^ rer, and that not even infinite power can compel 
another to freely choose to act in a certain manner.
Such a concept is "nonsense" says Hartshorne and therefore 
human freedom does not detract from a proper understanding 
of God's omnipotence.
Such a proper understanding of God's omnipotence must 
allow that some power belongs to individuals other than
3God, and that omnipotence be defined as "causal adequacy",
that is, power adequate to cosmic need.
Religious faith imputes to God at least the kind and degree of power that the world needs as its supreme ordering influence. Or, more brief-
^Man's Vision of God, p. 105. 
^Ibid., p . 294.
^Divine Relativity, pp. 134, 138.
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ly, it imputes power adequate to cosmic need . . . .His power is absolute, if that means absolute in adequacy, or such that greater power would be no more adequate, and therefore would not really be "greater"--since adequacy is the measure of greatness, on our theory.1
Thus for Hartshorne, omnipotence is defined as "causal
adequacy" or "adequate cosmic power." But what is
"adequate cosmic power"?
Adequate cosmic power is power to set conditions which are maximally favorable to desirable decisions on the part of local agents. Maximally favorable conditions cannot imply that the most desirable local decisions will be inevitable.For decision is by its very nature not wholly inevitable.^
Therefore, omnipotence is not the ability to do anything,
but is rather the setting of limits to the decision
making process of local agents so that whatever decisions
they make, the society will be preserved.^
It will be recalled from previous discussion that
God's power lies not in compulsion but in "persuasion".
He influences us by changing himself, as the object of our 
4awareness.
Thus God's power is absolute in the sense that it 
is always and unfailingly adequate to any situation 
which may occur. But this adequacy of God's power in con­
crete experience does not infringe upon the free responses 
of the finite existents whom he can influence but can never
^Ibid., p . 134. ^Reality as Social Process, p . 4l.
^Ibid. , p. 135. ^Divine Relativity, pp, 139» l4l, 142.
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compel.
Since for Hartshorne "adequacy" is the measure of 
greatness, he defines "omniscience" as "cognitive 
adequacy." Cognitive adequacy is knowledge adequate to 
its objects; it is knowledge which is infallible, that is, 
it truly and infallibly corresponds to whatever is, to
Qthe actual as actual and to the possible as possible.
It is precisely because God's knowledge infallibly or
perfectly corresponds to what is, that his knowledge must
be considered as truly and unrestrictedly relative.
Hartshorne argues that the "knowledge" of men is not
truly relative, that is, does not truly correspond to
reality; we think we know when we do not; we make mistakes..^
But not so with God. Whatever is, God knows infallibly;
his knowledge is truly relative, truly corresponds to
reality. Thus for Hartshorne, infallibility implies
relativity. Hartshorne further argues that -since God's
knowledge is truly relative to the actual as actual and
the possible as possible, that his infallible knowledge
can grow in content as future possible events are actual- 
4ized. Thus the specific content of God's knowledge is 
contingent, that is, depends upon the free choices and 
actions of the finite existents.^
^Ibid., pp. 121, 122. ^Man's Vision of God, pp. 98,
2 ÏÔ41Ibid., p p . 8-I5.
^Ibid., p . 10. ^Reality as Social Process,__
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Thus far what has been emphasised is that God's 
concrete knowledge is truly relative. In what sense, then, 
can God’s knowledge be absolute, which by Hartshorne's own 
definition, means unrelated? The answer, of course, lies 
in Hartshorne*s distinction of abstract and concrete 
aspects of God. In his concrete aspect God's knowledge 
is truly relative ; in his abstract aspect his omniscience 
is truly absolute, that is, nonrelative or unrelated. This 
is the case because omniscience is a type of relation, not 
a relation itself. (As noted earlier, God's abstract 
character is made up of relational types). As Hart­
shorne says,
The type of a relation is not itself subject to the relation, is not relativized by it. "Greater than" is not itself greater than, cognitive adequacy does not itself know, whether adequately or otherwise— any more than it is volition that wills . . . .  If volition does not will, and cognitive adequacy does not know, then cognitive adequacy need not be relative, even though the adequate knowér himself is relative, relative to what he knows.Thus there is in God something absolute or non- relative, his cognitive adequacy. Nevertheless, in knowing any actual thing, God himself is related and relativized with respect to that thing. There is here no paradox, unless it is paradoxical that seeing does not see, or that humor does not laugh.^
God's knowledge, then, is both absolute in that it partakes
of the abstract relational form of adequacy, and relative
in that it truly corresponds to every concrete existent
^Divine Relativity, pp. 121, 122.
l6o
and circumstance.
Also with reference to God's omniscience, Hartshorne 
argues two further points of importance. First, in keep­
ing with realistic epistemology, he contends that knowledge 
is an internal relation as far as the subject is concerned,
that is, knowledge makes a difference to the subject and is
-1therefore constitutive of the knower. This principle Hart­
shorne applies also to God, thereby making God's knowledge
2constitutive of his being. Here, too, Hartshorne is
emphasising the relativity of God's knowledge. Secondly
however, Hartshorne goes beyond this principle that the
object known is constitutive of the subject who knows; he
argues that relations— such as the relation involved in
knowledge— contain their terms. He states.
We find that persons contain relations of know­ledge and love to other persons and things, and since relations contain their terms, persons must contain other persons and things. If it seems otherwise, this is because of the inadequacy of human personal relations, which is such that the terms are not conspicuously and clearly contained in their subjects . . . .  In God, terms of his knowledge would be absolutely manifest and clear and not at all "outside" the knowledge or the knower.3
On the same theme Hartshorne writes.
To include relations is to include their terms.
, pp. 7, 119.
^Ibid.. p. 17.
^Ibld., pp. 143, 144.
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Hence to know all is to include all. Thus we must agree with modern absolutism and orthodox Hinduism that the supreme being must be all-inclusive.^
Thus Hartshorne presents an epistemological argument for 
God as all-inclusive in addition to the general metaphys­
ical argument and specific aesthetic argument discussed 
earlier.
Compared to the other attributes of God discussed by
Hartshorne, God’s holiness receives little attention.
However, in compliance again with Hartshorne’s view of
adequacy as the measure of greatness, he defines God’s
holiness as "motivational adequacy". This motivational
adequacy is implicit in God's omniscience.
If then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate motivation for seeking to actualize maximal possibilities of further value. There can be no ethical appeal beyond the decision of the one who in his decision takes account of all actuality and possibility . . . .  There could not be a wrong decision which thus took account of the situation; for a right decision can "be defined as one adequately informed as to its context. Omniscience in action is by definition right action.3
So we see that God’s cognitive adequacy (or omniscience) 
is the foundation for his motivational adequacy (or 
holiness). Because God knows everything, he is able to 






The holiness of God consists . . .  in the single aim at the one primary good, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living, and pour this richness into the one ultimate receptacle of all achievement, the life of God.^
Thus while God's holiness is absolute in that it is an
abstract relational type— motivational adequacy--it seems
to be the case that the concrete response of the creatures
is necessary for the "completion" of that holiness, that
is, for the realisation into fact of the purposes or
aims which God recognizes as maximally good.
It could probably be argued with much justification
that the attribute most associated with God is love.
In Hartshorne's estimation, "the new doctrine . . .  is
nothing at all but the analysis of the simple idea that
2God is 'the perfectly loving individual,'" and since God 
is love, then the attribute of love must determine "the
3legitimate scope of the concept of absoluteness." It 
will be recalled that Hartshorne's definition of ab­
soluteness is "nonrelative", that is, non-related. But 
if God is love, he must be related to the world. "For 
to love a being yet be absolutely independent of and 
unaffected by its welfare or suffering seems nonsense.
^Ibid.. pp. 1 2 7 , 128.
^an's Vision of God, p. 48.
^Ibid., p . 42.
^Reality as Social Process, p . 4o .
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Further, that God. is truly related to the creatures is
emphasised in Hartshorne's definition of love as "social
awareness." God is the only one who is truly socially 
aware of others, whose compassion for them is without 
limit.^
Having argued that the very concept of love implies
God's "relatedness" to the world and compassion for it,
Hartshorne continues to emphasise the point by way of
illustration, namely the example of Jesus.
I can only say that if it is Jesus as literally divine who loves men, really loves them, then my point, so far as I can see, is granted. . . .Should we not take him /Jesu^ as proof thatGod really is love— just that, without equivo­cation?^
But divine love must be understood as more than benevo­
lence .
I suggest that much more than divine benevo­lence or human kinship was symbolized in'the doctrine that the man on the cross was deity.The devotion of Jesus to his fellows was not mere benevolence . . . .  It was a feeling of sympathetic identity with them in their troubles and sufferings, as well as in their joys, so that their cause and their tragedy became his . . . .To say that Jesus was God then, ought to mean that God himself is one with us in our suffering, that divine love is not essentially benevolence--external well-wishing--but sympathy, taking into itself our every grief.^
The basic meaning of the cross, says Hartshorne, is that
^Divine Relativity, p. 3 6 .
^an's Vision of God, p. 165.
^Reality as Social Process, p . 14?.
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God shares with us all of our griefs as well as our joys,
1that God suffers for us and with us.
The above quotations could leave the impression that
Hartshorne does attribute deity to Jesus in some unique
sense. Such, however, is not the case. Hartshorne openly
concedes this point when he writes, "I have no Christology
to offer, beyond the simple suggestion that Jesus appears
to be the supreme symbol furnished to us by history of
the notion of a God genuinely and literally 'sympathetic'
2. . . ." While Jesus is indeed the supreme example of 
divine love, Hartshorne feels that such phrases as "Jesus 
was God" or the "divinity of Jesus" are too ambiguous
3to have any real meaning.^ However, Hartshorne goes on
to say, if we insist that in some sense Jesus was God,
then "we must remember that in some sense or degree
4every man is God." Thus Hartshorne, with the refreshing 
candour typical of his writings, explicitly states that 
in his particular philosophical perspective no true 
uniqueness can be attributed to the being of Jesus.
With Hartshorne's emphasis upon reality as social 
and God's being supremely related to the world, one 
important qualification must be kept in mind, and this
^Ibid., pp. 123, 14?', Man's Vision of God, p. I9 8 , 
^Reality as Social Process, p . 24.
^Ibid., p . 1 5 2 .
\bid. , p. 1 5 3.
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is the process principle--already found in Whitehead 
— of the independence of contemporary entities. For 
Whitehead, it will he recalled that this meant that two 
actual entities contemporary with each other could not 
prehend each other. Hartshorne likewise states that "two 
subjects cannot be objects to each other . . . ." This 
is not to deny that two individual persons could know 
each other, "for a man is not one particular but a stream 
or system of actual and potential particular experiences. 
But two experiences, two momentary or irreducible 'sub­
jects, ' could not, according to our principles . . . each
know the other . . . .Contemporary events are mutually
2independent." In Hartshorne's own words, "The topic of 
contemporary relations bristles with difficulties" and is 
"the most vulnerable point in the surrelativist doctrine." 
Hartshorne concedes that the answer to this problem escapes 
him and we shall have cause to return to this matter later 
in the chapter.
The brief exposition of Hartshorne's surrelative 
panentheism given in this chapter will, we believe, suffice 
to demonstrate how he has applied the process principles 
of Whitehead in order to produce a theistic philosophy 
of his own. While the similarity to Whitehead is obvious.
^Divine Relativity, p. 98
^Ibid., p. 99.
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we wish to take this opportunity to once again stress the 
importance of recognizing the environment in which White­
head' s philosophy can best be understood, namely the 
broader context of British neo-realism. Thus in and 
through Whitehead, British neo-realism had its influence 
on the American philosophical scene and, perhaps to a 
greater extent than many have realised, particularly on 
the philosophical theology of Charles Hartshorne.
This concludes the positive explication of the major 
points of Hartshorne's surrelative panentheism. As we 
now turn to a brief examination of his philosophy, we 
shall be concerned primarily with the internal coherence 
of Hartshorne's dipolar theism, and particularly his 
view that such dipolar theism has its natural conclusion 
in panentheism.
Dipolar theism— including panentheism— requires to
be examined in light of its attributing to one being,
God, both infinite and finite qualities. It is surely
justifiable to say, in this respect, that dipolar theism
at least gives the appearance of being self-contradictory
since as Owen emphasises, "the idea of the infinite by
1definition excludes the idea of the finite . . . . 
Hartshorne'8 response is that such a criticism is based 
upon a failure to grasp the real significance of God's
1H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (London: Macmillan& Co., Ltd., 1971) , p. 83.
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dipolarity. True, if God were regarded as both infinite 
and finite in the same aspect of his being, then such 
would indeed be contradictory. But Hartshorne, as noted 
earlier, believes that the problem can be overcome by 
attributing both infinite and finite qualities to God, 
but to different "aspects" of his being. The infinite 
aspect of God is eternal, abstract, impersonal and un­
related, that is, absolute; the finite aspect is temporal, 
concrete, personal and related, that is, relative.
The question must then be raised concerning the 
relationship between the two aspects of God, one of which-- 
the infinite— cannot be related to any particular exist­
ing thing, and the other--the finite— which must be re­
lated. Hartshorne, it will be recalled, contends that 
while it is true that God in his absolute nature cannot 
be related to any particular existing finites, that is, 
to the "contingent alternatives of creation," he is re­
lated, and must be so related to some creation, That is, 
some accidents are necessary; God's absolute character 
requires, that is, must be related to some accidental 
embodiments, but he is not dependent upon nor related to 
the specific form which the accidental embodiments may 
take at any given moment.
Hartshorne's response, however, gives rise to 
several further criticisms. First, in stating that 
while the abstract aspect of God can be related to, and
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indeed must be related to something, it cannot be related 
to any particular thing. Hartshorne leaves himself open 
to the charge of saying what is meaningless. For example, 
Hartshorne believes that God has always been creative, 
and has been so through an infinity of universes. Very 
well, let us ask if God in his abstract character is 
related to the present universe? Hartshorne's answer 
is in the negative. This present universe, after all, 
is only one of the contingent alternatives of creation.
What about the universe immediately preceding this 
present one; was God dependent upon and thereby related 
to that universe? Apparently not, and for the same 
reason. Then let us ask the same question concerning any 
one or all of the preceding universes a^ infinitum. 
Hartshorne’s answer must always be the same; God in 
his abstract, absolute aspect cannot be related to any 
particular contingent creation, though Hartshorne insists 
that this does not prohibit God's being related to crea­
tion ^  such. But what can this possibly mean? Hartshorne 
insists that God needs some creation, but seems to be say­
ing that God has not needed any one of them produced thus 
far and, furthermore, will not need any one of any uni­
verses which may be produced in the future.
This same problem can also be stated from Hartshorne's 
viewpoint of something contingent being necessary, but no
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particular contingent being necessary. But again, it
could be asked of any contingent existent (whether in
this universe or previous ones) "Does this exist
necessarily?" In each case, Hartshorne's response would
be in the negative, since necessary existence does not
belong to any particular contingent being. But surely,
as Craighead says, "if it is contradictory, then, to
assert of any particular concretum that it necessarily
exists, it would seem to be likewise contradictory . . .
to assert of all concrete, that at least some of them 
1must exist." It would, thus far at least, seem to be 
the case that Hartshorne's concept of God's relationship 
to the finite existants is indeed self-contradictory, and 
since in panentheism these finites constitute God’s 
contingent or finite aspect, it does seem that the 
relationship between God's infinite and finite aspects 
is indeed problematic.
Secondly, Hartshorne argues that although God's 
abstract and eternal aspect needs to be related to some­
thing, the need is satisfied by God himself, that is, 
God's eternal aspect has the power to continually create 
the contingent aspect. It will be recalled that as 
abstract God is cause, and as concrete he is effect. But 
here two further inconsistencies may be noted. To create
1Houston Craighead, "Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God," Process Studies, I (1971), 19 «
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is surely to be related to what is created, even--and 
especially--to the particular things created. Hart­
shorne himself agrees that to create, or to be the 
cause of something, is to be related, but he fails to 
acknowledge that the eternal aspect of God can be re­
lated to any particular contingent existent. A further 
inconsistency is recognized when it is remembered that 
in Hartshorne’s view, God's essential attributes are types 
of relationship and a relational type cannot itself be 
related. For example, as Hartshorne states the case, 
cognitive adequacy cannot know. How, then, can causal 
adequacy— which is only a type of relationship— create the 
contingent existants which God needs? As another writer 
has well stated, "Hartshorne's abstract, immutable 
absolute, as qualityless . . . is a concept which gives 
us no satisfactory idea of how God can create anything." 
Thus again, we see difficulty concerning the. relationship 
existing between the infinite and finite aspects of God.
In this respect, Hartshorne's panentheism suffers from a 
common weakness in process thought, namely the onto­
logical problem. There is no adequate explanation for 
finite existents.
Thirdly, we present Hartshorne with a dilemma as 
follows; either God’s abstract aspect related to the
-1 D, Luther Evans, "Two Intellectually Respectable Conceptions of God," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, X (1950), 576•
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present universe or it is not so related; if God's 
abstract aspect i^ related to the present universe, then 
God has no absolute aspect at all, since according to 
Hartshorne's own definition, to be absolute means to be 
non-related. (Indeed, it has been argued that since in 
Hartshorne’s view even the abstract aspect of God needs 
to be related to something, there is in actual fact no 
way in which a dipolar God can be absolute). If on the 
other hand, God's absolute aspect is not related to the 
present universe, then this is the same thing as saying 
that God's infinite aspect is not related in any way to 
his finite aspect since the present universe of contingent 
existents actually constitutes God’s finite aspect. Thus, 
if the former horn of the dilemma is accepted, then Hart­
shorne ' s dipolar God is absolute in no respect whatever; 
if the latter horn is accepted, then Hartshorne has created 
within the very being of God a bifurcation which radically 
undermines the unity of the concept.
Leaving aside this particular problem, let us now 
turn to the question as to whether God as he is related 
to the world can really function in the way that Hart­
shorne demands. According to Hartshorne, God conserves 
without loss the values achieved in the world. Now, it 
will be recalled that Hartshorne views God not as an
-1 Edward Parley, The Transcendence of God (Philadelphia: The Wes^minster Press, I9 6 0), pp . 147-149,
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actual entity but as a series of actual entities, 
this being consistent with Hartshorne’s insistence that 
God is truly personal. The question is, can God as a 
society of successive entities function in the way Hart­
shorne suggests? Can God truly conserve all values 
achieved? If so, then God— at best— differs in this 
respect from every other temporal series or--at worst—  
he must be regarded as a being who violates the funda­
mental process principles which Hartshorne endorses.
The real tragedy of life , according to both Whitehead and 
Hartshorne, is loss, specifically the loss of the present, 
the problem of forgetting to which we humans are so much 
subject. This particular problem arises because the 
occasions in our past are no longer "immediate" for us 
and, since time is "perpetual perishing", we find our­
selves losing much of what has gone before. But if God 
too is a series of actual entities, as Hartshorne believes, 
then how is the problem of loss solved? If time as per­
petual perishing is the problem, and God is a temporal 
series, then God too must suffer loss; values achieved 
could not be conserved, at least not in their totality, 
not in their immediacy.
But the problem is not only that God is a temporal 
series; it is aggravated by the process principle of the 
independence of contemporary entities. No actual entity, 
including God, can prehend or experience another as sub-
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ject. What is experienced or known must he an object, 
having already lost its subjective immediacy. In accord­
ance with this principle, God has never known the sub­
jective immediacy of any actual occasion, but surely 
that subjective immediacy was a vital part of the value 
achieved by the temporal occasion, a value which God 
could not ever have known, far less conserved without 
loss. As others have stated, "Hartshorne's insistence 
on this power in God is inconsistent with his own (and 
Whitehead's) metaphysical principles according to which
no actual entity can experience the immediacy of past
•1(i.e., ’objectively immortal') actual entities."
Thus we have seen that the process principle of 
the preservation without loss of all values achieved, in 
the consequent or relative aspect of God, is nullified 
not only by another process principle— the mutual in­
dependence of contemporary actual entities— but also by 
Hartshorne'8 view of God as a temporal series of entities.
With continuing reference to God as a temporal 
series, John Baker has raised what appears to be another 
problem for process thought. According to the principles 
of process philosophy, God must be able to prehend the 
satisfaction of every temporal actual entity, and every
Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, "Evil and Unlimited Power," Review of Metaphysics, XX (1966/6 7), 284; See also Robert C. Neville, "Neo-Classical Theology and Christianity; A Critical Study of Ogden's ’Reality of God,'" International Philosophical Quarterly, IX (1 9 6 9), 6 1 7, 6 1 8 .
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temporal actual entity must also prehend the satisfaction 
of a divine occasion. Baker then demonstrates that if 
every occasion in the universe enjoys one or another of 
twenty four temporal extensions based upon fractions of a 
second, then God must have 2,042,042 occasions of experience
"Iper second. However, if one is tempted to believe along 
with Professor Edwards that in a universe such as ours 
the temporal occasions would share many more than the 
twenty four temporal extensions which Baker used for his 
calculations, then God's actual occasions would not be 
limited to approximately two million per second, but would 
be infinitely dense and as Edwards states, "an entity with 
infinitely dense actual occasions is a continuum! Such a 
God would simply be a continuously concrescing actual 
entity!
It would seem, then, that for God to be omniscient—  
which Hartshorne argues he is— he would for all practical 
purposes have to be regarded as a single actual entity, 
always in concrescence. However, it will be recalled from 
our discussion of Whitehead's view of God as a single 
entity, that such a view involves further problems, 
particularly a violation of process principles in that
4John Robert Baker, "Omniscience and Divine Synchronization," Process Studies, II (1972), 203*
^Rem B. Edwards, "The Human Self: An Actual Entityor Society?", Process Studies, V (1975), 203.
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God as a single entity is always in concrescence (possess­
ing subjective immediacy) and always satisfied (possessing 
objective immortality) at one and the same time.
Thus Hartshorne can be presented with another dilemma; 
either God is a single actual entity always in concrescence 
and always satisfied, or he is a temporal society of 
actual entities. If he is a single actual entity as 
described then he is a blatant violation of process 
metaphysical principles; if he is a temporal society, 
then there is no guarantee either of his omniscience or 
his ability to preserve without loss all the values 
achieved in the world.
Hartshorne, of course, does view God as a temporal 
society, always growing in perfection, this because of 
the continual addition of the values achieved by the 
"imperfect" beings.^  But the question we wish to ask is, 
"Will God, then become more perfect by the addition of 
further imperfections?" We have not forgotten Hartshorne's 
redefinition of perfection as the all-inclusive self­
surpassing surpasser of all. However, we do not believe 
that even this redefinition can remove all difficulty for 
Hartshorne on this point. Dealing with this apparent 
contradiction, he states that some argue
. . . that God is good and wise and therefore excludesthe predicates bad and foolish, leaving them outside
1Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, pp. 19, 20.
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himself. By the same reasoning a house which is large and heavy excludes small and light, which must be outside the house. On the con­trary the smallness and lightness of the parts of the house are in the house, and yet the house is not small or light. It is not according to logic to suppose that predicates not applicable directly to a thing as a whole must be outside it. They may be inside it as the properties of its constituents,^
On this particular occasion, Hartshorne is somewhat less
than convincing. We agree that many light things taken
together do indeed become heavy. But surely it cannot
be justifiably argued that many bad and foolish things
together thereby become good and wise !
Hartshorne's argument, of course, has to do not only 
with God's perfection, but also with the concept of God's 
being all inclusive, that is, the doctrine of panentheism 
which we will now examine.
We observed earlier that Hartshorne sets forth three 
basic arguments for his concept of God as all-inclusive.
We termed these the arguments from aesthetics, epistemology 
and the general metaphysical position of panpsychism. We 
shall deal with these in the above order. First, to speak 
of Hartshorne's aesthetic approach as an "argument" is 
probably not entirely justified. Hartshorne assumes 
certain matters to be true concerning his theory of aes­
thetics without really arguing the case. Two basic as­
sumptions are made; (1) The contrast between the living
^Ibld.. p. 145.
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and dead matter is not beautiful and therefore all matter 
must, in some sense be alive ; and (2) God must possess 
as much variety in his being as the universe does. Hart­
shorne ' s conclusion, of course, is that God's "need" for 
aesthetic variety in his own being is supplied by the 
world's inclusion in God. Certainly, these assumptions 
can be questioned. For example, is not the first as­
sumption merely a subjective assessment on Hartshorne's 
part? Would the distinction between living and dead not 
be an even greater aesthetic contrast, emphasising the 
beauty and value of life? With reference to the second 
assumption, it may be appropriate to ask, "Why must God 
require aesthetic variety in his being?" Could God not 
simply be aware of, that is, 'know' the aesthetic variety 
in the universe without actually including it in his 
being? Hartshorne's answer to the latter question is an 
emphatic negative. For Hartshorne, to know'is to contain 
or include.
This brings us to the epistemological arguments for 
the all-inclusiveness of God. Hartshorne goes beyond 
epistemic realism which recognizes the existence of two 
entities in the knowing process, namely subject and 
object. Hartshorne, as stated above, contends that the 
object becomes included in the subject which knows it.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Hartshorne holds 
that this is even true of persons who thereby contain one
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another, and that if this does not seem to he the case, 
it is only because of the inadequacy of human personal 
relations. But for God, all the objects of his knowledge 
are clearly known and therefore are literally contained 
in God. Since God is omniscient, this would mean that 
he is all-inclusive.
Now, all of this is based upon Hartshorne's theory 
that relations contain their terms. But is such really 
the case? Is there anything in our experience which 
would justify such a theory, or pass sentence upon it as 
false? Hartshorne seems to say that an appeal to human 
experience in this matter would not be appropriate because, 
although persons do not seem to contain other persons, 
this is because of the inadequacy of human relations.
But we must ask, might it not seem to be the case because 
it is not the case? Might it not be the case that we 
human beings can have genuine knowledge--not infallible 
to be sure— of other persons, while they remain just 
that, other persons "over against us" with their own 
identity unviolated by the knowledge process? Such is 
the testimony of experience, and if God is the "eminent" 
personality, why not eminently "over against" other 
persons, rather than all-inclusive?
John Wild has drawn attention to the fallacy of 
Hartshorne"s epistemological argument when he argues that 
Hartshorne has failed to distinguish between noetic and
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entitative inclusion. As Wild well argues, no matter how 
exact a man's knowledge of Africa may he, it is not con­
ceivable that Africa thereby is "within" him. Knowledge 
does not result in spatial inclusion. Wild writes,
"As a realist, I believe that the noetic faculty immate­
rially grasps or assimilates its object, and in this sense 
'includes' it. But apart from this sense, certainly not 
that of entitative 'inclusion.'
It would seem that the epistemological argument used 
by Hartshorne is no more conclusive than the aesthetic 
argument in arguing the case for panentheism. Indeed, 
there is an epistemological argument, ironically drawn 
from Hartshorne's own process principles, which can be 
used in devastating fashion against the concept of panen­
theism. It is, once again, the theory of the mutual 
independence of contemporary actual entities. • The argu­
ment is simple and takes the form of a question concerning 
the present universe, with the emphasis upon the word 
"present." That is, the question does not concern the 
universe of a moment ago, but the universe of this very 
moment. Is the present universe prehended by God; is it 
the object of his knowledge? According to the process 
theory of the mutual independence of contemporary entities, 
Hartshorne ought to answer in the negative. Very well, if 
the present universe cannot be the object of God's
^John Wild, "The Divine Existence : An Answer toMr. Hartshorne," Review of Metaphysics, IV (1950/51), 6 9 .
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knowledge, how can it he included in him? How can panen­
theism he true? On one hand Hartshorne tells us that to 
know to include and therefore God includes the universe
1in his being; God is "surrelative to the present universe."
On the other hand he tells us that not even God can know
the present universe composed of actual entities still
possessing their subjective immediacy; "contemporary events
2are mutually independent." This is a fundamental contra­
diction in Hartshorne's panentheism.
Hartshorne may thus be presented with a further 
dilemma; either God includes actual entities still possess­
ing their subjective immediacy or he does not so include 
them; if he does include the actual entities as described, 
he may indeed be "the subject of all change" but is so 
in violation of the principle that contemporary actual 
entities cannot prehend one another; if he does not so 
include the actual entities, then panentheism is false, 
at least with reference to the universe of this present 
moment.
We turn now to the final argument for panentheism 
to be discussed, and this will involve some brief remarks 
concerning panpsychism, the philosophy upon which pan­
entheism depends. It will be recalled that Hartshorne 
regarded the universe as an eminent effect, being animate
1Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 88. 
^Ibid., p. 98.
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and rational. He then presented us with a dilemma of his 
own: "if the universe is eminently animate and rational,
then either it is God, or there are two eminent beings,
God and Universe . . . ." Hartshorne, of course, solves
the dilemma by resorting to panentheism, claiming that the 
two eminences are two aspects of God rather than two Gods, 
or God and an eminent being other than God. Now, this 
dilemma is built upon the supposition of a panpsychistic 
universe. But suppose the universe is not eminently 
animate and rational; suppose panpsychism is false. Then 
Hartshorne's dilemma would be no dilemma at all. There 
would be one eminent being, God, and the universe he 
created.
But is panpsychism false? Hartshorne states that the 
denial of panpsychism— specifically the concept of the
2universe as a self-maintaining society— is unverifiable.
If so, does this make panpsychism necessarily true? One 
is tempted to respond in kind by stressing that the 
affirmation of panpsychism is unverifiable. However, some 
additional response is possible. For example, the question 
has been raised concerning how Hartshorne's theory of the 
universe as a self-maintaining society can be upheld in
^Ibid., p. 79.
Reality as Social Process, pp. 32, 33, 39
182
1the light of entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, 
which states that entropy, that is, the measure of random­
ness or disorder, increases in all real processes. Fur­
ther, in chapter three dealing with Whitehead, we em­
phasised that Whitehead's philosoply did not seem to 
live up to his own criteria, including the standard of 
"adequacy". So also with Hartshorne, While a philosophy 
of organism may apply from the human through the animal 
to plant life, there seems to he no real indication (and 
certainly no confirmation) that physical objects such as 
stones consist of actual entities with feelings. Pan­
psychism seems to claim too much for such things. On
2the other end of the scale, George Thomas has pointed 
out that panpsychism is not adequate for a full under­
standing of persons. With its emphasis upon a succession 
of actual entities, panpsychism does not provide a doctrine 
of genuine personal identity. If panpsychism claims too 
much for "sticks and stones" it does not claim enough for 
persons. We must conclude that, at best, panpsychism 
must be regarded as very speculative and, as indicated 
above, speculation which does not adequately explain life 
as it is experienced.
We therefore conclude that Hartshorne's arguments
1Eric C. Rust, Evolutionary Philosophies and Con­temporary Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1 9 6 9}, p. 186.
2Thomas, Religious Philosophies of the West, p. 380.
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for his concept of panentheism, based upon aesthetics, 
epistemology and a metaphysical pansychism, have failed 
to establish his case. Further, we have shown in this 
chapter, particularly through a series of dilemmas pre­
sented to Hartshorne, that his surrelative panentheism 
seemingly lacks internal coherence and must therefore be 
regarded as inadequate in its formulation of its concept 
of God.
However, before concluding this chapter, we now 
wish to look briefly at the panentheistic view of the 
personality of God, Hartshorne's view of the personality 
of God is somewhat ambiguous and, indeed, this ambiguity 
gives rise to the impression that the concept may also 
be self-contradictory. The problem arises because Hart­
shorne seemingly attributes God's personality to his 
abstract aspect on one occasion and to his concrete 
aspect on another. On the one hand, Hartshorne con­
stantly refers to God's abstract aspect as his "character", 
and does so in this passage where the character of God is 
equated with his personality.
. . . since the essence of God is compatible with any possible universe, we can be allowed some power of decision, as between possibilities, v/ithout infringing the absôlute independence .of God in his essential character or personality.
On the other hand, Hartshorne also identifies the
•1Hartshorne, Divine Relativity, p. 89,
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personality of God with his concrete aspect when he 
writes that "If God is in process, then he has, in a 
sense, a distinct personality for each stage of his 
life.
Hartshorne's ambiguity is understandable. It is 
perhaps inevitable given panentheism's emphasis upon 
God's dipolarity. God's personality must be somewhere, 
that is in one aspect or the other, but neither option 
does justice even to what Hartshorne seeks to express. 
Hartshorne wishes to preserve God's immutability of 
personality (and thereby attributes such personality 
to God’s absolute aspect) while still holding that God 
as a person is truly related to other persons (and 
Hartshorne therefore attributes God’s personality to 
his relative aspect). But Hartshorne simply cannot do 
both. We recognize his dilemma. If he attributes 
God's personality to the abstract aspect then he will 
have preserved God’s immutability at a terrible cost; 
God's personality, belonging to his essence— "what 
makes God God"— would be unrelated. That is, God in 
his essence--which would include his personality—  
would be totally unaffected by and unconcerned with the 
world and its affairs. If it is argued that this is not 
a deficiency but is precisely what Hartshorne is con-
1Reality as Social Process, p. 153-
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tending for, then we must respond hy saying that this 
is so much the worse for Hartshorne's position. How can 
God's essence he unrelated and yet consist, as Hart­
shorne insists it does, of God's goodness, love and 
other "religious" attributes? What is unrelated good­
ness; unrelated love? If these are meaningless concepts, 
then panentheism is meaningless. If they are meaningful 
concepts, then such meaningfulness has not yet been given 
adequate explanation by panentheists.
If on the other hand, Hartshorne attributes the 
personality of God to the relative, concrete aspect, 
then other problems arise. God would then even in his 
personality be "related" to the world, but that personality 
would no longer in Hartshorne's estimation be immutable, 
dependable. Further, what would it mean to attribute 
God's personality to his relative aspect and his 
character to his abstract aspect?
If it is argued that we have failed to distinguish 
between the personality of God and God as a person (which 
would amount to the charge that we have failed to recognize 
the true significance of God's dipolarity), we respond 
that not only have we not failed to recognize the sign­
ificance of the dipolar concept, but rather it is the 
dipolar concept itself which creates the problem.
One question of importance needs to be directed 
towards the matter of the panentheistic view of God as
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a person. Is God as a person finite or infinite? Hart­
shorne, of course, does not like such dyadic formulations, 
insisting that they beg the question that one of the two 
alternatives must be true, whereas some third alternative 
may be possible. Hartshorne, of course, may be somewhat 
less than objective in this assessment, since he wishes 
to hold to a concept of God as both infinite and finite, 
infinity belonging to one aspect of God and finitude 
to the other. However, we insist that it is meaningful 
to address the above question concerning God ^  a whole. 
Hartshorne himself states that "deity . . . as an actualowhole, includes all relative items." Now, is such a God 
infinite or finite? If the response is that he is 
infinite-finite, we suggest that the hyphen does not 
solve the problem, and we further insist that this part­
icular dyadic formulation as to whether God is infinite 
or finite is not question begging but is true by 
definition,
We contend that Hartshorne's panentheism results in 
the concept of a God who is finite. It is not possible 
for a God who is constituted in part by finite constitu­
ents to be truly infinite. Prom Hartshorne's own writings 
we recall that God, in his abstract essence, is "no
M^an's Vision of God, pp. 2?, 28, 34.
^Divine Relativity, p. 89.
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actuai subject. But in his concrete aspect God is a
temporal series of actual entities--required for God's
2"personhood"— and is contingent. ' The concrete aspect of 
God which is required for his "personhood" is the aspect 
which makes him finite.
While such criticisms are significant within the 
context of our study insofar as they allow us a better 
understanding of process and panentheistic concepts, the 
major point of this chapter has been to confirm White­
head's influence on Hartshorne, a point generally con­
ceded. But in this particular study in the history of 
ideas, Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne has been ex­
pounded in the wider context of twentieth century Anglo- 
American process philosophy. We have traced an affinity 
of thought in Alexander's theory of correspondence, 
Morgan's concepts of correlation, involution and depend­
ence, Whitehead's dipolar theism, and Hartshorne's 
surrelative panentheism. It was the purpose of this re­
search to set forth systematically the affinity of thought 
in early twentieth century British neo-realism and the 
later American panentheism. Through expounding primary 
sources, we believe that this purpose has been accom­
plished, this relationship of ideas demonstrated in
Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, p. 76.
% a n  '8 Vision of God, p. 29; Divine Relativity, p. 32.
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systematic fashion.
However, before concluding this research, we wish 
to take note of an American influence on Hartshorne and 
his concept of God, namely the idealist William Ernest 




AN AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON HARTSHORNE
This research thus far has demonstrated an affinity 
of thought in early twentieth century British neo-realism 
(as set forth in the works of Alexander, Morgan and White­
head) and American panentheism (as expounded in the 
writings of Charles Hartshorne). This affinity can he 
seen in common elements in these philosophers, such as a 
doctrine of emergence or novelty, the theory of panpsychism 
and the concept of a God who is involved with or in the 
temporal process. We have also argued that this affinity 
of thought is not totally coincidental, but is due in large 
part to the influence of Whitehead upon Hartshorne. How­
ever, no claim is being made that Whitehead--and through 
Whitehead the wider context of British neo-realism--was the 
only major influence upon Hartshorne. On the contrary, we 
have already noted from Hartshorne's own writings that his 
first convictions that God was temporal as well as eternal 
he derived from William Ernest Hocking. We wish therefore 
to take this opportunity to briefly review Hocking* s
idealism, laying emphasis upon his concept of God and the
1similarities of that concept to the view of Hartshorne,
Much of Hocking's emphasis lies in religious epistemology. While we recognize his contribution in this area, our primary concern in this brief review is Hocking*s concept of God and not his concept of how men come to know God
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The disaffection with absolute idealism which was
occurring in Great Britain during the early twentieth
century was also taking place in the United States of
America. In Britain one result of this disaffection was
neo-realism; in America Hocking attempted a modification
of absolute idealism, which would nonetheless allow his
philosophy to retain its idealistic identity. According
to Hocking, the deficiency of absolute idealism could be
recognized within the framework of religion. He states
that people "do not find the Absolute of idealism
identical with the God of religion; they cannot, worship 
1the Absolute." In a similar vein he continues, "Idealism 
is unfinished, then, not having found its way to worship: 
it has not found its way to the particular and the 
historical in religion; to the . . . wholly super­
personal . . . .  it has not yet been able in this matter
pof religion to accomplish union with the concrete."
To this concept of the Absolute, Hocking applies the 
criterion of negative pragmatism. This standard can be 
stated as, "That which does not work is not true, When 
this principle of negative pragmatism--which Hocking 
insists must be an effective instrument of religious
William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), p. vi
2Ibid., pp. xi, xii.
^Ibid., p . xiii.
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'Iknowledge --is applied to absolute idealism, the concept 
of the Absolute as here discussed does not "work" in 
terms of religion and therefore cannot be true. Hocking 
argues that the problem is not so much that idealism is 
essentially false as that it is "unfinished" and requires 
to be completed. He writes,
Idealism fails to work, I believe, chiefly because it is unfinished. Unfinishedness is not in itself a blemish . . . .  A thing is properly unfinished when is finishable; when it has an identity that finishing will not change . . . .Idealism can entertain much of what pragmatism, realism, and the rest have brought forward, and still remain idealism . . .  .2
Hocking therefore argues that idealism can be finished
or completed by incorporating into it certain realistic
elements. He speaks of the need of this synthesis: "It
is the finished idealist who best knows the need of the
realistic elements of experience . . . .  I know not what
name to give to this point of convergence, nor does name
much matter: it is realism, . .* it is idealism also,
its identity, I believe, not broken,
The need for idealism to complete itself reaches into
the realm of religion and specifically the doctrine of God.
Hocking describes the God of orthodoxy:
. . . this God does things in the world which, ifwe like, we may call miracles or, if we likebetter, deeds of Providence. Upon this differential work of God, as contrasted with his total work,
^Ibid., p . xiv.
2Ibid., pp . X, xi.
^Ibid., pp. xix, XX,
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was based much of the urgency of former religious observance, prayer, and piety. Pragmatism rightly enquires what becomes of this differential work when God becomes the All-One of idealism In such wise, the pragmatic principle tends to confront idealism . . . with the substantial values of orthodoxy; compelling idealism to complete it­self by the standard of these values (I do not say, of these propositions), even if at the cost of its philosophic identity.^
Thus Hocking seeks a modified, that is completed idealism
which rejects the concept of God as merely the "All-One"
and which regains the doctrine of a God who can be
distinguished, through his work, from the All. God, then,
is not to be identified with the "All-One" of idealism,
that is the Absolute. Nonetheless, although God and the
Absolute are not equivalents, "God, whatever else he may
2be, must needs also be the Absolute." For Hocking, then, 
the Absolute does not "work" in terms of religion when it 
is identified with God, that is when God and the Absolute 
are regarded as equivalents. But the concept of the 
Absolute, no longer equated with God but now regarded as 
a necessary attribute of God, remains a fundamental feature 
in Hocking's philosophy.
Hocking retains the Absolute because, he argues, it 
is not possible to dispense with a "Changeless Ultimate
3in our world." For example, men constantly seek im-




provement in many aspects of life. But what does
"improvement" mean; what goal is sought? The possibility
of improvement implies the concept of the Absolute,
Hocking argues, because "the degree of alteration which
we can endure, even for the better or best, is not
indefinitely great" and "there will be something at the
last day which was also there at the f i r s t . S e c o n d l y ,
the Absolute is necessary if men are to judge or measure
achievement. "We pass judgment upon the intellects, and
estimate the world-guesses, of Newton, and Paracelsus,
and Thales, and Lao Tze, and Moses: we are able to do
this only in so far as they, and we all, have been aiming
2at the same mark . . . ." Thirdly, the Absolute is 
necessary because of its qualities of unlimited hospitality
and indifference. These attributes have the advantage of
being compatible "with every relative improvement. Offer­
ing all the advantages of changelessness, with none of the 
disadvantages of conserving the undesirable."^ Hocking 
continues this important theme later, emphasising that the 
Absolute must indeed be compatible with everything.
If the absolute good were not compatible withevery relative evil, it would not be the Absolute.If the Absolute were not compatible with everyrelative danger, it would not be the Absolute. That which holds good, no matter what occurs,— that is precisely the object of our search.
^Ibid., p. 187.
^Ibid., pp. 187, 188.
^Ibld., p. 187.
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Such an object is no modern discovery. From the beginning of religious thought, in the very conception of a creator, there has been present to the mind of man a Being who is present alike in good and evil, , . . The founder of a popular religion held up to the minds of a spell-bound multitude, as his own original revelation, a God who "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." Upon this basis he defined the "perfection" of God, and summoned men to the same perfection, the same absolute bearing. Thereby he defined an atti­tude of mind which was indeed new in that world, an attitude of equal treatment toward friend and enemy, toward good and bad,--an attitude much garbled and misunderstood, but an attitude wholly intelligible in the light of that unmistakable description of the Absolute God.l
Thus we cannot dispense with the Absolute, and God
must be regarded as absolute but, as noted earlier, he is
not equivalent to the Absolute; whatever else he may be,
2he must also be the Absolute. Hocking is seemingly ar­
guing that God cannot be less than the Absolute, but must 
be regarded as possessing attributes which allow him to 
be described as something more than the Absolute. This 
interpretation of Hocking is confirmed when he states 
that God may be regarded as both absolute and personal, 
that is, God is the Absolute raised to the level of per- 
sonality.^ "Substance is known as Subject: reality from
the beginning is known as God."^ God, then, is both Sub­
stance and Subject, both absolute and personal. In what 
respect, then, does Hocking regard God as absolute and in
^ITnld. , pp. 204, 205. ^Ibld. , p. 20?.
^Ibid., p. 206. Ibid., p. 296.
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what respect personal?
Hocking describes God as absolute in that he is "the 
God who merely . . . ." As absolute God stands "out­
side the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good
2and evil . . . ." This absoluteness of God is regarded 
by Hocking as advantageous in that God, "standing outside 
the arena . . .  is able to transmute evil into good; . . . 
this standing outside the arena itself is a necessary 
condition of his being all-powerful in this transmuting 
work." In this respect, God as absolute is promotive of 
human morality, and is therefore both good and righteous 
in his activity.^
But can the Absolute, even as an attribute of God, 
be justly described in this way? Does the concept of 
the Absolute not imply neutrality? Has Hocking himself 
not already spoken of the "indifference" of the Absolute? 
Hocking's response is to concede that the Absolute makes 
no difference; what makes a difference is consciousness 
of the Absolute.^ For example, "Evil becomes a problem, 
only because the consciousness of the Absolute is there: 
apart from this fact, the 'colour of evil’ would be mere 
contents of experience."^ But how is this knowledge of
^Ibid., p. 331. Ibid.. pp. 331. 332.
^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 203.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.
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the Absolute attained? Hocking appeals to what one
might justifiably call a qualified mysticism, While
rejecting much of what may be described as historical
mysticism, Hocking insists that there is a necessary
mysticism, a mysticism which is compatible with idealism
and which constitutes the essential standpoint in 
1religion. The mystic, writes Hocking, "finds the
2absolute in immediate experience." Thus in Hocking's 
philosophy there seems to be an intuitive element not 
unlike that of C. Lloyd Morgan discussed earlier. In 
this intuitive process, the absolute is recognized, and 
this recognition makes all the "practical difference" in 
the world.^ For Hocking, then, God as absolute has 
reference to God as he merely i^, who transcends the 
temporal realm of human affairs, is compatible with every 
relative danger and who can be "found" of men, and in 
being found makes a difference to the world.
But now what of God as personal? Hocking draws the 
contrast: God as absolute is God as he merely is; God as
personal is God in his relationship to others. "For God 
is not apart from what he has created . . . .  Self includes, 
and is with, its objects, in so far as it comprehends them, 
or is creating them. God, then, does actually include me.
1 Ibid., pp. xviii, xix,
2Ibid., p . xix.
^Ibld.. p. 203.
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1in so far as I am dependent upon him . . . ." This
relationship of inclusion is one which is associated with
God's comprehension of, or reflection upon, the finite
existents. Hocking, once again arguing that God must
stand outside the arena of human affairs in order to be
the supreme power, also adds that while God must be
another than any finite self, he must also reflect upon
and in his reflection include all finite selves and their 
2circumstances. Thus God as personal is God as inclusive.
And yet in adopting this position Hocking recognizes that
some may regard it as unusual.
It is God in external relation to me, as my Other, that seems the personal God; it is God as the Whole, including me within himself, that seems impersonal: and the true God is the Whole, as in Christian doctrine God is the One of the three persons. But we may discern in the world generally a principle to the effect that inner relations assimilate them­selves to outer relations, and conversely. Thus, of organisms, the whole cares for the parts in the same sense that the parts may be said to care for each other.3
So Hocking argues that his concept of inclusion detracts 
neither from the possibility of regarding God as personal, 
nor from the finite existents having a genuine relation­
ship to God and to one another.
Has Hocking here reached the position of regarding 
the world as God’s body? In connection with this question,




and as a further development of the concept of God as
personal, we now turn to Hocking's introduction of some
realistic tenets into his idealism. Hocking not only
recognizes but insists upon the realistic doctrine of the
independence of Nature. "This world, in its constitution,"
he says, "is not my doing; nor is it the doing of any one
1else situated as I am, nor of any assemblage of such."
Thus far this position coincides with natural realism, 
but Hocking goes beyond this formulation claiming that in 
its independence, in its "obstinacy", Nature begins to
Qassume "the unmistakable aspect of Other Mind." This is 
the case. Hocking affirms, because Nature is that which 
sustains us from moment to moment and is in actual fact
creative of us. In its obstinacy and independence we
find Nature unyielding, and in responding to it we are 
created by it. Speaking of Nature Hocking states,
Is not that outer activity then essentially. . . creative of me? My dependence upon Nature,my momentary submission to its independent, obstinate, objective decision of what Fact and Truth shall be, both in principle and in detail:—  is not this a finding of my own mind? It is here,in this momentary (as well as permanent) creation of my Self that I begin, I say to find Nature taking on the aspect of an Other Mind.^
Hocking carries this argument a step further when he adopts
the position that this creative influence of Nature upon
^Ibld.. p. 283.
^Ibld., p. 284.
^Ibld., pp. 286, 287.
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men is intentional. He writes of the "Other Mind . . .
1which is there actively and intentionally creating me."
Nature "is found as an intentional communication of a
2Self wholly active." In this latter quotation, Hocking
leaves the impression that he is drawing a distinction
between Nature and the Self who communicates through it.
Nature does not seem to be the "Self" but rather the
communication of or from the "Self" who is Other Mind.
This position is verified when Hocking states that "God
. , . is immediately known, and permanently known, as
the Other Mind which in creating Nature is also creating
m e . In creating us God is that Self or Other Mind who
is wholly active in and through Nature. In this respect 
4God Is Subject and as such may be regarded as personal.
In additional reference to God and his relationship 
to the world, Hocking relates that God must be under­
stood as supplying the unity of the world, but this unity 
must be recognized for what it really is, namely a 
personal world unity.
There is neither merit nor truth in rarefying the thought of God; nor in presenting him to our conceptions in terms of some thinner and weaker sort of world-unity easier to image and believe in than a personal world-unity.-5
^Ibid., p. 294. ^Ibid., p. 296.
. P- 295. ^Ibid., p. 334.
^Ibid., p. 297.
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Thus Hocking presents God as personal not only in terms
of his relationship to men, hut also in terms of his
relationship to the world as a whole.
We are now able, after this discussion, to return
to our question: does Hocking regard the world as God's
body? The answer, we believe, must be in the negative.
Hocking speaks of God as the Other Mind who communicates
through Nature, rather than being Nature, as the Other
Mind which, in creating Nature (rather than being Nature)
is also creating men. That God is undoubtedly related
in some intimate manner with the world we do not deny;
we have already recognized that he is the personal world-
unity, and also in some manner "includes" the finite
existents. That he is related to the world is obvious;
that the world is God's body does not necessarily follow.
But does our admission that God in some sense includes
the finite existents not amount also to a concession
that the world is God's body? No, because the "inclusion"
of which Hocking speaks is a noetic rather than spatial
relationship; God "includes" the finite existents as he
reflects upon them. Lest this be insufficient to establish
our point, we refer to Hocking's own explicit statement
that, in discussing the nature of God, "We are baffled and
not foolishly by the absence of a body that we can
1attribute to God , . . ." We must therefore conclude
^Ibid.. p. 332.
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that the world is not God's body; we do not thereby deny 
God's intimate relationship with the temporal process. 
Indeed, Hocking insists upon it.
At this point two further questions may be raised:
(1) Since God is the personal world-unity in intimate 
relation with Nature, does God himself undergo change as 
the world does so? And (2) in conjunction with this, may 
God be regarded as finite? With reference to both questions 
Hocking is very explicit in his response and answers in 
the negative in each instance. He writes that while it 
is true that men have unlimited co-operation with God 
in world-making, this does not hold true "in ultimate 
God-making. The religious object offers that identity 
without which creative freedom itself would, lack, for us, 
all meaning." Men do not help create or change God;
God is the abiding identity behind the ever-changing 
world. This language, of course, coincides*with that 
which describes God as the personal world-unity. Else­
where Hocking raises the question as to whether a develop­
ing God would be sufficient for the world's needs and
2answers emphatically in the negative. From what has 
already been stated, one could justly conclude that the 
answer to the second question has also been given. God 
cannot be regarded as finite. However, such an inference.
^Ibid., p. xvii.
^Ibid., pp. 184 ff.
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while true, is not required since Hocking explicitly
deals with the matter when he accepts the entire justice
1of the contention "that the finite God is of no worth."
The personality of God must be understood as personality
2"whose bonds are broken 'in passing through infinity.'"
If we deny this infinity, the rest must be rejected as
3useless. Thus for Hocking God is neither developing nor 
finite. He is the infinite God who is the permanent 
identity behind the changing world, the personal world- 
unity which can be perceived in and through Nature.
We trust that this brief exposition of booking's con­
cept of God is such that the similarity to and influence 
upon Hartshorne can already be seen. However, we wish to 
conclude this chapter by drawing attention to certain 
specific points.
First, both Hocking and Hartshorne insist that God must 
be absolute in some respect. Hocking argues that God, what­
ever else he is, must also be the Absolute; that is he must 
be not less than the Absolute and, as shown in this expo­
sition, Hocking adopts the position that God is more than 
the Absolute. Hartshorne specifically emphasises that God 
must be more than the Absolute, that is, the Absolute must 
represent only one aspect of God.





is God not in relation to the finite existents. Hocking 
describes God as absolute as "the God who merely 
. , . ," Hartshorne speaks of God in his absolute aspect 
as abstract, Being itself, separate and apart from the 
creatures. In this respect. Hocking speaks of the 
Absolute’s "indifference" and Hartshorne writes of the 
Absolute's being neutral or non-related.
Third, both men concur in their assessment that the 
Absolute in God is compatible with everything or any 
particular thing. For Hocking, the Absolute is com­
patible with every "relative improvement" and every 
"relative danger." For Hartshorne, God's absolute, 
abstract aspect "can be correlated with any possible 
character you please in its correlate, the world."
Fourth, Hocking and Hartshorne adopt similar 
positions with reference to our knowledge of the Absolute. 
Hocking stresses that men can intuitively reach a know­
ledge of the Absolute and that this consciousness of the 
Absolute is what makes the difference in the world. 
Hartshorne agrees. Men do have a knowledge of God as 
absolute; as absolute, God is the object of our awareness. 
By being the object of our awareness, God effects trans­
formation in the contingent existents. Hartshorne, however, 
carries this a step beyond Hocking. Hartshorne argues 
that it is not merely our knowledge of God which is 
constitutive of our being, but rather our knowledge that 
God is aware of us.
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Fifth, both philosophers agree that while God must 
be absolute, he must also be personal. Hocking views 
God as personal insofar as "he is not apart from what he 
has created," God is personal as he is with his creatures 
and, indeed, as he "includes" them through his reflection 
upon them. God is also personal in that he must be 
regarded as Subject who, through Nature, communicates 
with and creates us. The similarity to Hartshorne’s
position is obvious. Hartshorne argues that relations,
including the relation involved in the knowing process, 
contain their terms. Thus he concludes that as God knows
all things so he must include all things; God must be all-
inclusive. (We are not arguing that these positions are 
identical. We have already indicated that Hocking's con­
cept of "inclusion" is not spatial, but noetic). For 
Hartshorne also, it is God as inclusive of the finite 
existents who is personal, himself a temporal succession 
of actual entities. Again, with reference to God as 
personal subject, Hartshorne writes that God in his 
abstract essence is "no actual subject" but in his con­
crete aspect is so.
In all of these points the similarity existing in 
the philosophies of Hocking and Hartshorne is evident. Of 
course, not all of these similarities may be the result 
of Hocking's direct influence upon Hartshorne, but in 
light of Hartshorne's statements to the effect that Hocking
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first introduced him to the concept of God as temporal 
as well as eternal, we deemed it appropriate in this 
research to include Hocking's perspective as a view­
point to which Hartshorne expressed his indebtedness. 
Thus in Hartshorne we find an original thinker in his 
own right influenced— for no man is an island unto him- 
self--by both American idealism and British neo-realism, 
and it may with much justification be argued that Hart­
shorne 's panentheism is in some respects a synthesis 
of both philosophical perspectives.
CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In laying the foundation for our study in the concept 
of God, it was necessary for us to briefly examine the 
metaphysics of the writers discussed. In this research, 
certain common elements were identified in the respective 
metaphysical theories and, on the basis of these common 
elements, a significant conclusion can be drawn: the his­
tory of twentieth century Anglo-American process philosophy 
is the history of a movement involved in philosophical syn­
thesis, a synthesis of realism and idealism.
As noted earlier, the British neo-realists in reject­
ing absolute idealism never fully escaped it. They re­
tained some basic tenets of idealism, among which perhaps 
the most obvious was the retention of "mind" as central to 
their cosmology. This concept, in which "mind" was attri­
buted to all of reality resulted in panpsychism, a common 
trait in Alexander, Morgan and Whitehead. Thus the 
British neo-realists combined their realism with idealism. 
Of course, we are not suggesting that a complete escape 
from idealism was even desired by the neo-realists. On 
the contrary, at least one of them--Whitehead— indicates 
that his philosophy may be considered as "a transformation
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of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic
-Ibasis." Thus at least in Whitehead's case this fusion of 
realism and idealism which resulted in the panpsychistic 
philosophy of organism was a deliberate philosophical syn­
thesis, and tUs synthesis was true of the philosophies of 
all three British neo-realists discussed in this research.
However, we have claimed that this combination of 
realism and idealism was true not only of the British neo­
realists but also of American process philosophy. This 
conclusion is justified not only by the proven influence 
of Whitehead upon Hartshorne, but also by the explicit 
statements of Hartshorne himself. He too stresses the 
centrality of "mind" in his cosmology when he writes,
"Mind in general becomes the theme of which the entire 
universe is a system of variations." This statement is 
made within the context of Hartshorne's argument for pan­
psychism, a position he held in common with- the British 
neo-realists. But Hartshorne, more explicitly than they, 
affirms that panpsychism— normally regarded as a concept 
associated with idealism--can be a wholly "realistic"
3doctrine. This is possible, Hartshorne claims, if pan­
psychism is the necessary conclusion of realistic episte- 
mological premises.^  Hartshorne believes that such is 
the case and regards his own philosophy as one which com-
1Process and Reality, p. viii. 
%an's Vision of God, p . 214.
^Reality as Social Process, p. 73* ^Ibid.
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bines epistemological realism with ontological idealism. 
To this synthesis Hartshorne attributes the description 
of "realistic idealism". Thus in Hartshorne also (as 
representative of American process thought) this philo­
sophical synthesis of realism and idealism can be found. 
This synthesis, as we stated, is a common point in the 
philosophers discussed in this research, an identifying 
trait in Anglo-American process philosophy. We also 
included in this research a brief review of Hocking's 
philosophy and his influence upon Hartshorne, and noted 
there that Hocking also deliberately formulated a view­
point which was a synthesis of idealism and realism.
We therefore suggested that Hartshorne's panentheism 
may best be understood as a synthesis of American ideal­
ism and British neo-realism.
While the process philosophy of panentheism is not 
by any means a majority viewpoint in the religious world, 
thanks to the influential writings of Hartshorne it is a 
perspective which is gaining ground in the United States. 
The philosopher whose impact was undoubtedly greater 
than any other on Hartshorne was Alfred North Whitehead. 
We have argued that while Whitehead was the immediate 
influence on Hartshorne, Whitehead's philosophy was not 
radically novel, but was representative of a particular 
philosophical perspective. This perspective was British
^Ibld.
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neo-realism. Whitehead's influence on Hartshorne, there­
fore, was the influence of not just one man, but rather 
of a philosophical viewpoint shared by others, such as 
Alexander and Morgan. Whitehead's direct influence on 
Hartshorne consequently resulted in an affinity of thought 
in two entire philosophical perspectives, namely British 
neo-realism and American panentheism. It was our pur­
pose in this study in the history of ideas to systematize 
this relationship of thought in these two philosophical 
perspectives more fully than had previously been done, 
and particularly so with reference to the concept of God. 
Our effort therefore has been to concentrate on the con­
cept of God as expounded in British neo-realism and 
American panentheism, explicating the general metaphysi­
cal background where such was beneficial to the under­
standing of the theory of God. In accomplishing our 
purpose, we set forth the metaphysical theories of con­
temporaries of Whitehead on the British philosophical 
scene. We traced an affinity of thought in Alexander's 
theory of correspondence, Morgan's concept of correlation, 
and Whitehead's dipolar theism. Whitehead’s dipolar 
theism, of course, laid the foundation for Hartshorne*s 
panentheism. Thus we have contended that American pan­
entheism shares a relationship of thought not generally 
recognized to the British neo-realism of the early 
twentieth century. In this thesis we have systematically 
set forth this affinity of thought, thus fulfilling our
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purpose.
This similarity of thought is clearly seen in the 
respective concepts of ultimate reality and of God. It 
is extremely significant that in the Anglo-American pro­
cess philosophers discussed in this research, these two 
concepts--ultimate reality and God— are not to be equated 
God is to be understood and defined within the context of 
either something more "ultimate" than himself--such as 
Alexander's Space-Time or Whitehead's creativity--or as 
requiring a necessary co-existent--such as Morgan's basal 
limiting concept of the physical world or Hartshorne's 
temporal actual entities necessary for God's actuality.
We must therefore conclude that in twentieth century 
Anglo-American process thought, God must be regarded as 
finite.^
In conjunction with this, the concept of God in the 
process perspective is deficient in that it-does not ful­
fil the principle of sufficient reason. If God is the 
explanation for the world process, he is not the explana­
tion for the world's existence. Cobb has endeavoured to 
interpret Whitehead in such a way that Whitehead was at
1This conclusion is not nullified by Hocking's view of God as infinite. Hocking is included in this research, not because he was a process philosopher-- for no such claim is being made— but because he in­fluenced Hartshorne in the development of the latter's process perspective of panentheism.
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least moving in the direction of regarding God as the 
cause of the being of the actual occasions,^  and Cobb 
himself wishes to regard God as playing such a role, 
However, even here Cobb concedes that he does not claim 
for God "either eminent reality or necessary existence
pin contrast to contingent existence." Cobb, adopting 
a position seemingly identical to that of Hartshorne, is 
therefore compelled to regard each divine occasion as 
receiving its being from its predecessors through an in- 
finite regress.-^ In this he sees no problem, but we 
feel it necessary to question whether an infinite regress 
of contingent existents is capable of fulfilling the 
principle of sufficient reason. We believe not. Cobb 
is to be commended for recognizing this particular lacuna 
in process philosophy, but given the basic tenets of di­
polar theism, it was perhaps inevitable that his own 
answer would leave the problem unsolved.
While we have been compelled to draw the conclusion 
that process philosophy has certain déficiences, parti­
cularly with reference to its internal coherence, we 
nevertheless acknowledge that the process viewpoint con­
tains some very valuable insights. For example, Hart-
^Cobb, A Christian Natural Theology, pp. 212, 213.
^Ibid., p , 212.
^Ibid.
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shorne's emphasis upon God's love rather than power'is 
significant. It would seem that the "logic of love" 
demands that God really cares for man, "feels" for him 
(though perhaps not in the literal sense Hartshorne in­
tended) and is genuinely related to him. The fact that 
God loves us and suffers with us is surely confirmed in 
the crucifixion of Christ, The cross cries out to us 
that we are loved, cared for, and can he redeemed 
(although Hartshorne seems to have little concept of 
redemption).
Further, the process emphasis upon God's being truly 
related to the world is certainly welcome. In the intro­
duction to this research we argued for the validity of 
metaphysical studies, but in much of metaphysics the con­
cept of God as related to the world is blurred or perhaps 
even lost. Such is not the case in process thought.. The 
relationship of God to the world is constantly affirmed. 
We concur with Hartshorne's rejection of the Greek philo­
sophical view— and its modern counterparts--of a totally 
unrelated and unmoved mover. God must be portrayed as a 
living God.
Again, process thinkers have rendered a service in 
stressing that God's omnipotence must be defined in such 
a way that man's freedom is preserved. We must recognize 
that some things are not subject to power, not even in­
finite power, and that God therefore cannot compel another 
to freely choose a specific course of action. To define
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God’s omnipotence in terms which leave men truly free is 
significant, not least in current discussion concerning 
the problem of evil. Of course such a meaningful defini­
tion of God's omnipotence is not entirely original to 
process theology. Many who do not adopt the process per­
spective have for some time argued that not even God can 
do the "undoable", such as that which is self-contradict­
ory, including God’s compelling men to freely choose a 
specific course of action. Nevertheless, we are grateful 
to process writers for a needed reminder of a valuable 
insight.
Also, Hartshorne's panentheism, with all men as 
constituents of God, causes the American philosopher to 
stress the importance of social justice, human dignity 
and worth. Certainly such concepts are vital to a cultured 
civilization, and yet tragically are still lacking in many 
parts of the world. Hartshorne rightly reminds us of our 
responsibilities to our fellow-men, that we are our 
brother's keeper.
But perhaps as much as anything, the process philo­
sophers and theologians prompt us to be constantly aware 
that we live our lives in the very presence of God.
However, these insights are not exclusive to process 
thought, nor are they dependent upon a panentheistic 
interpretation of the relationship between God and the 
world. In traditional theism, for example, God's love 
is directed towards others who are truly other than God,
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whom God loves in and for themselves and not merely be­
cause they contribute to God as constituents of his being. 
Further, that God is truly related to man is not denied 
by traditional theism. On the contrary, it lies at the 
very heart of the Christian faith that God is the one 
who has revealed himself to men and is thereby truly 
related to them.
In addition, scripture speaks clearly on the need 
for social justice and respect for human dignity. In 
Malachi 2:10 the writer asks, "Have we not all one father? 
Hath not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously 
every man against his brother . . •?" In Biblical the­
ism, social justice and a sense of human worth are called 
for, not because we are all constituent elements within 
the being of God as in panentheism, but because we are 
all creatures of the same God, children of the same father.
As to living our lives in the presence- of God, since 
Biblical times many men have succeeded in doing so, have 
walked with God as it were, separate and apart from any 
acquaintance with process philosophy.
A more traditional theism, then, contains the same 
valuable insights. We are grateful, however, to Hartshorne 
and other process thinkers for reminding us of them.
In conclusion, the history of ideas is the history 
of influence, of action and reaction, suggestion and re­
sponse. It is the history of questions and answers, of 
seeking and finding. It is also the history of what men
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regard as important, as significant. It is therefore 
appropriate that this study in the history of ideas has 
centred upon the concept of God, No more significant 
topic could be discussed, no more important answer 
sought. If therefore we have had occasion to take ex­
ception to some of the conclusions of the process philo­
sophers, we nonetheless thank them for their recognition 
of the momentous nature of the discussion whose Subject 
is the Living God.
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